Suicide as PR

So, it turns out that one of the three detainees who committed suicide at Guantanamo over the weekend was due to be released but had not been told. But if that seems a poignant comment on the whole system of holding prisoners entirely beyond the reach of the law, one can’t help but notice the nonsense it makes of the spin from Karen Hughes’s office on the sorry affair: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Colleen Graffy told the BBC that the suicides were a “good PR move to draw attention” and “a tactic to further the jihadi cause.” Don’t go believing that mushy human-rights hype about people driven to despair — after all, hard-core terrorists are more than happy to give their lives to strike a blow for the cause, aren’t they?

Nice try Colleen — you’re certainly no worse at this stuff than your boss. But do you really expect us to believe that a man who the U.S. had decided to release was also someone who would hang himself to strike a PR blow for the jihadi cause?

Posted in 99c Blogging | 8 Comments

Zarqawi Death Suggests the U.S. Has Brought the Baathists in From the Cold

Late last year, after Musab al-Zarqawi’s group bombed hotels in Jordan, I wrote that the move would widen the rift between Zarqawi and the nationalist-Baathist leadership of the Iraq insurgency. It was already clear back then that the U.S. was negotiating with the latter element, and that these guys would have happily killed Zarqawi themselves as part of any long-term compact.

The Baathists are unlikely to stand by and watch their own interests imperiled by those who would seek to make Iraq a new headquarters for terror attacks across the Middle East. Their objective, after all, is to restore some version of a regime detested by al Qaeda.

And with everyone from Ayman Zawahiri to the Baathists alarmed by his appetite for snuff videos that repulsed even most insurgent sympathizers, and also his strategy of wanton murder of Shiites, he was being increasingly sidelined in the insurgent leadership.

The fact that the U.S. managed to find and kill Zarqawi the day after the new Iraqi government released 2,500 insurgent-sympathizers from prison (they were greeted and given money by leaders of the main Sunni party in parliament), announced a reintegration of Baathists into political society, and appointed a Sunni former Baathist general as defense minister seems to suggest that some sort of deal has been done. Obviously, the elimination of Zarqawi is not going to end the insurgency or stop a civil war. But it may be a sign that the U.S. and its allies in Iraq have reached a new understanding that rehabilitates the Baathists, which would likely split the insurgency and isolate the Qaeda element. Now, the question is whether the U.S. can hold the most powerful Shiite parties on board after tilting its policy back towards the Baathists. Much may depend on the state of play between Washington and Tehran. And on that front, so far so good. (More on this soon.)

Posted in Featured Analysis | 8 Comments

Is Condi Rice Finally Growing Up?


Here’s to Condi…

After five years of impotent hawkish posturing has done nothing to restrain North Korea’s nuclear program, the Bush Administration is finally showing the maturity to admit defeat — by its actions, if not in as many words. It was reported this week that the Administration is planning to offer North Korea direct negotiations over a comprehensive peace treaty — a longstanding demand of Pyongyang’s — if it agrees to return to the Six Party talks over its nuclear program. Not only would that reverse the position adopted at the behest of the hawks (and the occasion of Colin Powell’s first public humiliation as Secretary of State when Bush second-guessed him days after he announced that the new administration would follow the Clinton policy of engagement with North Korea) that no concessions could be offered to North Korea; it also effectively takes regime-change off the table.

The U.S. had no choice, because the policy pushed by the hawks had achieved diddly squat. It had entered the six-party process imagining it was building a diplomatic united front to squeeze North Korea, but instead it created a consensus against its own policies of refusing to negotiate directly with North Korea and offer it security guarantees. The Chinese, Russians and South Koreans shared U.S. concerns over Pyongyang’s nuclear efforts, but they saw Washington’s own hardline positions as part of the problem. Eventually, Beijing made clear that the U.S. would have to engage, or the process would collapse and the U.S. would be blamed.

Credit to the Administration for recognizing it was on a hiding to nothing, and changing course. The hawks led by Cheney and Rumsfeld offered only red-meat rhetoric for the conservative base and self-righteous posturing. Their policy was bankrupt from the get-go, and yet it was Powell who was frozen out and the politically-adolescent Cheney who managed to set the course. When it comes to national security policy, this man has yet to demonstrate an even casual relationship with reality. He doesn’t belong within miles of grownup conversation over how to handle these complex crises. John Wayne was just an actor, Dick.

But having decided to grow up on North Korea, it becomes a matter of urgency that the Administration does the same on Iran. There is simply no logical or coherent argument against holding direct talks with Tehran, and offering it security guarantees as part of a package of incentives, if the objective is to prevent it going nuclear. And just as on North Korea, the Administration may think it’s building a diplomatic united front against Iran, but it’s ignoring the fact that most of its partners in that process don’t share the U.S. appetite for regime change and want it to talk directly with Tehran. Unless the Administration wants to blunder its way into another armed conflict that will — at great cost to life and limb everywhere — hasten the decline of the U.S. strategic position in the world, it needs to fashion a credible diplomatic strategy. Like it appears to be ready to do on North Korea.

And if it’s going to do some growing up, the other area in which its political immaturity has become an exceedingly dangerous thing is its determination to reverse the results of the Palestinian election, even if that means destorying the Palestinian Authority and the lives of many ordinary Palestinians. Jimmy Carter put it more eloquently than I ever could:

Innocent Palestinian people are being treated like animals, with the presumption that they are guilty of some crime. Because they voted for candidates who are members of Hamas, the United States government has become the driving force behind an apparently effective scheme of depriving the general public of income, access to the outside world and the necessities of life.

Overwhelmingly, these are school teachers, nurses, social workers, police officers, farm families, shopkeepers, and their employees and families who are just hoping for a better life…

One clear reason for the surprising Hamas victory for legislative seats was that the voters were in despair about prospects for peace. With American acquiescence, the Israelis had avoided any substantive peace talks for more than five years, regardless of who had been chosen to represent the Palestinian side as interlocutor… There is no doubt that Israelis and Palestinians both want a durable two-state solution, but depriving the people of Palestine of their basic human rights just to punish their elected leaders is not a path to peace.

Their efforts to overthrow the elected Palestinian government by means of a financial blockade are not only starving Palestinians, they are also raising tensions between Palestinian factions to the point that the danger of civil war is more palpable than ever. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, the Palestinians will suffer, Israel will suffer (and it will be forced, as the occupying power, to resume its direct civil administration over Palestinian cities) and the U.S. hopes for ever winning its ideological battle with the Bin Laden worldview will be dead and buried. And yet the Administration seems stuck in its teenage ideological fantasies about being able to remake Palestinian politics to its own specification.

They didn’t like Powell because he was a grownup, warning them of the consequences of pursuing ideological visions with no regard for the realities on the ground. For the same reason they have been ignoring the grownups of Bush’s father’s generation who have been predicting the disasters that the current Bush administration has authored. But the Korea shift suggests they are capable of growing up. And it’s become a matter of life-or-death urgency for much of the planet that they do so as quickly as possible.

Posted in Situation Report | 10 Comments

How Jewish is Israel?


Israel is still largely shaped by the unresolved
trauma of its birth

My favorite Israeli newspaper Haaretz (the best paper in the Middle East, along with Lebanon’s Daily Star) asked me to contribute to a debate in their pages on the question of Jewish identity, sparked by the author A.B. Yehoshua’s recent ruffling of feathers in the U.S. by reiterating the long-time Zionist claim that Jewish identity can’t survive outside of a Jewish state. My own response was to turn the question on its head, and ask whether Israel, in fact, is able to live up to the ethical challenges at the heart of Judaism. Extract:

If we concede A.B. Yehoshua’s claim that Israel is the source of Jewish identity in today’s world, we reduce Jewish identity to a conversation between anti-Semitism and a blood-and-soil nationalism that is Jewish only in the sense that anti-Semites use the term i.e., racial. But if, instead, we define “Jewish” on the basis of the universal ethical challenges at the core of Judaism, then not only is the Diaspora an essential condition of Jewishness, but Israel’s own claim to a Jewish identity is open to question.

The idea that the modern State of Israel expresses some ageless desire among Jews across the Diaspora to live in a Jewish nation state is wishful thinking. Before the Holocaust, Zionism had been a minority tendency among Western Jews, and scarcely existed among those living in the Muslim world. And a half century after Israel’s emergence, most of us choose freely to live, as Jews have for centuries, among the nations. That choice is becoming increasingly popular among Israeli Jews, too: 750,000 at last count – hardly surprising in an age of accelerated globalization that feeds dozens of diasporas and scorns national boundaries.

The State of Israel was created by an act of international law in 1948, largely in response to the Holocaust. It was violently rejected by an Arab world that saw it as a new Western conquest of the territory over which so much blood had been spilled to defend Muslim sovereignty during the Crusades, so like most nation states Israel had to fight its way into existence. Its victory came at the expense of another people, whose dispossession was the precondition for Israel achieving an ethnic Jewish majority. And the conflict fueled by the unresolved trauma of its birth has condemned the Jewish state to behave in ways that mock the progressive Zionist dream of Israel fulfilling the biblical injunction to Jews to be a “light unto the nations.”

Click here to read the full piece.

Posted in A Wondering Jew | 6 Comments

Bend it Like Mahmoud?


Ahmedinajad trains with Iran’s World Cup Squad

Having failed so far to get any traction on efforts to impose sanctions on Iran, frustration is creeping in among some of its foes as they seek new, innovative ways to punish Tehran. And with Iran due to join 31 other teams at the World Cup in Germany in June, some are lobbying FIFA to expel Iran from the tournament. Mercifully, most European leaders have shunned the idea, and FIFA has made clear it’s a non-starter. Because it’s a spectacularly bad idea. Soccer is a source of national pride to Iranians at home and throughout the exile Diaspora, and the World Cup has traditionally presented a challenge to the Mullahs as tens of thousands of young men and women gather in the streets to celebrate their victories in de facto defiance of multiple conservative edicts. As I’ve noted previously, populist hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmedinajad has recognized the appeal of soccer among elements of civil society opposed to the regime, and has even moved to put himself on-side with that trend by attempting to reverse a decades-old religious edict against women attending matches.

Banning Iran from the tournament would probably have the same effect on the citizenry as a military attack would, rallying them behind the regime in response to a national humiliation. (Many Iranians are fed-up with always being cast in the Western media as a terrorist nation, and soccer is one place where they show their true face as a nation looking to participate as equals on a fair basis in the global community.) But that’s not likely.

What I’m worried about is the move to bar Ahmedinajad personally from attending his country’s games. Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel is coming under pressure to use her country’s laws against Holocaust denial to declare him persona non-grata, but that’s a tough call when the person in question is a head of state. She has indicated that only an EU travel ban would make that possible, and that’s very unlikely to occur in time for the World Cup. The Germans are hoping Ahmedinajad gets the message and stays away, warning that he would be called to answer for his positions on Israel and the Holocaust if he shows up. But that may be just the sort of dog-and-pony show you seek if you’re Mahmoud Ahmedinajad and you don’t like the way nuclear negotiations are going between the West and the more pragmatic elements who trump Ahmedinajad in Iran’s power structure. If the search is on for a diplomatic solution, which Ahmedinajad may well seek to sabotage for his own domestic power reasons, then the more prudent approach may simply be to ignore Ahmedinajad if he decides to show up in, uh, Nuremberg, for Iran’s opener against Mexico on June 11.

Posted in Glancing Headers, Situation Report | 6 Comments

U.S. and Gadhafi: Oil is Forgiven


If President Bush’s immigration speech was an attempt to divert attention from his failures in Iraq, then Condi Rice’s announcement this week that the U.S. would restore diplomatic ties with Libya — and that Iran and North Korea should take note — may have been a useful distraction of attention from the fact that in the course of a single week, she’d suffered two significant diplomatic setbacks (on the quest for Iran sanctions and on the attempt to financially throttle the Palestinian Authority). Most of the media seemed to lap up her explanation that Libya had been suddenly cowed by the U.S. invasion of Iraq into renouncing terrorism, WMD and seeking to rehabilitate itself in the international community.

That revisionist account, of course, ignores the fact that Libya had been strenuously attempting to restore ties with the West for more than a decade — that was the intention of all those talks over taking responsibility for Lockerbie, which were mediated by the South Africans in the mid 1990s. Libya had longsince begged off sponsoring terror attacks against the West, although part of the Colonel’s grand ambition to style himself as a Pan-African liberator had seen him back some of the most vicious war criminals (think Charles Taylor or Foday Sankoh) that the continent has ever seen. Yes, it was only in 2003 that Gadhafi declared his nuclear program and shipped it off to Washington. But that simply completed a process that had already begun years before, during the Clinton administration.

What much of the reporting of the story seems to have overlooked, however, is that there was an intense lobbying effort from the mid 1990s onward by the U.S. oil industry to rehabilitate Libya and lift sanctions so that U.S. companies could take the lead in upgrading Libya’s aging infrastructure and get a jump on the competition for drilling rights.

You have to figure that since those days, the oil price has increased four-fold, and consequently the incentive. (The Bush administration has already lifted the sanctions, restoring diplomatic ties is a symbolic icing on the cake.) That’s probably why Gadhafi has been entirely rehabilitated despite being the same old flaky despot he always was. (Ripley’s Believe it Or Not take note: What constitutional leadership position does Gadhafi hold in Libya? That’s right, none at all.) It’s not as if he’s suddenly holding elections or allowing freedom of speech and the press. He’s just become your garden variety friendly oil-autocrat.

And as for Condi saying this is the model for Iran and North Korea, I wonder if that bit of flakkery was run through the “careful of what you wish for” policy test: Libya, in negotiations with the U.S. and others, satisfied Western concerns over terrorism and WMD, and was then rehabilitated to the point of diplomatic relations, i.e. it got security guarantees. Regime-change was taken off the table, even though by Bush’s measure, Gadhafi’s regime is presumably no more legitimate that Ayatollah Khamenei’s. Libya is arguably less democratic than Iran. So, does Rice’s comment suggest that the U.S. is about to take regime-change off the table if the Iranians negotiate in good faith to satisfy Western concerns over nuclear proliferation and terrorism? If so, that would be a dramatic turnabout on the part of the Bush Administration, which rebuffed an Iranian offer to do just that in 2003. Something tells me, though, that it was more likely simply a rhetorical flourish from a Secretary of State whose record suggest she’s a lot better at PR than she is at diplomacy.

Posted in Situation Report | 11 Comments

Hamba Kahle, Ace Ntsoelengoe

If you were a white boy in the suburbs of Cape Town during the heyday of apartheid in the early 1970s, you didn’t know any black people. Not only socially, but even as public figures. That was the whole idea: Apartheid laws meant your school was all white, your suburb was all white (and any black person found there after dark who wasn’t a live-in domestic worker faced summary arrest), your media was all white and told stories only about white people — you were sometimes privy to a bit of a debate about apartheid, but it was conducted exclusively among white people, sometimes around a dinner table where it would be suddenly paused whenever “the maid” walked in bearing another course.

Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and scores of others languished literally on our horizon, Robben Island scarcely visible as you watched the sun set from Milnerton Beach, but you never heard anything about them — I was at university before I even knew who Nelson Mandela was, and I had been a comparatively politically aware adolescent: The media white-out was total.

There were black people all around us, of course. They bore only first names, and they existed only to make our lives more comfortable, cooking, cleaning, doing the garden, working for our parents. Of course there were cool black people elsewhere — Pele and Muhammad Ali, Jimi Hendrix and Sir Garfield Sobers, Link from “Mod Squad” and others — but not in South Africa.

At least, not before Ace Ntsoelengoe, the Kaizer Chiefs attacking midfielder, and his partner in crime, the nimble winger Teenage Dladla — and of course the two great midfield schemers of Soweto in the mid 1970s, Jomo Sono and Computer Lamolo. Wagga-wagga Likoebe, and Chiefs’ legendary Malawian ‘keeper Patson Banda. And a handful of others. The first black people whose full names many of us ever learned (okay, Ace’s real name was Pule, and Teenage’s was Nelson, but their soccer monikers were not English names chosen because their given names were unpronouncable by white people)

Although it frowned upon a game that the likes of Pele, Eusebio, Jairzinho and Garrincha had long ago proved made nonsense of any white supremacist pretenses, the apartheid system nonetheless had its own soccer leagues: A white league in which every Friday night, the likes of Cape Town City and Hellenic would take on Arcadia Shepherds, Durban City (the club that eventually nurtured Liverpool’s own Bruce Grobelaar!) and Highlands Park. Of course the crowds at these games, and those of us who played soccer on the school playground (it was officially discouraged; the only winter games our schools officially sanctioned were rugby and field hockey)were from the politically unreliable (from the regime’s perspective) segments of white society — Brits, Jews, Greeks and Portuguese.

But by around 1974, the regime had heard its death knell tolling in the distance, as the coup in Portugal ended a half century of fascism, and with it the colonial regimes in Mozambique and Angola. White Rhodesia was looking increasingly vulnerable as the Zimbabwean liberation movement picked up its guerrilla campaign. At home, black students were starting to organize themselves and the trade union movement had survived its baptism of fire in the massive Durban strikes of the previous year. One area the regime decided it could afford to experiment was sport, and it began allowing, initially, white and black “national” teams to play against each other, and then eventually the leading white clubs to play against the leading black clubs.

Although Chiefs stuttered the first time, they soon made the Mainstay Cup tie their own, and Ace Ntsoelengoe — who could do things with the ball none of us had ever seen before, score thirty yard screamers, lobs and curlers from tight angles, or waltz through a defense with the ball glued to his foot before strolling it into an empty net, was the player you wanted to be.

In one of the more bizarre and largely unnoticed moments in the annals of international football, Argentina in 1976 sent their national squad — under the banner of an “Invitation XI” to beat the Fifa ban which at that stage prevented teams, but not individuals, from playing in South Africa — that was how I got to see Kevin Keegan and Mick Channon turn out for Cape Town City in 1978. They played against South Africa’s first ever “Multiracial” national team, turned out in Springbok green, with equal (rather than proportional) representation of white, coloured and African players. (These days, curiously enough, a national team selected purely on merit would have six or seven Coloured players — not bad for a minority that comprises significantly less than 10 percent of the population, but again, that’s another story.)

It was to be Ace’s only opportunity to represent his country, or at least his idea of what his country should be, and he revelled in it. The Argentines may have won the World Cup two years later, but they were hammered 5-1 in South Africa — and four of those goals were scored by Ace.

He played abroad, of course, many many seasons with the Minnesota Kicks in the now defunct North American Soccer League. In those days, there were no African players in any of the European leagues — hardly any European players played outside their home countries until some time in the 1980s, and even then it was initially mostly a case of a handful of galacticos playing in Italy. I won’t make extravagant claims for what Ace might have achieved in Europe, but I suspect he’d have been magic.


Another goal for the Minnesota Kicks

But Ace was a double victim of apartheid: He was oppressed as a black person with no rights, living the same reality those ruled by far-off European countries in the colonial era — except that the rulers were a stone’s throw away. Black people were effectively excluded from all power, and forced to contend with a legal structure that deemed them fit to live in the white-dominated urban space only to the extent that they were able to serve the needs of white people. And when they challenged those power arrangements, they were viciously suppressed — most graphically during the Soweto uprising of 1976.


The lifeless body of 13-year-old Hector Petersen, the first of many Sowetans shot dead by police, is carried away on June 16, 1976

Ace and his fellow soccer stars were part of a people struggling against vicious odds to be free. And he paid a price for that struggle, in that the FIFA ban — necessary to help isolate the apartheid regime — also meant that he would never get the opportunity to shine on the international stage as every coach, player and pundit in South Africa knew he would if given the chance.

Ace was not a political activist, yet by his very existence as an icon of a new form of urban African existence, he was innately subversive to the apartheid order. If the apartheid idea was that black people would not have any presence or identity in the city except to work for white people, then the emergence of Ace and his contemporaries as the first generation of urban black celebrities in South Africa (recognizable across social boundaries), using their skills and talents to enrich themselves or (more likely) black club owners was a negation of the very basis of apartheid’s version of black identity as a rural, tribal phenomenon.

Ace and his contemporaries were hip and styling, and their game spoke of an attitude of freedom, creativity and power. Whether intending to or not, they were social role models for thousands of city-born black kids who took their destiny into their own hands starting with the 1976 uprising.

The regime may have hoped that allowing black soccer to flourish was a “safety valve,” but instead it helped cultivate the urban black civil society that tilted decisively, and across all classes, to the liberation movement. I’ll never forget the adrenalin rush I felt in 1988, watching the Mainstay Cup Final on television. It was the height of the State of Emergency, and all open political activity had been crushed. Many of my closest friends and comrades were in prison or had been forced into exile, I was living in hiding and had mentally compiled an extensive reading list that I hoped would help wile away the years I was expecting to spend behind bars. It was a dark and gloomy time, and liberation seemed decades away, along a road that involved much pain and suffering.

And yet here, on live television with a crowd of around 50,000 turned out to watch Chiefs and Swallows (if I remember correctly), the head of the football federation was making a speech setting out the democratic demands of the movement, the black-green-and-gold flag of the ANC was fluttering in the bright sunshine even though flying it carried a prison sentence, and the tears rolled freely down my cheeks as the crowd rose, fists in the air to sing our national anthem, Nkosi Sikelel i’Afrika. I knew in that moment that the regime had lost. Whatever it did to the activists of the political movement, the regime could not reverse the gains we had made in civil society. Maybe it wasn’t going to be decades, after all. And it was obvious not only in the flags and songs: As I remember it, that day the Chiefs lineup included Gary Bailey in goals, Jimmy “Brixton Tower” Joubert at the heart of defense and Neil Tovey in the midfield, while Swallows included striker Noel Cousins — all talented white boys who were now playing for Soweto clubs. Here was the future which Ace, in his unassuming way, had helped inaugurate.

While Jomo Sono may have gone on to manage the national team and create a franchise out of himself and his team, Ace was all quiet grace, letting his game do the talking. He was, in every sense, a natural, and spent the post apartheid years of his retirement coaching the next generation at Chiefs.

And so, a little weepy, here in Brooklyn New York, I’ll put some old Soul Brothers in the i-Pod, and think about what might have been, and what was. Hamba Kahle, Ace, as we used to say in farewell to the comrades slain by the regime, those who would never see the freedom for which they gave their lives. Go safely. You scored some memorable goals, but none more so than the freedom and dignity of your people — all of us.

Posted in From Tony's Archive, Glancing Headers, The Whole World's Africa | 29 Comments

Behind Ahmedinajad’s Letter


You don’t see much of this man in the Western media,
but Hassan Rohani speaks for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
the man who actually rules Iran. Rohani is promoting
a negotiating agenda quite different from Ahmedinajad’s —
and he has the blessing of his boss

As we’ve been saying for a while now, President Mahmoud Ahmedinajad does not speak for the regime in Tehran. So what, then, to make of his rambling 18-page letter to President Bush?

The most notable thing about Ahmedinajad’s letter was not that it was the first communication between Iranian leaders and the U.S. since 1979, but that it was the first public communication between Tehran and Washington since the hostage crisis. It was less significant for its content — a longwinded scolding of the Bush administration that could be bluntly translated as “here’s why we think you suck” — than the fact that Ahmedinajad sent it, and in grandstanding fashion. All previous attempts by Iran to engage the U.S. have been delivered discreetly via back channels, and Iran has long maintained a preference for secret talks to manage the relationship. Ahmedinajad would have no role in such negotiations, which would have to involve emissaries answerable to and speaking for the executive branch in Tehran, which is not Ahmedinajad but Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Given his previous inclination to scupper such rapproachment between the regime in Tehran and the West — but also the populist instinct he has displayed by his efforts to buck the clerics by allowing women into soccer matches — I’d say that Ahmedinajad is acting to preempt a far more serious negotiating initiative from Tehran.

TIME carries an op ed written by Hassan Rohani, the Supreme Leader’s representative on the National Security Council that does just that, offering a negotiated solution on the issues of concern over Iran’s program. There’s not all that much new, although Iran is moving towards acceptance of a suspension of enrichment activities in some way. (Tehran’s bottom line, at least going into negotiations, appears to be that while it will come to some arrangement to have nuclear fuel supplied from outside, it insists on maintaining a research facility — a position the U.S. and Britain have rejected on the grounds that it allows Iran to refine its enrichment know-how, and also that it creates a pretext for importing technologies that could be diverted for a bomb program. But Iran hopes to overcome those objections by submitting all of its actitivies to an even stricter inspection regime than is currently in place.)

The Iranians appear to be moving in to a diplomatic space left vacant by the fact that the Bush administration has no coherent or credible policy on resolving the crisis without going to war. Bush insists he favors “diplomacy,” but he does not use the word in the conventional sense: Despite growing calls from European allies and even senior leaders of his own party in Washington, Bush steadfastly refuses to actually talk to Iran at all. Instead, by “diplomacy,” he means talking to allies in the hope of persuading them to back economic, and eventually military action against Iran unless it buckles to U.S. demands on the nuclear issue. The reason for this bizarre position is that the administration actually favors a policy of “regime-change” in Iran, and believes that talking to Tehran would therefore legitimize the regime. Even more seriously, of course, the premise of a diplomatic solution would require that Washington give Tehran security guarantees, undertaking on a treaty basis or something close to that to refrain from attacking the regime. And Bush, clinging to the adolescent revolutionary fantasy that he can transform those parts of the world that he doesn’t like by “moral clarity” and sheer force of will, is not prepared to go there. (Will somebody please remind these Reagan-wannabes that for all his “moral clarity,” President Reagan went further than any of his predecessors in actually engaging with Moscow, reducing tension and cutting missile fleets — to the alarm of the neocons at the time — in a way that helped ensure a climate in which the Soviet Union’s own leaders could acknowlede the longstanding decrepitude of their system and begin to dismantle it.)

The problem, of course, is that nobody in the international community, with the possible exception of the increasingly deranged and therefore unpredictable Tony Blair, backs the regime change agenda. (I’d suspect that even Israel would be cautious on this score — in a comment that got no play in the U.S. media at all, the head of Israel’s security service, Yuval Diskin, said recently that Israel would come to regret the overthrow of Saddam Hussein for the instability it has wrought.) Russia and China are leading the charge at the Security Council against any resolution that sets Iran up for sanctions or war over the nuclear issue, but Germany has also made clear that it expects the U.S. to talk to Iran. Continental Europe wants a diplomatic solution, here — Blair was even moved to fire his own foreign secretary, Jack Straw, for ruling out military action. (Straw had told the British cabinet that military action against Iran would be illegal, although Blair appears to have wholeheartedly embraced the cavalier contempt for international law of his captain in Washington.) On the difference between Europe and the U.S. over Iran, I’d venture to suggest that if the options were boiled down to military action or acceptance of a nuclear-armed Iran, most of the Europeans would learn to live with the latter.

The point, though, is that the Bush administration is offering nothing by way of diplomatic initiatives; only a march in the direction of war. Diplomacy is about seeking common ground, finding solutions short of warfare on the grounds that war will be more costly to both sides. But it is also a theater of struggle, in which each side seeks to win allies and to peel away or neutralize the allies of its adversary. And here, it’s plain to see that the passive-aggressive position of the U.S. is going to be the loser if Iran now steps forward with a diplomatic initiative that offers hope to the Europeans and others that the matter can be settled without a confrontation.

An Iranian negotiating initiative now — probably using Germany as the interlocutor — will probably not win over the Bush administration, because the Iranians seek to continue uranium-enrichment, at least in a research setting. But it’s far from clear that the U.S. and Britain can win the day on that issue. (Germany indicated a willingness to deal on that basis when Russia first floated it.) More importantly, however, if the U.S. maintains its static position on negotiations, the Iranian initiative could leave it increasingly isolated.

Posted in Featured Analysis, Situation Report | 6 Comments

Iran’s Girls of Summer


Iranian women recently cheering on their women’s
national soccer team in a match against Germany

President Mahmoud Ahmindenajad may be a hardline hawk and who spends much of his time constructing political messages that challenge Iran’s ruling Mullahs from the nationalist right, but he also clearly has a populist’s touch rather than the heavy hand of a clerical conservative. That much was clear recently when he shocked Iran’s clerical establishment by reversing a decades-old decree banning women from attending male soccer matches. Not even his reformist predecessor Mohammed Khatami was so bold as to challenge the Mullahs on that one, yet it displayed Ahmedinajad’s keen sense of the popular sentiment. Iranian women have chafed under those restrictions, and this being a World Cup year, allowing them into soccer stadiums is a smart move. Iran is going to the World Cup in Germany, and on previous occasions their performances have drawn tens of thousands of young men and women onto the streets of Tehran to celebrate — much to the chagrin of the Mullahs, whose harsh responses turned those soccer celebrations into de facto protests against the regime. Ahmedinajad is smart enough to read the winds, and make sure he’s positioning himself on the right side of popular sentiment.

Which is also what he’s doing on the nuclear issue, although there he’s also doing his best to whip up emotions in the hope of denying his more pragmatic rivals the space to engineer compromises with the West. That the Bush administration has failed to grasp the impact of its saber-rattling on the nuclear issue is plain to see: Anyone who sees Iran through anything other than the neocon-Likud prism knows that the confrontation is actually entrenching the power of the most hardline and retrograde elements in the regime, and launching a war (which is what a “surgical” strike on its nuclear facilities will certainly do, whatever the wishful fantasies of the Washington hawks may lead them to believe) will delay the onset of a more liberal democratic order in Iran by decades. Don’t take it from me, listen to Shirin Ebadi, the Nobel Peace Prize winning liberal jurist and dissident, who has repeatedly warned that an attack on Iran will rally the population behind the regime.

But Ahmedinajad’s liberalization of the rules governing attendance at soccer matches points to another foolish mistake currently being considered by the U.S. and its European allies: Banning President Ahmedinajad from attending the World Cup. Ahmedinajad is planning to attend a few games, and there’s not much Germany can do to stop him being there as a head of state. But those frustrated at their failure to get UN Security Council endorsement for any kind of sanctions against Iran are now hoping to resort instead to such symbolic sanctions — indeed, an EU-wide travel ban on Iran’s leaders might be the only way for Germany to stop Ahmedinajad showing up.

Something tells me, though, that a nation that has rallied behind its leadership on the nuclear issue out of national pride is not going to take kindly to having its president barred from watching the national team play in the World Cup. Were that to happen, it wouldn’t surprise me to see Tehran decide to withdraw its team from the World Cup altogether – a devastating blow to the young people of Iran who simply want to see their country assume its place in the international community, but on the basis of retaining its pride and dignity. But were that to happen, would they blame their leaders’ nuclear stance, or the West? And would it strengthen or weaken President Ahmedinajad, latterday patron of a woman’s right to enjoy a good game of footie?

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Roasting Bush, Shaming the Media


Colbert: Dirty work, but somebody has to do it

The media furor over whether Comedy Central’s conservative talking head-impersonator Stephen Colbert’s sharp-elbowed humor roasting President Bush at the White House Correspondents Dinner (video link here) was funny or not seems to miss the point. And as my colleague Jim Poniewozik points out, much of it has been focused on the question of whether he made the room laugh.

Of course he didn’t. They giggled uncomfortably now and then, less and less certain each time as Bush became more and more visibly uncomfortable. And that’s because the joke was on the media as much as on the President. Colbert was funny, but it was angry humor. What Comedy Central has done, through Jon Stewart and Colbert, is challenge the anasthetic role played by much of the U.S. media in contemporary American politics. Remember Jon Stewart going on CNN’s Crossfire and savaging the show’s role in substituting substantial political debate on issues that will affect millions of lives into a kind of Punch & Judy vaudeville? (If you don’t, here’s the video clip.) Colbert simply took it to the next level.

No event captures the pathos of the media’s relationship with power than the White House correspondents’ dinner, at which the President mocks himself and invites ridicule from the gathered media professionals that he and his administration spends all year treating as apprentices and stenographers. Just as carnival in the Caribbean was a pantomime subversion of race/class relations — the slaves got to play at being master for a day — so is the White House Correspondents Dinner a pantomime subversion of the real order of things.

The reason the “room” got so uncomfortable at Colbert’s merciless roast is that he was disrupting the chummy bonhomie of the White House-media relationship, in which the administration offers journalists the illusion of being treated as “insiders” in exchange for what in political terms we might call a “loyal opposition” posture. Colbert bust loose and began drawing attention to the things outside of this clubby relationship for which the administration ought to be held account. In the process, he was drawing attention, also, to a job that most of the U.S. media doesn’t do, because its relationship with power precludes that. To challenge Bush directly, to interrupt him when he is spewing unintelligible doggerel (reminiscent of the cartoon character Beavis saying “uh, heheheh, words and stuff, heheh” when he was at a loss) and say “You haven’t answered the question, here it is again” — as the Irish journalist Carole Coleman did in perhaps the only challenging interview of his presidency, and earning the eternal outrage of the White House — if you did that here, you’d lose access. And access is everything. Supposedly. So if any journalist from a mainstream American news organization did what Coleman did and got frozen out by the White House, they’d be of no use to their news organization — supposedly. I wouldn’t blame individual journalists for the extent to which the White House has managed to force the media into retreat from fulfilling its proper function in a democracy.

At least in Britain, when a politician doesn’t answer a question, it’s asked again. He or she will obviously evade again, but at least by doing that the journalist alerts the public to the fact that the politician is ducking the question, rather than remaining silent which unfortunately has the effect of suggesting the reporter is content with the answer. (Journalists do this all the time with the White House Press Secretary, there’s no reason it shouldn’t be done to the President — and the fact that he’d be angry is the worst possible reason for not doing it.)

Colbert’s impact on that room, then, was to make the guests a little uncomfortable about the relationship that binds them to the hosts. Which is exactly what we ought to expect from a good comedian in that situation. Just as we should expect our media to routinely roast those in power, pulling no punches. Making the President feel uncomfortable is not a comedian’s job; it’s the media’s job. As Hunter S. Thompson used to say, “dirty work, but somebody has to do it.”

Posted in 99c Blogging | 2 Comments