Iraq and U.S. Faith in Violence

Guest Column: Alastair Crooke: Although there are different ideas about how and when to use it, there is, I think, a consensus in Washington on the idea that by applying its overwhelming advantage in military force, the U.S. can do good in the world. It can make the world a better place through the transformative impact of violence, in the way that the violence of the hero in a Hollywood movie “cleanses” the world of incorrigible evil.

I didn’t get a chance to get into this question in my fifth anniversary of the Iraq war piece, but I believe that an innate faith in the transformative power of military violence as a legitimate and effective tool of social engineering underlay the whole project. That, and the sermonizing of the arch ideologue of an armed Orientalism, Bernard Lewis, to the effect that violence is the only language Arabs understand — and, of course, Lewis is still called to brief the White House from time to time, even as America flails in a qaugmire into which he urged it.

It has always struck how Bush Administration sounded like Bolsheviks, rationalizing the trauma to which they were going to subject the Iraqis on the basis that this was good for them, that it was the necessary “surgery” to repair Iraq and make it well again. Condi Rice, exposed in recent writing as fatally lightweight, preferred, three years later, to hew to Engels’ notion that revolutionary violence was part of the “midwiving” of a new, and universally beneficial society waiting to be born — the Israel bombing of Beirut that killed hundreds of Lebanese was, she memorably proclaimed, “the birth pangs of a new Middle East.” Their advocacy of violence, as David Bromwich points out, is always couched in cute euphemisms of progress, which are eagily swallowed by the media — “regime-change,” say.

Anatol Lieven wrote an interesting op ed in today’s FT about why he fears a McCain presidency, precisely because he finds the Arizona senator to be the candidate most wedded to a belief in dealing violently with those who stand in America’s way. (It has struck me for a while, now, that while the abuses McCain suffered in captivity at the hands of the Vietnamese are widely discussed in the U.S., there’s precious little discussion over just what it was that he doing over their skies before he was shot down.)

Wanting more discussion on this question, it was with great pleasure that I received a guest column from Alastair Crooke, the Conflict Forum founder who once served as EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana’s Middle East adviser, and who has written forcefully and eloquently on the need for the West to begin engaging with the Islamists it prefers to ignore. (He sent this piece after it had appeared in the Guardian, if it seems familiar.) He argues that a dangerous myth persists that remaining resolute in a commitment to violence in the name of progress, the West can protect its values in the face of a mythological “Islamic” onslaught. Also, read his excellent critique of the “new orientalism” that underlines Western approaches to dealing with the Middle East.

The Armchair Warriors are Fighting a Delusional War

Calls for the west to use force to restore its values in the face of radical Islam reveal a profound detachment from reality

By Alastair Crooke

The French philosopher Michel Foucault notes that in all societies discourse is controlled – imperceptibly constrained, perhaps, but constrained nonetheless. We are not free to say exactly what we like. The norms set by institutions, convention and our need to keep within the boundaries of accepted behaviour and thought limit what may be touched upon. The Archbishop of Canterbury experienced the backlash from stepping outside these conventions when he spoke about aspects of Islamic law that might be imported into British life.

Once, a man was held to be mad if he strayed from this discourse – even if his utterings were credited with revealing some hidden truth. Today, he is called “naive”, or accused of having gone “native”. Recently, the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi) marshalled former senior military and intelligence experts in order to assert such limits to expression by warning us that “deference” to multiculturalism was undermining the fight against Islamic “extremism” and threatening security.

Former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, in a recent interview with a German magazine, embellished Rusi’s complaints of naivety and “flabby thinking”. Radical Islam won’t stop, he warned, and the “virus” would only become more virulent if the US were to withdraw from Iraq.

The charge of naivety is not limited to failing to understand the concealed and duplicitous nature of Hamas and Hizbullah, Iran and Syria; it extends to not grasping the true nature of the wider “enemy” the west is facing. “I don’t like the term ‘war on terror’ because terror is a method, not a political movement; we are in a war against radical Islam,” says Kissinger. But who or what is radical Islam? It is those who are not “moderates”, he explains. Certainly, a small minority of Muslims believe that only by “burning the system” can a fresh stab at a just society be made. But Kissinger’s definition of “moderate” Islam sounds no more than a projection of the Christian narrative after Westphalia, by which Christianity became a private matter of conscience, rather than an organisational principle for society.

If radical Islam, with which these experts tell us we should be at war, encompasses all those who are not enamoured of secular society, and who espouse a vision of their societies grounded in the values of Islam, then these experts are advocating a war with Islam – because Islam is the vision for their future favoured by many Muslims.

Mainstream Islamists are indeed challenging western secular and materialist values, and many do believe that western thinking is flawed – that the desires and appetites of man have been reified into representing man himself. It is time to re-establish values that go beyond “desires and wants”, they argue.

Many Islamists also reject the western narrative of history and its projection of inevitable “progress” towards a secular modernity; they reject the western view of power-relationships within societies and between societies; they reject individualism as the litmus of progress in society; and, above all, they reject the west’s assumption that its empirical approach lends unassailability and objective rationality to its thinking – and universality to its social models.

People may, or may not, agree, but the point is that this is a dispute about ideas, about the nature of society, and about equity in an emerging global order. If western discourse cannot step beyond the enemy that it has created, these ideas cannot be heard – or addressed. This is the argument that Jonathan Powell made last week when he argued that Britain should understand the lessons of Northern Ireland: we should talk to Islamist movements, including al-Qaida. It has to be done, because the west needs to break through the fears and constraints of an over-imagined “enemy”.

Camouflaged behind a language dwelling exclusively on “their” violence and “their” disdain for rationality, these “realists” propose not a war on terror, nor a war to preserve “our values” – for we are not about to be culturally overwhelmed. No Islamist seriously expects that a “defeated” west would hasten to adopt the spirit of the Islamic revolution.

No, the west’s war is a military response to ideas that question western supremacy and power. The nature of this war on “extremism” became evident when five former chiefs of defence staff of Nato states gathered at a think-tank in Washington earlier this year. Their aim was not to query the realism of a war on ideas, but to empower Nato for an “uncertain world”.

“We cannot survive … confronted with people who do not share our values, who unfortunately are in the majority in terms of numbers, and who are extremely hungry for success,” Germany’s former chief of defence staff warned. Their conclusion was that the security of the west rests on a “restoration of its certainties”, and on a new form of deterrence in which enemies will find there is not, and never will be, a place in which they feel safe.

The generals concluded that Nato should adopt an asymmetrical and relentless pursuit of its targets regardless of others’ sovereignty; to surprise; to seize the initiative; and to use all means, including the nuclear option, against its enemies.

In Foucault’s discourse, he identified a further group of rules serving to control language: none may enter into discourse on a specific subject unless he or she is deemed qualified to do so. Those, like the archbishop, who penetrate this forbidden territory – reserved to security expertise – to ask that we see the west for what it has become in the eyes of others, are liable to be labelled as naively weakening “our certainties” and undermining national resolve.

But do we, who are brushed out of this discourse by the blackmail of presumed expertise, really believe them? Do we really believe, after so much failure, that Islamist alternative ideas will be suppressed by a Nato plunged into an asymmetrical warfare of assassinations and killings? The west’s vision for society holds power only so long as people believe it holds power. Do we really think that if force has not succeeded, that only more and greater force can restore belief in the western vision? If that is the limit to western thinking, then it is these “realists”, these armchair warriors fighting a delusional war against a majority who “do not share our values”, who are truly naive.

Posted in Guest Columns, Situation Report | 14 Comments

Yummy yummy Umami

Having observed the martyrdom of my favorite Nazarene Jewish revolutionary of yore with the customary roast leg of lamb (incisions stuffed with garlic and rosemary) last weekend, I arrived home Sunday night with a lamb bone with a few scraps of meat left on it. So, popped that in a stock pot, with a couple of onions, a carrot, some salt and about a liter of water, and boiled it down for a few hours, till the bones were bleached and the meat could be scraped away from them, to melt in your mouth. Stored in the fridge overnight, removed fat layer the next evening.

Soaked a cup of navy beans the next day, then boiled for two hours with salt and kombu (to remove the wind factor).

At the same time, in a saucepan, sauted two small onions, lots of garlic, fennel seeds, a tin of diced tomatoes and a cup of chicken stock, with dried thyme and basil. After about a half hour, added the lamb stock/bones/meat, and a bit of water. Made a lovely ragout, to which I then added the beans, sauteed some kale in garlic and chile flakes, and served with rice.

A delicious stew that cost very little, made full use of leftovers (with attendant righteousness), and, most importantly, was absolutely delicious. Really hard to stop eating, a distinct, indescribable tang that was about a lot more than the tomato.

Trying to figure it out, I remembered this excellent radio insert on NPR recently about umami, the fifth taste added by Japanese researchers to the traditional quartet of sweet, sour, salty and bitter. NPR was trying to get to the root of what made things umami, that absolutely delicious can’t stop taste of, say, Miso soup. Or soy sauce. And the answer their subjects came up with was glutamates — one source of which was the extended boiling of meat bones.

From what I tasted tonight, I’d say they’re onto something.

Posted in Cuisine | 8 Comments

Iraq War Honor Roll


Salute Juan Cole, not Ken Pollack or Fred Kagan

Amid the disastrous manner in which most of the American media aquitted itself in enabling the Iraq war, and then for months after exulting in its “successful” execution until the insurgency took hold, there were a number of honorable exceptions. And Tom Engelhardt, whose web site TomDispatch remains an honorable exception in a media world that has long abandoned deep, critical thought, offers this great list as part of the intro to Greg Mitchell’s critical examination of Iraq war coverage. I was meaning to do something like this myself, but I’ll rely on Tom!

He begins by noting the New York Times’ pathetic attempt to assess the war last Sunday:

Just imagine: You run a flagship national newspaper, the New York Times. It’s the fifth anniversary of President Bush’s catastrophic invasion of Iraq. Your own record of reportage in the period leading up to the invasion was not exactly sterling. So, for a change of pace, you decide to turn most of your double op-ed page in your Sunday “Week in Review” over to people who can look back thoughtfully on the misapprehensions of that moment.

But who? Now, that’s a tough one. You want “nine experts on military and foreign affairs” who can consider “the one aspect of the war that most surprised them or that they wished they had considered in the prewar debate.” Hmm, sounds like an interesting idea. Of course, one option would be to gather together an involved crew who, even before the invasion began, saw in one way or another that problems, possibly disaster, lay ahead. That would be a logical thought?

?But it wouldn’t be the Times, which this past Sunday chose to ask a rogue’s gallery of “experts” who led (or cheerled) us deep into the war and occupation what surprised them most. Leading off those pages were Richard Perle, nicknamed “the Prince of Darkness,” L. Paul Bremer III, the former American viceroy of Baghdad, who so brilliantly disbanded the Iraqi Army and much of the country as well, not to speak of invasion and occupation cheerleaders Frederick Kagan, Danielle Pletka, and Kenneth M. Pollack. With the exception of Pollack, all of them unsurprisingly pointed the finger elsewhere or claimed they were really on the mark all along.

So, just in case the Times has a sudden, bizarre urge on some future anniversary to ask a cast of characters who didn’t drive us into the nearest ditch to look back, it seems worthwhile to start on a list of suggestions for its editors.

He salutes Mitchell’s own efforts at Editor and Publisher, then adds the following list:

My list would be long indeed, but it would certainly include: the Knight Ridder (now McClatchy) reporters Warren Stroebel and Jonathan Landy in Washington, as well as Tom Lasseter, Hannah Allam, and others in Iraq who never had a flagship paper to show off their work, but generally did far better reporting than the flagship papers; Seymour Hersh, who simply picked up where he left off in the Vietnam era (though this time for the New Yorker); Riverbend, the young Baghdad blogger who gave us a more vivid view of the occupation than any you could ordinarily find in the mainstream media (and who has not been heard from since she arrived in Syria as a refugee in October 2007); Jim Lobe who covered the neocons like a blanket for Inter Press Service; independents Nir Rosen and Dahr Jamail, as well as Patrick Cockburn of the British Independent, who has been perhaps the most courageous (or foolhardy) Western reporter in Iraq, invariably bringing back news that others didn’t have; the New York Review of Books, which stepped into some of the empty print space where the mainstream media should have been (with writers like Mark Danner and Michael Massing) and was the first to put into print in this country the Downing Street Memo, in itself a striking measure of mainstream failure; and Juan Cole, whose Informed Comment website was so on the mark on Iraq that reporters locked inside the Green Zone in Baghdad read it just to keep informed.

Amen to that. But as Bill Moyers noted a while back, having been wrong about Iraq has hardly been a handicap for the career of most of the “pundits” preferred by the mainstream media. Frankly, looking at the career trajectories of the likes of Bill Kristol, Max Boot, Charles Krauthammer, Peter Beinart and George Packer, I’d say that, if anything, having been wrong about Iraq appears to be something of a job-requirement in the mainstream punditocracy.

Posted in 99c Blogging | 10 Comments

Spare Us More ‘Globalization & Football’


Cote D’Ivoire vs. Egypt

The globalization of football is a fascinating topic that shapes the way the game is played, today, and offers interesting pointers on questions of identity, nation, corporations etc. But there’s nothing quite as irritating as the efforts of globalization wonks to graft extraneous analyses onto the game, in order to illustrate their points about the economic and political strategies they’re promoting. The apotheosis of this unforunate habit was Franklin Foer’s “How Soccer Explains Globalization,” which contained some really good, and some really bad football journalism, cobbled together under the absurd rubric of a general theory of globalization.

But I found another example today in Beirut’s Daily Star — Dani Rodrik’s argument that Egypt’s African Cup of Nations win shows that teams with a strong domestic league do best in international competition. I have no quarrel with the broader point he’s trying to illustrate, i.e. that counries with a strong domestic economy do best in a globalized economy. It’s the football analogy that is just plain wrong. Here’s the nut of his argument:

…the winner of the cup was not Cameroon or Cote d’Ivoire or any of the other African teams loaded with star players from European leagues, but Egypt, which fielded only four players (out of 23) who play in Europe.

By contrast, Cameroon, which Egypt defeated in the final, featured just a single player from a domestic club, and 20 from European clubs. Few Egyptian players would have been familiar to Europeans who watched that game, but Egypt played much better and deserved to win. Nor was it a fluke: Egypt is consistently the most successful national team in the Africa Cup tournament, winning it five times previously.

The lesson is not that embracing globalized soccer is a bad thing. If that were the key to Egypt’s success, Sudan, which has no players in Europe, would have done well. Instead, Sudan (along with Benin) was the tournament’s least successful team, losing all three games that it played.

The real lesson is that taking full advantage of globalization requires developing domestic capabilities along with international links. What makes the difference for Egypt is that it has a strong domestic league, which fosters depth of talent and coherence as a national team.

Sorry, Dani, but you’re missing the bigger picture. Egypt has a strong domestic league, meaning its players are in the same place and can train together during the domestic season, and that allows them to do better at the African Cup of Nations than the far stronger individual talent pools of Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon etc. Sure. But that’s because the African Cup of Nations is held in January/February, slap-bang in the middle of the domestic season. Now, if you compare the performances of the various African teams at the World Cup, which is held in the northern hemisphere’s summer — outside of the domestic season — you find that the opposite is true. In the 2006 World Cup, for example, Ghana did the best of the African teams, being the only one to reach the knockout stage. The fates were cruel to Cote D’Ivoire, though, placing them in a “Group of Death” with Holland, Argentina and Serbia (who they beat, having lost narrowly to both the Dutch and the Argentinians — most analysts would agree that had the Elephants been in most of the other groups, they two would have made the last 16, and possibly gone even further). Egypt, by the way, failed to qualify for the tournament. So, on the even playing field of the World Cup, where all teams have the same preparation time, the teams dominated by players based in Europe far out-perform those who pick largely home-based players. (After all, the European clubs represent the game’s elite, like the NBA for basketball, and the fact of a mostly Europe-based squad for an African country is a measure of the quality of its players.)

The point is further underscored if you look beyond the African teams. Italy, of course, is the exception that proves the rule (let’s not consider Germany, here, because it was the home team, and South Korea proved that the euphoria of a home crowd can drive you all the way to the semis), but in general, those countries with the strongest domestic leagues fared worse than those with comparatively weak domestic leagues, whose teams were based largely on foreign-based players. The quarter-finalists included three teams with strong domestic leagues and mostly home-based players (Germany, Italy, England) and five with comparatively weak domestic leagues and largely foreign-based squads. (France, Brazil, Argentina, Ukraine, Portugal). The three strongest leagues in Europe, right now, are England, Spain and Italy. Enough said. (Italy, as I noted, is the exception that proves the rule.)

I’ll go even further and suggest that the recent migration of Spanish players to England will strengthen their national team and make them worthy of a flutter for Euro 2008.

Rodrik also notes, without critical comment, that “Many blame [England’s] failure to qualify for this summer’s European championship on the preponderance of foreign players in English club teams.” Yes, many do. And they have very short memories. As long as I have been following football, England have never been a safe bet to qualify for international competition. They failed to qualify for the 1974 and 1978 World Cups, and again in 1994. They failed to qualify for the 1984 Euro tournament, and narrowly scraped in for 2000 and 92. When the English league was full of English players, England struggled internationally. The problem is not the foreign players in the Premiership; it’s the English players. It’s that simple. Sorry, England fans, but the sad truth is that England has simply not produced more than one or two players of the highest caliber at any one time over the past four decades. And that has nothing to do with the number of foreigners at English clubs.

So, please spare us the grand theories of globalization ignorantly grafted onto football statistics taken out of context.

Posted in Glancing Headers | 24 Comments

Iraq, an American ‘Nakbah’


American Taliban council of war

The Arabic world nakbah, denoting “catastrophe” best describes what George W. Bush and his American-Taliban administration has wrought in Iraq — and, as a result, what it has meant for the United States. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died as a result of Bush’s failed attempt to violently reorder the politics of the Middle East; 4 million have been displaced from their homes; more than 4,000 American troops have been killed and some 60,000 maimed in a war that smart estimates suggest will cost the U.S. economy $3 trillion — it currently costs America $12 billion a month to maintain an occupation whose time-frame remains open-ended. The Financial Times reported today that the war has already cost the average American household of four (like mine) $16,000 in taxes.

And this blood-drenched disaster has done absolutely nothing to advance U.S. strategic interests; on the contrary, it has dramatically debilitated U.S. strategic influence by graphically demonstrating not the extent, but the limits of American military power. The “shock and awe” mantra that the U.S. media so dutifully chanted at the war’s commencement sounds like a pretty sick joke now.

The fifth anniversary of the Iraq catastrophe will see the usual endless hemming and hawing in the media over tactical mistakes and over whether or not the “surge” is working (as Chou en-Lai once said of the French revolution, “too soon to tell”; check back 15 years from now… I know, that’s not funny…); over how the U.S. will extract itself. (No matter what the debate in Washington, as argued here previously the reality is that the U.S. will not be in a position to withdraw for the foreseeable future, at least to the extent that it retains its superpower view of its national interests.)

Expect precious little serious discussion on how America got into this mess, not least because so much of the mainstream media was so complicit in enabling it by failing to do its job and challenging the patent nonsense that was being fed to the American people by an Administration whose dissembling was plain to see, even back then.

I recently looked up a couple of pieces I wrote in December 2002 and January 2003, which I used to mail out to a list of a few hundred people before I launched this site. And what those reminded me was just how obvious it was that the case for war being offered the American people was bogus.

This from December 14, 2002:

The Evidence Gap

As things stand, the Bush administration is looking increasingly unlikely to get UN authorization to go to war with Iraq for the simple reason that Baghdad is complying with the new inspection regime, putting the onus on the U.S. and Britain to come up with evidence of prohibited weapons activity that can be verified by the inspectors. And the U.S. has made clear that it doesn’t have such specific nuggets of evidence, and that its case is based on circumstantial evidence derived from putting together tips from defectors with satellite imagery, procurement records etc. That’s why, for now, they’re focusing on the fact that Iraq has again failed to account for Gulf War mustard gas shells etc. that had been left unaccounted for after the last UN mission. Still, a skeptical Security Council is unlikely to be convinced in the absence of forensic evidence, and London and Washington are already preparing the public for the possibility that none may be revealed.

Saddam is well aware of this, of course, basing his strategy on maximizing divisions among his enemies and isolating Washington from potential allies. (Bush operates from the principle, echoing Stalin during his 1928-33 “left turn,” that “Those who are not with us are against us.” Saddam and bin Laden, separately of course, are basing their own strategies on the principle that “Those who are not against us are with us,” i.e. doing everything they can to neutralize potential opponents and keep them out of the American camp. And frankly, the Bush administration is playing into his hands with the way it’s approaching this thing.)

The al-Qaeda Chestnut

Both sides, though, seem to accept that a war is inevitable. And if the inspections won’t create a pretext, other means will be found. Enter the Washington Post, this week (12/11/02), with a lede that might have been culled from a Saturday Night Live skit:

“The Bush administration has received a credible report that Islamic extremists affiliated with al Qaeda took possession of a chemical weapon in Iraq last month or late in October, according to two officials with firsthand knowledge of the report and its source. If the report proves true, the transaction marks two significant milestones. It would be the first known acquisition of a nonconventional weapon other than cyanide by al Qaeda or a member of its network. It also would be the most concrete evidence to support the charge, aired for months by President Bush and his advisers, that al Qaeda terrorists receive material assistance in Iraq. If advanced publicly by the White House, the report could be used to rebut Iraq’s assertion in a 12,000-page declaration Saturday that it had destroyed its entire stock of chemical weapons.”

“If,” indeed. The report is more than a little bizarro, claiming that the group responsible is a tiny al-Qaeda linked (who isn’t, these days, in the world of militant Islam?) group based in a single Palestinian refugee camp Lebanon, Asbat al-Ansar, who had supposedly established themselves in an enclave in Iraqi Kurdistan. Journalists covering Iraqi Kurdistan say this is simply rubbish. The group in Kurdistan is Ansar al-Islam, an Islamist Iraqi Kurdish faction with some links to al Qaeda and unclear relations with Iraq and Iran.

Even if you read to the bottom of the Post story you’ll see that U.S. defense and intelligence officials pooh-pooh the claims, some speculating that the W Post’s source got the wrong end of the stick after reading a hypothetical scenario described in an internal Pentagon communication. “Knowledgeable officials, speaking without White House permission, said information about the transfer came from a sensitive and credible source whom they declined to discuss.” Now that’s a scoop.

Massaging the Media

Reading this stuff reminds me of recent remarks by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld regarding the Office of Strategic Influence. Remember, that was the Pentagon program designed to secretly intervene in the media to influence public opinion in support of whatever the Pentagon was up to at the time – and the idea was dropped after a firestorm of criticism in February. Except, as Rusmfeld said two weeks ago, they’ve dropped the title but have continued the program: “And then there was the Office of Strategic Influence. You may recall that,” he told reporters at a Pentagon briefing. “And ‘oh my goodness gracious isn’t that terrible, Henny Penny the sky is going to fall.’ I went down that next day and said fine, if you want to savage this thing fine I’ll give you the corpse. There’s the name. You can have the name, but I’m gonna keep doing every single thing that needs to be done and I have.”

Not that the media needs much massaging. They’re ready to run just about anything that maintains the momentum of their “Countdown Iraq” type threads. Because hey, that’s what gets people tuning in.

A Feith-Based Initiative

The Bush administration’s “evidence gap” on Iraqi WMD and the efforts to revive the Iraq-al Qaeda link despite that notion being pooh-poohed by the CIA after extensive investigation, is a reminder of the new intelligence order the Likudniks have built in the Pentagon. Disturbed that the CIA was failing to harmonize with the hawks’ war cries, Wolfowitz’s deputy, Douglas Feith (who, like Richard Perle, also served as a political adviser to Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996) set up a parallel intelligence structure in the Pentagon, which quizzed their pals in the Iraqi exile community and combined their tips with raw data gleaned from other U.S. intel sources, reporting straight to the President. But these are the people, remember, who after 9/11 immediately put out the word to their operatives (as reported by CBS) to link it all to Iraq, whether or not there was any evidence of any real connections.

Al Qaeda’s Take

The al-Qaeda game plan, of course, is not a short term one or simply tactical (in the sense of doing as much physical damage as possible). As Paul Rogers notes in a perceptive piece (with some great insights on question of its relations with the Palestinians and with Iraq), “al Qaeda is specifically interested in inciting greater U.S. and western military action anywhere in the Islamic world. It is not expecting to defeat the United States in the short term. Quite the contrary–it positively seeks an increased confrontation as a means of greatly increasing support for both its medium- and longer-term aims.” Right now the U.S. strategy is based almost exclusively on pursuing al-Qaeda’s organizational structures and picking off its operatives. But it’s doing very little to address the political climate in its theaters of operation, which has become even friendlier to Al Qaeda in the year since 9/11 because of the way U.S. actions are perceived.

The Liberal Hawk Fallacy

Never mind the presence or absence of weapons of mass destruction, say the self-styled “liberal hawks” – the best reason for invading Saddam Hussein is that he’s a horrible dictator who tortures and butchers his own people. The arguments in this respect are summed up in last Sunday’s Times (12/08/02) magazine by George Packer

He interviews various (current and former) liberals and lefties who’re now backing the war. Most laughable, predictably, is Christopher Hitchens with his Patton swagger and his plans for a Valentine’s Day tipple with Iraqi “comrades” in Baghdad: “So you want to be a martyr? I’m here to help…” Orwell morphs into Flashman and puts to flight the Mohammedan legions…

Packer attributes this swing in the liberal mood to Bosnia, and the idea of military intervention in pursuit of good. Frankly, I think the traumatic impact of 9/11 may have more to do with it, bringing to the surface the inner-Rumsfeld of a lot of (mostly male) liberals – Alan Dershowitz suggesting U.S. judges being empowered to order the fingernails of suspects to be pulled out, that sort of thing…

The idea that the best reason for going to war in Iraq is to overthrow the noxious Saddam and replace him with a democracy is simply wishful thinking. Democracy has never been the organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy, and to imagine the Bush administration as a kind of Lincoln Brigade of selfless internationalists going out to fight the good fight is simply delusional. These are the same people who helped empower Saddam Hussein in the 80s – Rumsfeld was Reagan’s point man in cutting deals with him.

Washington is suddenly demanding democracy throughout the Arab world and lambasting its own client regimes for their failures on this account. Everything they say about democracy and human rights in Saudi Arabia, Egypt etc. is true. What they’re not saying, of course, is why they have done everything necessary to keep such regimes in place for decades, and when one fell (in Iran) under the weight of its own corruption and violent authoritarianism, the Bush types regard their failure to quickly restore the despotic Shah as one of Jimmy Carter’s greatest crimes. Democracy in the Arab world is a very good idea, but is the U.S. prepared to tolerate democracy when they don’t like the choices made by electorates? Are they prepared to accept the Muslim Brotherhood as the government of Egypt or Jordan? Are they prepared to accept Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves being in the hands of a government hostile to U.S. interests? Obviously not. And that’s the reason democracy has never been a priority in Washington’s dealings with the Arab world. (No matter how democratic they are at home, empires very rarely reproduce that democracy in their satellites abroad, for obvious reasons.)

Jonathan Raban, in the Guardian, offers a perceptive [we might now add “prescient” — ed.] piece on the history of Western nation-building in Arab lands, and warns that the same mistakes are about to be repeated.

Republic of Fear

All of this, of course, may soon become moot. The forces will be in place in February to mount an invasion, and if Karl Rove approves, the UN may be simply discarded. A tough call for Rove, since polls are still finding some 55 percent of Americans preferring UN authorization – then again, a few Qaeda-Iraq link stories could swing that. Indeed, I think the reason we’re even contemplating this scenario right now is to be found in the central thesis of Michael Moore’s new film “Bowling for Columbine” – that fear is the primary organizing principle of contemporary American political culture. The 10 o’clock news is all about things that could kill you – microbes living in sponges, lysteria in your ground beef, out-of-control young black men or terrorists spreading smallpox… This is not just an episode, but a consistent thread that I’ve noticed throughout the decade that I’ve been here. Domestically its all moral panic; internationally it’s the Threat of the Month Club. It’s lampooned in Saturday Night Live and South Park, but I think it’s deeply rooted. And it allows the likes of Bush not only to scare Americans into wars, but also to distract them from the more immediate and politically-challenging fears induced by the recession.

A month later, I wrote the following:

The weirdest thing about the current moment is just how cartoonish Bush appears, sounding more and more each day like a caricature drawn by some agitprop lefty theatre-troupe. This week it was all this “war can still be avoided” stuff when it’s written all over his face (never mind his actions) that he believes the exact opposite. And his announcement of more than $300 billion in new tax breaks for corporations and the rich, in the name of restarting an economy that has millions of working poor and unemployed Americans gasping for breath – along with the warning that anyone who dared challenge this was engaging in “class warfare.” (He’s not short on chutzpah!) And just in case anybody starts getting any wussie doubts about invading Iraq just now, his office comes out with the estimate that a war would cost the US no more than $60 billion – that’s after his own former economic adviser Larry Lindsey had put the figure at $200 billion last fall, while Congress factored in the inevitability of a long-term occupation and suggested a far higher figure. And then to cap it all, a restatement of his Nixonesque policy on government secrecy – and how about appointing John Poindexter to head up a program to browse your email and your Amazon.com purchases – he mislead Congress? Hell, that’s a virtue in the Bush administration…

I had been reminded, about Brecht’s poem German War Primer. Extracts:

WHEN THE LEADERS SPEAK OF PEACE
The common folk know
That war is coming.
When the leaders curse war
The mobilization order is already written out….

WHEN IT COMES TO MARCHING MANY DO NOT
KNOW
That their enemy is marching at their head.
…The man who speaks of the enemy
Is the enemy himself.

As we noted a few weeks ago, the inspectors have found nothing in Iraq. Of course, they still might – but they have not yet been given any intelligence by the Bush administration that would point them to any place where they might find any. Bush promised two weeks ago that such intelligence would be provided, but sources in the inspection system say they’ve been given nada. Could be, of course, that Bush is simply trying to get all his ducks in a row before pointing them to a killer piece of evidence. More likely, though, is that the cupboard is rather bare.

All of this diminishes the prospects of achieving UN backing for war when the inspectors make their formal report on January 27. As Kofi Annan noted at the new year, Iraq’s cooperation with the inspection program means there is no basis at this time for military action. (And, as one reader who trawls the corridors of the UN notes, Kofi’s interventions probably carry some backing from the Powell camp in Washington.)

That doesn’t mean there won’t be a war, of course. This is not about weapons of mass destruction, nor has it ever been. I don’t really believe it’s simply about oil or Sharon, either, by the way, although oil certainly plays a key role in shaping the long-term strategic agenda of which it forms part. As the BBC notes, Cheney’s energy report warned that the US would have to double its oil imports by 2020 (no wonder Kyoto was given short shrift) and would have to secure the necessary supplies in the Mideast, Central Asia and Africa (all of which goals are currently being pursued).

But Iraq is not simply an oil-grab as some on the left would have it. As Nicholas Lemann explained in the New Yorker last fall, Iraq is the launching pad of a new imperial strategy designed to impose a Pax Americana on the increasingly unruly Middle East.

(For a great piece of real audio on this, click on the “This American Life” segment Why We Fight in which the arguments for and against going to war are well summarized by eloquent advocates of both positions, and a summation from Lemann.

While such a Pax Americana would certainly ease the oil flow, it’s also based on the much broader (Orientalist) idea of pacifying the region through force, impressing the Arabs (according to the theories of the White House’s favorite scholar of the Arab world, Bernard Lewis) with a massive show of force that renders any challenge to Washington’s writ folly in the eyes of the would-be mujahedeen. [That old crank Lewis is still briefing the White House today despite the disaster he helped spur them into. – ed.]

For a tart Arab critique of Lewis and his role in shaping the Bush agenda, try Lamis Andoni’s piece from Al Ahram last month.

But all of this is academic, I think, because once there are 100,000 US troops, complete with hospital ships, in the Gulf (by some time in February) Bush may find it politically impossible to bring them home without Saddam’s head in a bag. Not that this is his intention.

The point about these long extracts is to emphasize how clear it was before the war that the case being made for invading was flimsy, spurious even. Cheney and Rice were spinning patent falsehoods suggesting that Iraq represented a nuclear weapons threat to the U.S. But much of the media simply allowed it all to pass, enabling a climate of absurd fear to prevail that made war inevitable.

But as I wrote last year in reference to the media making the same mistakes on Iran (link temporarily unavailable due to server migration), the problem is that the media failed to question the basic assumption of the case that was being made, i.e. that if Iraq did, indeed, possess some unconventional weapons, then an invasion was a necessary and prudent response. More sober heads, in Europe for example, suspected that Saddam might have some battlefield chemical and biological capability left over from his war with Iran, but they could see that the consequences of invading Iraq were far more dangerous than any threat represented by Saddam.

As I wrote, last year:

Imagine, for a moment, that U.S. troops invading Iraq had, as they neared Baghdad, been fired on by an artillery unit using shells filled VX nerve gas — an attack that would have lasted minutes before a U.S. aircrew had taken out the battery, and may have brought a horrible death to a handful of American soldiers. Imagine, further, that the conquering troops had later discovered two warehouses full of VX and mustard gas shells. And later, that inspectors in a science lab had discovered a refrigerator full of Botulinum toxin or even anthrax.

The Administration and its allies in the punditocracy would have “proved” their case for war, and the media would have hailed President Bush as the kind of Churchillian visionary that he imagines himself to be. And goodness knows what new adventures the Pentagon ideologues would have immediately begun planning.

Now, ask yourself, had the above scenario unfolded and the “case for war” (on the terms accepted by the media and the Democrats) been proven, would Iraq look any different today? Would it be any less of a bloodbath; any less of a quagmire for U.S. troops; any less of a geopolitical disaster; any less of a drain on U.S. blood and treasure? Would the U.S. mainland or U.S. interests and allies worldwide be any safer today? In short, would the Iraq invasion seem any less of a catastrophic strategic blunder had the U.S. discovered some caches of unconventional weapons in Iraq?

The answer to all of those questions is obviously no.

And it’s from that point that we must begin our discussion on Iran, and the media’s role in preparing the American public for another disastrous war of choice. The “necessity” in the American public mind to go to war in Iraq was established through the mass media — a failure for which there has been precious little accounting. But that failure runs far deeper than is typically acknowledged even by critics: It was not simply a case of the media failing to properly and critically interrogate the spurious claims by the Administration of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction capability. Sure, even the likes of France and Germany suspected that Saddam may, in fact, have still had a few piles of chemical munitions left over from the Iran-Iraq war. The point, however, is that they did not see these as justifying a war. They recognized from the outset that invading Iraq would cause more problems than it would solve.

The more important failure of the U.S. media, then, is its failure to question the basic proposition that if Iraq had, indeed, had unconventional weapons, then an invasion and occupation of that country was a wise and prudent course of action.

Of course many of the decision-makers in the U.S. media in the wake of 9/11 were scared and confused, and looking for John Wayne-style authority figures for comfort — read back now and you’ll find some astounding toadying up to the self-styled tough guys of the Administration: Bill Keller’s wet-kiss profile of Paul Wolfowitz in the New York Times suggested to me a man playing out Robert Mitchum’s epiphany in The Green Berets, the jaded liberal recognizing the harsh truths of John Wayne’s approach to making the world safe for freedom. And Donald Rumsfeld’s loquacious buffoonery created a comforting sense of certainty among a liberal media intelligentsia suddenly desperate to embrace an imperial mythology, and in the case of the George Packers and Peter Beinarts, to render it profound as a narrative of global liberation. Others simply preferred to avoid anything that might have demagogues branding them “un-American,” for fear of losing ad dollars.

That may help explain the failure, but it does not excuse it.

The fact that carnival barkers like Kristol and Beinart continue to be touted as having opinions worth heeding on these matters is ample evidence that the media has either learned little, or else is more dedicated to a kind of edutainment vaudeville than in empowering the American people to make informed foreign policy choices.

Beinart, in a mawkish attempt to account for himself in the excellent Bill Moyers documentary Buying the War, offers up this little gem: “The argument in the fall of 2002 was not mostly about the facts, it was about a whole series of ideas about what would happen if we invaded.”

Exactly. The fact that Beinart and company were wrong on the facts was only part of the problem. More importantly, it was their ideas about the use of force and its consequences that proved so disastrously flawed. And most of the decision-makers in the mainstream media did not bother to challenge the basic proposition that if Saddam had certain categories of weapons, then an invasion was necessary and beneficial.

The very idea that there are certain categories of weapons that draw down a red mist over rational discussion of geopolitical options is an exceedingly dangerous one — that should be one of the key lessons drawn from Iraq. And that’s exactly what’s being cooked up over Iran, too.

The deeper problem, of course, is the Administration’s belief — and the media’s willingness to indulge it — in revolutionary violence as a means to an end. But that’s a theme we’ll have to explore further in a separate post.

Posted in Situation Report, The 51st State | Tagged , , | 9 Comments

The Abbas-Hamas Delirium

barghouti
There’s something quite remarkable in the depths of denial to which the Bush Administration, and the likes of Dennis Ross, are reaching in their take on Palestinian politics. On Sunday, the Washington Post reported that Middle East “hands” are divided over whether to talk to Hamas, with longtime realists stating the obvious about the need to talk to Hamas, and even the hapless Condi Rice being forced to support Israel-Hamas truce negotiations with plausible deniability. But then comes Dennis Ross, whom as we have noted elsewhere, may be more part of the problem than part of the solution in the Middle East, with this warning against talking to Hamas: “It would give the sense that the world has to adjust to them, and immediately demoralize the Palestinians you want to work with.” Uh, Dennis… Let’s just say that had “the world” (presumably this being “the world” as in “the World Series”) adjusted to Hamas when it won the Palestinian election, we might be in a better place than we are now. As for demoralizing “the Palestinians you want to work with,” is it not time to call an end to the fantasy that Mahmoud Abbas represents the Palestinian people? Why would you want to work exclusively with a leader who can’t possibly deliver anything at the peace table? It’s frankly absurd.

It’s always worth paying attention to the polling of the Palestine Center for Social Research in Ramallah — had U.S. officials done so, they’d have noticed that Hamas had the momentum before the election in which they trounced Fatah. The latest PSR survey of Palestinian public opinion finds that Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh would run neck and neck with Abbas in a Palestinian presidential election, at 47% each. And that, once again, shows that Hamas has the momentum. More importantly, though, it shows that if the Fatah candidate were the imprisoned Marwan Barghouti, he would receive 58% of the vote to Haniyeh’s 38%. (Nor is this really news — polls showed that Barghouti would have trounced Abbas if he’d stood as an independent last time around, from inside his Israeli prison cell, as he briefly threatened to do.)

The “good news,” then, for those who want to see Hamas eclipsed by democratic means, is that Barghouti has made clear that he’ll consider a presidential run in 2009. The bad news, of course, is that Barghouti, easily the most popular leader in Fatah because of his reputation as uncorrupt and willing to stand up to the Israelis, is no more “the Palestinians that (Ross) wants to work with” than is Haniyeh. Barghouti, the closest thing the Palestinians have to a Nelson Mandela, is currently in an Israeli prison on terrorism charges. He believes in a two-state solution, but also that the Palestinians have the right to bear arms against the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. And he sees Hamas not as an enemy to be eliminated, but as an ally with which Fatah should share power.

One thing that you can be sure of is that if Dennis Ross has his way and the U.S. continues to seek to work only with those Palestinians it likes (i.e. Abbas and his aides), there’s unlikely to be a Palestinian election next year — or for the foreseeable future. Nor, by the way, is there likely to be any peace.

Posted in Situation Report | Tagged , , , , , | 19 Comments

Who’s Afraid of Dick Cheney?

Vice President Dick Cheney’s arrival in the Middle East has prompted some to speculate that this is a sure sign that President Bush is preparing to launch a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Others have reached a similar conclusion from the firing of Admiral William Fallon has head of Central Command. Such speculation is not hard to understand given Cheney’s previous role as hand-holder to the region’s pro-U.S. Arab regimes whenever the Bush Administration is about to embark on one of its catastrophic schemes to remake the Middle East by force — he did the rounds before the Iraq war, and before and after Israel’s disastrous campaign (at the urging of the U.S.) to eliminate Hizballah in the summer of 2006. And Cheney is nothing if not the champion of the testosterone-addled-teenage mindset in Washington that sees military force as the answer to complex challenges, and has certainly been lobbying for a showdown with Iran.

But to put Cheney’s tough talk and saber-rattling in context, I’d suggest those worried that he means business watch the YouTube clip above, taken from Monty Python and the Holy Grail, in which the Black Knight refuses to let King Arthur pass, and continues to issue bloodcurdling threats even as the English king lops off his limbs. The Black Knight hopping about on one leg screaming “I am invincible!” is an apt analogy for Dick Cheney threatening Iran, right now.

Cheney might like to see Iran’s nuclear facilities destroyed by either an Israeli or a U.S. air strike, but that’s unlikely to happen. It is questionable whether Israel has the technical capability to do the job alone, and would need a U.S. green light to do. That, and the fact that the Iranians would hold the U.S. accountable for any Israeli strike, and would retaliate against U.S. targets within range (think 140,000 U.S. troops just across the border in Iraq), would make it worth the U.S. doing the job itself if it were going to get done.

The problem is that U.S. power in the Middle East has begun to go the way of the Black Knight’s limbs precisely as a result of the confrontational policies championed by Cheney, and that has left it both lacking the troop strength — and dangerously vulnerable in its Iraq deployment — to launch a war with a country three times the size of Iraq, simply on the basis of a potential threat, i.e. that Iran’s currently very limited uranium enrichment capability gives it the means to eventually create bomb-grade materiel. The air-strike scenario holds far greater perils than those it would currently eliminate, and no rational strategic establishment woud consider it. (That may be why there are such over signs of resistance from within the security bureaucracy to Cheney’s efforts, from last year’s National Intelligence Estimate to Fallon’s blunt comments about war-talk in Washington.)

A military strike has no way of guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear capabilities will actually be destroyed, and Tehran would almost certainly move whatever it retained underground, and continue to work outside of the monitoring regime (currently in place) of the IAEA. It would compel Iran to respond to an act of war by confronting the U.S. and its allies throughout the Middle East. While neocons tout the fantasy that such a blow would bring down the Islamic Republic, it’s far more likely that the people of Iran, from liberals to fundamentalists, would rally behind the government, and strengthen the hand of the conservatives currently running things. Last weekend’s election, with a turnout close to two thirds of the electorate (far higher than the U.S. usually sees) was a sure sign that Iranians are willing to defend their regime from outside attack, even if they don’t like that regime.

Iran would deliver its response over a sustained period across a wide range of fronts, but its ability to make life hell for the U.S. forces stationed in Iran (both via the firing of short and medium range missiles, and by urging the Shi’ite militias whose loyalty it commands there to attack the Americans), and its ability to drive oil prices into the stratosphere by blocking deliveries through the Straits of Hormuz, make the cost of attacking Iran simply prohibitive to the U.S. right now, and perhaps for the foreseeable future.

Moreover, the Arab allies on whom Cheney is calling over the next ten days have long ago concluded that the Bush Administration’s prescriptions for dealing with the Middle East are dysfunctional to the point of self-destruction, and have longsince begun going their own way, even as they politely indulge emissaries from Washington. While the Bush Administration insists that Iran must be pressed and isolated, the Egyptians and Saudis are openly engaging in the warmest diplomatic ties with Tehran since 1979, aware that only a cooperative and mutually accomodating relationship can stabilize the consequences of the strategic rivalries of the region.

Whatever Dick Cheney has to say, the Arab regimes are well aware that they are having to conduct their own diplomacy to address the region’s problems because the current administration has little more to offer than ideological megaphone diplomacy. But, of course, the current administration only has nine months left, and already the region is simply running out the clock, assuming that things can only get better with a new Administration. At which point, if Cheney keeps to his stated plan of returning to the private sector — and if he returns to the corporation he left in order to take the job — the Vice President will simply revert to being just another Dubai-based CEO.

Posted in Situation Report | 21 Comments

My Dinner With Dalglish

Well, okay, not mine, Fernando Torres’s. This three-part video series shows a Spanish TV program hosted by former Anfield striker Michael Robinson, coming across like some old lush in an Almodovar movie, focusing on Fernando Torres’s ascent as the new King of the Kop.

It’s gripping, moving stuff, as they show just why Liverpool FC is the genuine People’s Club in England — enough to bring tears the to eyes of any longtime Red. For others, it’ll give you a sense of why we feel the way we do about our club.

The second two installments show Robinson hosting a dinner, with Sammy Lee, who also learned Spanish when he coached there, featuring Kenny Dalglish and Graeme Souness meeting Torres, Pepe Reina and Alvaro Arbeloa. A real passing of the torch affair

Posted in Glancing Headers | Tagged , , | 14 Comments

Behind the Fall of “Fox” Fallon

fallon
Guest Column: Mark Perry. When Admiral William “Fox” Fallon resigned, or was forced out, of his position as head of the U.S. military’s Central Command, responsible for Iraq and Afghanistan, and for Iran if there were any conflict with Iran, much of the speculation hinged over Fallon’s very public opposition to Washington’s saber-rattling at Tehran. It struck me, though, that there was something misleading and melodramatic in the media reports suggesting, like the Esquire piece that proved his undoing, that Fallon was somehow a lone voice of opposition, a singular hero obstructing a march to war with Iran, like the man putting his body in the path of the Tiananmen-bound tank from 1989’s most famous news photograph. The opposition to war with Iran being expressed by Fallon is shared, as far as I know, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by Defense Secretary Gates himself. So, for some explanation of the dynamics at work, I turned to my friend Mark Perry, longtime defense and security analyst in Washington with his ear to the ground in the U.S. capital.

Mark is a director of Conflicts Forum, a longtime national security expert in Washington, whose most recent book, Partners in Command explores the relationship between Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and George C. Marshall in managing the U.S. war in Europe.

Here’s what he sent, after burning the midnight oil — as ever, I’m excited and grateful to have Mark as a guest contributor.

American Icarus

The Slow Rise and Meteoric Fall of Admiral Fox Fallon

By Mark Perry

There is a bar. Set perilously atop the Marine Memorial Club and Hotel, the Leatherneck Lounge is one of San Francisco’s most legendary watering holes, an exclusive-of-sorts meeting place for veterans and their families. It is all that you might suppose it to be: semi-dark and warm, quiet and somber, with good steaks and smooth scotch and, if you are lucky enough to know the waiters, you can talk late into the night. I was a guest there several weeks ago, seated at a table with eight men who had seen a bit of war. Arrayed around me were retired three and four star Generals and a combat Colonel. While they talked (of the “Frozen Chosin,” the Ia Drang, “Helicopter Hell,” Beirut, the Highway of Death and Anbar) I listened: checking what they had experienced against what I had read.

The next morning, as the Boeing 737 carrying me home struggled into the air headed east, I memorialized the evening in the pages of my small notebook, filling twelve pages with anecdotes, quotes and descriptions. I did this knowing, of course, that I could never refer to any of the men at that table by name, nor place the words they had said in their mouths. It was not that the evening had been too personal or emotional, but that all of them had let down their guard to the point where I had been given insights to fundamental truths about their profession and its current state that were at once both damning and insightful. To the degree that I have been privy to such rare evenings among senior military officers (and I have) is not because I write about them — but because I don’t.

Which is why, after reading Thomas Barnett’s Esquire article on America’s Centcom Commander, I knew that William “Fox” Fallon would be forced into retirement. After reading the article, the men around that table would have thought as I do: that he was lucky he wasn’t fire. In truth, I would have busted him to Seaman Recruit.

Barnett’s piece has to rank as one of the most embarrassing portraits of an American officer in U.S. military history. Both for Barnett, as well as for Fallon. And that’s saying a lot. Written in pseudo Tombstone style — a kind of vague signaling that this is just-between-us tough guys talk — Barnett presents a military commander who is constantly on-the-go, trailing exhausted aides who never rest (oh, what a man he is!): Fallon doesn’t get angry (he gets “pissed off”) he doesn’t have a father (he has an “old man”), he doesn’t spend time (he does a “stint”), he doesn’t walk (he “sidles”) and he doesn’t talk, “he speaks in measured koans.” It’s boorish and, very often, it’s just plain wrong. Thus, Barnett: “If, in the dying light of the Bush administration, we go to war with Iran, it’ll all come down to one man. If we do not go to war with Iran, it’ll come down to the same man. He is that rarest of creatures in the Bush universe: the good cop on Iran, and a man of strategic brilliance. His name is William Fallon.”

Well, actually, yes — and no. The decision to go to war will come down to one man, but his name won’t be Fox Fallon, it will be George Bush. More accurately, the Constitution of the United States places foreign policy in the hands of the President as the Commander-in-Chief and the decision for declaring war is in the hands of the U.S. Congress. Fox Fallon’s role in all of this, as I am sure he must know, is to obey orders and to keep his mouth shut, a point that was undoubtedly made plain to him by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in the immediate aftermath of the publication of this article. And, we might imagine, Bob Gates put his objections to the article in the following terms: “Fox, just what in the hell do you think you were doing talking to Thomas Barrett?”

But this little exchange, between Barnett and Fallon in Cairo, is what put the Admiral on the retirement list: “Fallon sidles up to me during a morning coffee break. ‘I’m in hot water again,’ he says.’ And Barnett asks him: “The White House?” And Fallon nods his head: “They say, why are you even meeting with Mubarak.” And Fallon goes on: ‘Why? Because it’s my job to deal with this region, and it’s all anyone wants to talk about right now. People here hear what I’m saying and understand. I don’t want to get them too spun up. Washington interprets this as all aimed at them. Instead, it’s aimed at government and media in this region. I’m not talking about the White House … This is my center of gravity. This is my job.”

Not anymore.

To hear Barnett talk about it, Fox Fallon is not only a “man of strategic brilliance,” he once actually stood between us and the apocalypse: “When the Admiral took charge of Pacific Command in 2005, he immediately set about a military-to-military outreach to the Chinese armed forces, something that had plenty of people freaking out at the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. The Chinese, after all, were scheduled to be our next war.” Oh really? The Chinese were scheduled to be our next war? That probably comes as somewhat of a surprise to Fox Fallon’s colleagues in the Navy and at the Pentagon and is just the kind of overblown claim that someone like Barnett thinks makes a commander a hero to his colleagues — but doesn’t. It’s poison of the worst kind and makes him ready fodder for every able seaman who carries papers from one Pentagon office to another: “Hey Tom, did you hear that Fox Fallon stopped World War Three — that guy’s really something.”

It’s not as if this hasn’t happened before. Fox Fallon is a modern Mark Clark, the legendary four star American Army commander of World War Two who led Allied troops in Italy. Like Fallon, the gangly Clark was tough talking and seemingly tireless, but he never met a reporter he didn’t like and he recruited them diligently. He trailed a tail of reporters who followed him through North Africa and Italy and posed, hands on hips, over maps when the photographers crowded around. “Take my good side,” he said, “my left side.” He hated the British, who had been bleeding all over North Africa, and commented that “it was better to fight an ally than be one.” When the allies landed at Normandy Clark was angry because the invasion took headlines away from his own triumphs. When his army took Rome he posed for the cameras and then turned to his colleagues: “I go now to the sounds of guns,” he said. Standing nearby, a reporter turned to a colleague: “On this historic occasion I feel like vomiting.”

There is a view abroad, commonly held, that Admiral William “Fox” Fallon has been sacrificed, has been gotten out of the way, by the Bush Administration because he disagreed with its policies on Iran. That Fallon stood in the way of the neo-Conservative cabal who is bent on expanding the Middle East conflict and that, when given the order for the attack (at some point in the future), Fallon would have courageously refused the order and reversed the tide of history.

What bunk.

William Fox Fallon was and is a Navy officer and a patriot. As such, if given a legitimate order from the President of the United States, as passed through the legally constituted chain-of-command, he would have obeyed the order. Of this we can have absolutely no doubt. To do otherwise is treason and to believe otherwise is to believe that Fallon would have rejected every moment of training, every tradition of his service, every law and custom that has governed U.S. civilian-military relations. The problem is not that Fox Fallon disagreed with George Bush.

The problem is that he talked to Thomas Barnett.

Posted in Guest Columns, Situation Report | 31 Comments

Spitzer Pimped

I have little interest in local politics and hold no brief for Elliot Spitzer, but I was intrigued by the headlines that came screaming off all the cable news networks and web sites on Monday about the New York governor’s “involvement in a prostitution ring” or his “ties to prostitution.” Those headlines had me giggling with schadenfreude imagining this rather self-righteous former Attorney General running a prostitution ring, or somehow being a beneficiary of the business — a kind of super-pimp of a type that would seem too fantastic even for Sin City or The Sopranos or gangsta rap…

Beneath those headlines, though, eventually the story emerges that Spitzer’s “involvement” with the prostitution ring were strictly those of a client. For an officer of the law to break the law is obviously a carreer-killer, and I have no quarrels with that. But the language in which the story was reported, pretty much across the board, was misleading and sensational. If he’d been busted with a bag of weed, would they have said he’d been “linked to a drug ring”? Or that he “had ties to drug trafficking?” Of course not, because that would imply he was involved with the operation that sold him the drugs, not simply one of its clients. How the editors and producers of most of the main national dailies and cable news shows allowed headlines suggesting Spitzer had “ties with a prostitution ring” just because his name was on their client list is beyond me. It would be like saying all of those media organizations who bought the Bush Administration’s prewar lies about Iraq were “linked to” the effort to mislead the American public into a war….

Posted in A Skeptical Read | 23 Comments