The Wrong Questions on Iran

McCain delivers that one as if it’s a last word, but it shouldn’t be. He’s trying to effect the familiar demagoguery of narrowing options in the way the Iran issue is defined in U.S. public discussion: If threats and sanctions can’t dissuade Iran from enriching uranium, then military action becomes the “last resort.” The idea that Iran enriching uranium is a “red line” is not questioned. An irreversible slide to war in the U.S. is being carefully constructed by those who are out to persuade the American public that if Tehran refuses to run up a white flag, military action — unfortunate as it may be — becomes essential. And the idea would be to have the outgoing U.S. Administration to do the job, its disregard for law (international and domestic) well established, as is its propensity to orchestrate disaster. The mythology last time around was that invading Iraq would transform the Middle East in a healthy way; this time it is that a “surgical strike” taking out Iran’s nuclear facilities or Revolutionary Guard facilities would settle the matter. Hardly. Iran would respond in an asymmetrical fashion, that would cost many thousands of American lives in Iraq and elswhere over the next decade, might disrupt world oil supplies and more. Together with the Iraq misadventure, it would ensure that the Bush Administration leaves a legacy that might be a latterday equivalent of the Hundred Years War between England and France; an open-ended conflict with the population of most of the Muslim world that the U.S. can’t really win.

So, the basic question on Iran should be exactly the same one the U.S. failed to ask on Iraq: Will military action against Iran leave the U.S. and its interests and allies in the Middle East in a more secure position or in greater peril. That, really, is the only question that matters.

There’s very little discussion in the U.S. media of why Iran might seek nuclear weapons, what alternatives it might have — and might choose to use should it be attacked — and whether the environment can be altered to persuade it that it doesn’t need nuclear weapons. What are Iran’s strategic needs, and can they be accomodated in a framework acceptable to others that at the same time accomodates its interests? And so on.

Intead, we’re essentially asked to believe that Iran wants nuclear weapons in order to destroy Israel and satisfy some sort of doomsday fantasy. The evidence for this is usually misquoted statements from President Ahmedinajad, and suggestions that he is personally inclined towards an eschatalogical world view (as if the same were not true for President Bush!). The fact is that Ahmedinajad does not actually rule Iran, and would never be in a position to decide on the use of nuclear weapons even if the portrait painted of him were true. Iran’s nuclear program has been in place for decades; Ahmedinajad is unlikely to survive the next Iranian election. (Yes, Iran actually holds elections, at least for the presidency — that may be one reason the presidency doesn’t run the country!) And the regime’s primary concern is to ensure its survival, a principle that governs even its proxy activities abroad — for example, it is conventional wisdom even on the right that Hizballah would attack Israel and U.S. targets in response to an attack on Iran; i.e. their purpose in the Iranian strategic doctrine is asymmetrical deterrence.

It would certainly be quite understandable in the strategic environment in which Iran operates to seek a nuclear weapon; some would argue they’d be stupid not to. After all, three of their arch-rivals, the U.S., Israel and Pakistan have such weapons. And they’ve seen such capability may have helped North Korea evade U.S. military action. The recent U.S. nuclear deal with India, moreover, underscores the fact that Washington is unashamedly selective in applying the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has always ignored the treaty’s premise, i.e. that other countries would refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons in order to allow those that currently have them to disarm. Disarm? The U.S. is the only nation ever to have visited nuclear terror on another nation, a war crime — yes, it is a war crime to deliberately target a civilian population — the discussion of which is quite simply taboo in America. Instead, in the U.S. it is still acceptable to talk of actually using nuclear weapons: Hillary Clinton castigates Barak Obama for ruling out their use against al-Qaeda in Pakistan or Afghanistan!

States do not pursue weapons systems as ends in themselves; and states are hardwired to ensure their own survival. It is to that end that they acquire weapons systems, to protect, enhance or advance their own strategic position and even up the odds against more powerful rivals. As everything from the Cold War to the current deal with North Korea demonstrate, the only way to avoid nuclear conflict is to address the concerns and fears on both sides that might spark such a conflict. Weapons systems are dangerous, but not as dangerous as the conflicts that might result in them being used. And we should also get used to the idea that the globalization of technology on the current strategic landscape makes nuclear weapons likely to become the norm among states — after all, the existing eight nuclear weapons states have no intention of relinquishing theirs, so why would any states that anticipate being in conflict with any of them refrain from pursuing those weapons when the opportunity presents itself?

It is the conflicts that fuel the drive for nuclear weapons that are more dangerous than the weapons themselves, and the problem of those weapons can’t be addressed separately from those conflicts. An Iran bombed to destroy its nuclear power plants would likely be far more dangerous to the U.S. and its allies over the next couple of decades than an Iran that had nuclear weapons within reach might be. The only way to diminish the danger of an escalating confrontation with Iran — which is what bombing its nuclear facilities would certainly do — is to address the conflict between it and its rivals directly, and seek a modus vivendi that can manage their conflicting interests. Iran has shown itself to be ready to engage in such dialogue; it is the Bush administration that has demurred.

At this stage, the U.S. media corps that facilitated the Iraq catastrophe ought to be asking the question, can the Bush Administration do any worse than it has already done in plunging the Middle East into bloody chaos and in destroying countless American and Arab lives — and doing irreversible damage to U.S. interests across the planet. The answer, of course, is yes, but only if the U.S. media once again enables it.