Elvis and Me: Never Walking Alone in New York City

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When you walk through a storm, hold your head, up high, and don’t be afraid of the dark…

They’re singing it, now, half-heartedly, some thousands of miles away at Istanbul’s Ataturk Stadium. A couple of weeks ago, “You’ll Never Walk Alone” brought tears streaming down my cheeks as I watched quietly, headphones connected to the TV on my desk while the daily New York office routine continued around me and I, silently, celebrated our epic triumph over Chelsea. Chelsea, flush with the ill-gotten cash of Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, had assembled a team of polished gladiators, but their players and their striped-shirted City of London fans can’t represent anything other than the fruits of crooked globalization and Yeltsin’s crony capitalism. And we, Liverpool FC, somehow, in our scarlet-standard red shirts, the people’s club from the heart of England’s traditional cradle of labor militancy, whose legendary manager Bill Shankly had proudly proclaimed himself a socialist because it meant people working together for the greater good — we somehow, in my mind represented the values of the old Labour Party against those of Chelsea, which somehow to me seemed to be the ultimate Blairite club. Cash-strapped and so wracked by injuries that for most of the season the combined value of the players in our treatment room was greater than that of those out on the pitch, somehow, against all odds, relying on the tactical genius of our newly-arrived Spanish boss, Rafael Benitez, a couple of wonder goals from our dinky Catalan midfielder Luis Garcia and the gritty yet watertight defending of local boy Jamie Carragher, had bested Chelsea (and before them Juventus) to make it to Istanbul for the Champion’s League final against AC Milan, Europe’s finest team.


The mass choir of Anfield celebrates victory over Chelsea

At the end, of the storm, there’s a golden sky…

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The victory over Chelsea was two weeks ago. Here, now, in a darkened pub on East Ninth street, surrounded by sombre scousers, and my nine-year-old son Gabriel, who I’d taken out of school a few minutes early — religious observance, I told his teacher with a wink — the atmosphere is gloomy, and “You’ll Never Walk Alone,” the Gerry and the Pacemakers rendition of the Broadway showtune that has, since the 1960s, been the anthem of the fans of Liverpool FC, sounds more like a dirge. The TV cameras show fans in Istanbul singing half-heartedly, and who could muster any passion now? We’re three-nil down to the best team in Europe, our Champion’s League dream turning into a nightmare at the final hurdle, and it’s only half-time. Suddenly the limits of our threadbare squad, cruelly dismembered through an outrageously persistent crop of injuries, are plain to see. The perenially wounded Australian Harry Kewell limped off after 20 minutes, to be replaced by Vladimir Smicer, and while the Czech midfielder has been a marvelous servant to the club, he’s missed most of the season through injury, and has been told he’ll be released in the summer. From the first minute, we’ve been outclassed, the Brazilian Kaka, the Argentinian Crespo and the Ukranian Shevchenko running our defense and midfield ragged.

Elvis Costello, also a lifelong Liverpool fan, wrote after the event that the specter of humiliation at half time prompted him to give up on the game and go on stage. His roadies were setting up and he was backstage warming up his voice, away from the TV.

It’s a salvage operation now, all that can be redeemed is our dignity. Don’t know if I can stay to the end. Jann’s coming to fetch Gabe soon, maybe I’ll go too. Can’t stand to watch the lads humiliated after all they’ve given to get here. My heart goes out to Djimi Traore, the Malian midfielder from a family of seven on a housing estate on the edge of Paris, whose plastic man tackles have kept us alive more than once on this wild, Cinderella ride. It was his mistake that gave Milan the free kick for their opener, within the first two minutes of the game.

Though your dreams be tossed and blown…

I guess the “we” requires some explaining. Many young South Africans of my generation simply adopted a team from England when they became interested in the game, and who they chose was simply a reflection of great runs or great players of the moment. I began following British football in 1973-4, when it was more fashionable to back Leeds. But I was drawn to the magic of Liverpool’s great Kevin Keegan-John Toshack duo, and their thrilling 3-1 win over Newcastle in that season’s FA Cup Final made them my team. But Liverpool, somehow, is not like other teams; it’s more. It’s a culture and a deeper story — it’s fans and players take off for away games in distant lands out of John Lennon International Airport. None of the great individual talents of the glory eras — Keegan, Kenny Dalglish, John Barnes, Ian Rush, Michael Owen, Steven Gerrard — was ever deemed bigger than the club. It was always a collective effort. Our fans had invented stadium singing as a means of spurring on the players, and in the late 1970s, when the only access I’d have to live games was trough the BBC World Service on my shortwave radio, their contribution was unmistakable. Through the whoops and whistles of shortwave interference, you’d hear the commentator’s voice — “Neal brings it forward, looks for McDermott, inside to Sounness…” — over the mass choir of the “Kop,” as the home fans favorite stand at Anfield was known.

kop

The values of the club, and the sense of solidarity conveyed by “You’ll Never Walk Alone” somehow came to fit with my political values as a young leftie student in the anti-apartheid struggle. (At least I fantasized that they did.) Of course the Celtic fans sang it in Glasgow, too, cementing our fraternal alliance with the Clydeside proletariat — an alliance personified by Kenny Dalglish who’d come from them to us. The song was a standard of every game, and you thought nothing of it most times — like the singing of Land of Hope and Glory at the FA Cup Final or the reciting of The Lord’s Prayer at my school’s assemblies. And the only other time I’d wept as freely on hearing it as I did the night we beat Chelsea last season was in April of 1989, when 96 Liverpool fans died in a crush at Hillsborough Stadium: At games all over Europe, that week, a minute of silence was held to mourn the dead of Hillsborough. And I’ll never forget the TV clip I saw of the fans of Barcelona FC, the glorious repository of elegant and exciting football (and both Catalan anarchism and, unfortunately, Catalan nationalism also). They didn’t extend their condolences through silence that night at the Nou Camp: Tens of thousands of voices rang out in an impassioned rendition of “You’ll Never Walk Alone.” (Apparently, the AC Milan fans did too, although I never saw that.) The song became, in my mind, a kind of Internationale for all that was good and right about football.

Walk on, walk on, with hope, in your heart

The second half kicks off, and suddenly we’re looking a little more in charge in the middle of the park. Didi Hamman has come on, our German midfield anchor there to protect the defense, break up Milan’s attacks, win the ball for us and turn defense into attack. Wait a minute, here we go. Stevie plays in Riise behind the defense and then starts making for the near post; no one’s tracking him and he gets a free header on the Norwegian’s cross.

Pulled one back! Stevie, you beauty. He’s all bottle, our skipper, refuses to lie down and die. (The kind of man, to quote right-wing nut job Senator Jesse Helms on right-wing nut job UN ambassador John Bolton, you’d want standing alongside you at Armageddon.) He’s a fighter, and he’s recaptured something essential about our game. But he’s hardly pausing to celebrate. With that furrowed brow of determination, he’s running back for the kickoff, but he’s waving his arms at the crowd — like a cheerleader. Sing, you bastards, come on! The fans have long been the club’s secret weapon, their passion capable of getting that extra measure of commitment out of the player unlike any other club. Both managers freely admitted that the home fans and the wall of sound they created had made all the difference against Chelsea. And now Stevie wants the fans to bring his team back into it.

stevie
It’s been a difficult year in his relationship with the club. Bigger bankrolls have come calling, with both Real Madrid and Chelsea coveting his services. All that’s kept him here is scouse loyalty, a local lad through and through who grew up on the terraces dreaming of donning the red shirt. But it only goes so far, and Stevie has a big ego. All season long he’s been warning us, through the media, that the club may not be able to match his own ambitions. And the whole sorry soap opera will be played out again in the coming summer. But right now, his iron willed ego is all that stands between us and humiliation.

Within minutes, Vladimir Smicer, only recently back from a long term injury, finds himself in space on the edge of their area after good world by Hamman, and fires a perfectly placed shot past the diving Dida in the Milan goal. I’m on my feet, in the pub, roaring “Game on! Yaaaaah!” There’s only one goal in it, and we’re all over them right now. Gabe has come to expect these sudden outburts, now. The first time he saw one — in our tiny East Village apartment on a steamy summer morning, an hour before I had to walk him to school, when Papa Bouba Diop scrambled the ball across the line for Senegal’s historic World Cup winner over France in 2002 — he was shocked, momentarily frightened, even. Now, he just mocks me. Settle down, dad.

But thousands of miles away, Elvis, too, has started to believe. As the fans wait for him to sing, he can’t leave the TV.

Jann arrives to fetch Gabe for an arrangement he had, but I know he hears the roar as Xabi Alonso, our Basque wunderkind, finds Milan Baros, the Czech striker with the golden boots who has driven the manager and the fans mad with his reluctance to look up and pass the ball to better-positioned teammates. This time Milan, with two defenders bearing down on him, backheels the ball into the path of the charging Stevie, who goes down in the area under a push by Gattuso. Xabi steps up to take the penalty, looking nervous. Dida guesses right and manages to parry, but Xabi is there first to slam home the rebound.
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Xabi scores the rebound

3-3! A recovery of this magnitude, against the best team in Europe, only ever happened in the Roy of the Rovers comics I read as a kid.
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We’ve done the unthinkable. But Milan are a quality team, and they throw everything at us, subjecting our defense to the test of fire for the next hour. (And on the replay I watch later, Djimi more than redeems himself.)

Now, I have a problem. So does Elvis Costello. He’s supposed to be going on stage now, but each goal we clawed back had made it harder for him to leave the TV. Now he’s going to have to sing through the shoot-out. My problem is that I’m supposed to be in Williamsburg at 5pm to fetch two-year-old Milla from school. I hadn’t bargained on the game going into extra time. So I leave as the whistle blows for 90 minutes, half running, to the L-Train, to take me over to Brooklyn. While I’m walking, I phone my friend Victor in Montreal. “Talk me through it, Vic, I’ve got to know.” We manage only a couple of minutes before I lose reception in the subway. The ride is interminable. As soon as I’m out, I phone him again. It’s still 3-3, but only because of a wonder save by Jerzy Dudek, our Polish keeper who met John Paul II (also a Polish goalkeeper in his prime) and reported back that the pontiff was a confirmed Liverpool fan who watched us on TV whenever he could. On the replay, Dudek plainly knew very little about that save, his hand just happened to be in the right place as Shevchenko struck. But he’s smiling this knowing smile, as if thanking someone, and sure enough, after the game he said the Pope, who died only weeks before the game, had been right there with him.

I grab Milla, hot right ear still glued to the cell phone. Full time, it’s 3-3. That means a penalty shootout. I have no idea where I’m going. Run into the little Pizza joint next to the subway. No cable TV. Wait, that pub across the street. A tiny little bar frequented by old timer Italians rather than the artists and hipsters that dominate “Berliniamsburg”. And yes, they have ESPN2.

I prop Milla up on the bar, it’s just the barmaid and a young man, in his late teens, who asks me who’s playing, then says “Milan, that’s Italian, right? I guess I’ll have to support them.” Yes, I answer, whatever. These identities are all only ghosts of a distant past — tonight, the players that have most tormented us have been Brazilian, Argentinian and Ukrainian. And there are only two Englishmen in our own side. The barmaid had produced some crayons and paper, and Milla is enjoying her company. Up steps the Brazilian Serginho to take their first spotkick. Jerzy is on the goal line, reprising a great moment from Liverpool’s storied European past: In the 1984 final against AS Roma, we’d won in a penalty shootout — not least because our Zimbabwean goalie Bruce Grobbelaar had done a weirdly disturbing rubber-legs type shimmy every time one of their players stepped up. So as Serginho runs up, Jerzy is waving his huge hands about, windmill style, making the open goal all around him look a lot small than if he’d been standing still.

It worked! Serginho skies it into Row H. Up stepds Didi Hamman, hero of the midfield battle, and makes no mistake as he drives it low into the corner. 1-0, and the pressure’s on them. Didi only reveals after the game that he struck his penalty with a broken foot. Up steps Pirlo for them, and this time Dudek makes a glorious save. They’re in trouble. Our next one is from Djibril Cisse, our lightning-fast Malian-French striker who broke his leg earlier in the season and wasn’t expected to be fit until next season. His recovery has been nothing short of miraculous, and he caps a fairytale end to the season by sending Dida the wrong way and making it 2-0. The Danish striker Tommasson makes no mistake with their third strike, and then Dida gives them hope with a marvelous save from our Norwegian midfielder John Arne Riise. This is getting awfully tense, although Milla is cooing away with the barmaid, and the local lad in the otherwise empty pub doesn’t really care.

Kaka brings them momentarily level, but Smicer, with what everyone knows will be his last kick in a Liverpool shirt coolly puts us back in front. And then its Shevchenko vs. Dudek again, the man generally regarded as Europe’s and possibly the world’s best striker against the goalkeeper with Vatican connections. And whether helped by the late Pope or not, Jerzy does it again. And with that, the cup is ours.
dudek
Jerzy stops Shevchenko–again!

I gather up Milla, and thank the barmaid, heading out into the gloomy rain of early evening Williamsburg. And holding her in my arms, I serenade her with a lullaby she’s come to know well in recent weeks.

Walk on, walk on, with hope, in your heart, and you’ll never walk alone, you’ll ne-e-e-ver walk alone…

She’s singing it with me, although she sings “You’ll never walk again,” which might be more appropriate as a Blackburn Rovers anthem.

And now I know, that three thousand miles away on a college campus in Norwich, Elvis Costello was singing it too. He was on stage during the shootout, finishing a song just as Dudek saved from Shevchenko, which he could see on the TV at the back of the venue. And for the first time in his professional career, he married his work and his passion, launching into a cover version of “You’ll Never Walk Alone.”

As the G Train rattled its way through grimy tunnels back towards my end of Brooklyn, there was no quiet moment to reflect on the game; I had to read Milla a Madeline book. But looking across the car, I saw a guy wearing an Irish Liverpool supporters jersey. We smiled at each other in acknowledgment. Stevie had restored the hope in our hearts. And I knew, and the guy sitting opposite me knew, and Elvis Costello knew that, in that moment, for what it was worth, none of us walked alone.

Posted in Glancing Headers | 24 Comments

Prophylactic Spin on Iraq

cheney

Mindful of the American public’s sharply declining enthusiasm for squandering more blood and treasure on his failed Iraq enterprise, President Bush is once again adopting his administration’s preferred prophylactic strategy for spinning the slow moving disaster. Thus, his warning on Wednesday that insurgent violence will increase ahead of next month’s constitutional referendum. Just as he warned that it would increase before the handover of sovereignty to Iyad Allawi last year, and also in the runup to January’s election. Perfectly true, of course, but that’s not the point: The purpose behind the spin is, firstly, to convey a message to the American public that although the situation looks out of control, it is, in fact, evolving according to expectation. There may be bloody chaos breaking out all over Iraq, but we told you it would. More importantly, this particlar trope of spin subtly suggests that reaching the said political milestone — handover of sovereignty, election, referendum — will somehow turn the tide against the insurgency and end a military mission that costs America $5 or $6 billion a month, as well as scores of dead and hundreds of wounded. And therein lies the basic fallacy of not only of the spin, but also of the U.S. exit strategy in general. That much has been proved at each of the previous “turning points,” after which violence actually increased, and it’s simply wishful thinking to imagine that holding the referendum — even if the bulk of Sunnis vote in it — will end the insurgency.

No wait, say the administrations Pollyannas, led by Condi Rice: Look, the Sunnis are starting to participate in politics. Of course they are; they’re participating in politics, also, when they build Improvised Explosive Devices and detonate them alongside U.S. convoys. You’d have thought the Secretary of State might be familiar with Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Administration spinners might like to spin the insurgency as the work of religious nihilists without any political agenda, but it’s widely accepted among even U.S. military analysts that the al-Qaeda element makes up no more than 5 percent of the insurgency, while its main leadership are Baathist operatives who certainly have a political agenda — which they have attempted to negotiate over with the Americans — and who are engaged in a marriage of convenience with the jihadists as long as their interests coincide, but whose long-term objectives are quite different.

So, Sunni nationalists are certainly calling on their supporters to register and participate in the referendum, but to do so in order to reject the new constitution. In other words, the Sunni political parties are asking their supporters to take the same message to the polls as the Sunni insurgents take to the streets with the tools of violence — a rejection of the new, U.S.-authored Shiite-dominated order in Baghdad. Indeed, the Baathist insurgent commanders have actually offered, in secret talks, to negotiate a new political arrangement with the Americans, on the basis of their long-term shared interest in curbing Iran’s influence.

It may well be that the Sunni nationalists choose to wage this battle on two fronts — at the polls, and in streets. (Or more than two, actually, because they’re also a lot stronger on the diplomatic front than might be obvious, with most of the Arab League states hostile to the prospect of a Shiite-dominated polity in Iraq.) They may also decide, however, that the terrain of electoral politics is too skewed against them given the short time available to register their supporters and organize a consensus in their ranks, and also the slim chances available to them to stop the process via the ballot box, in which case they might simply order another boycott. But even if they participate and the referendum passes the new constitution, the Sunni nationalists are unlikely to accept it as the last word.

The political process is not the binary opposite of civil war. Instead, the same conflicts are played out in the legislature as are waged by the gunmen of the various militias. The dominant political voices in politics are those of communal nationalists, from each of the three major communities, who are pursuing communal rather than national political interests first and foremost. And each of these retains an armed capability to pursue the same objectives — the Sunni insurgents fight the Americans, the new Iraqi security forces and often Shiite and Kurdish civilians; the only really effective units of the new security forces are essentially militias of the Kurdish and Shiite parties loyal to their party leaders rather than to a new state; and rival factions among these main elements have also been known to trade fire — Iraqi insurgents against foreign fighters in some instances, or Moqtada Sadr’s Mehdi army vs. SCIRI’s Badr corps, and so on. There is quite simply no national army. And there is no significant “national” Iraqi army ready to replace the role being played by the Americans — the U.S. general in charge admitted in Congress this week that the number of Iraqi units capable of acting independently of U.S. support had actually fallen from a pitiful three battalions to only one.

So, President Bush is correct that violence will intensify in the coming months. But he’s wrong that the referendum will somehow turn the situation around. The new constitution has actually sharpened the division among Iraqis, and the referendum can’t alter the basic political arithmetic of the new, Shiite-dominated order in Baghdad, which the Sunni nationalists find intolerable. The insurgents has very successfully sabotaged Iraq’s reconstruction, and they know that elections can’t do much to hamper their ability to maintain that success. Successful elections may in the minds of the Bush administration be a moral repudiation of the insurgency, but they’re unlikely to constitute even a tactical, never mind a strategic setback. The Bush spin relies on the public and/or gullilble journalists accepting the idea of a basic opposition between people engaging in a political process and people engaging in low-intensity warfare. Instead, what you have in Iraq is a contest over the distribution of political power, which is being waged with ballots and with bullets.

Posted in Situation Report | 5 Comments

U.S.-Iran: Here We Go Again

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Tempting as it is, I shall avoid invoking my all time favorite lede in discussing the U.S. effort to get UN sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program. That — my all time favorite lede — would be the observation by a certain 19th century German journalist that all the great events in history occur twice, first as tragedy and then as farce. But seeing as how we’re avoiding that reference, we’ll settle instead for the idea that the barking dog running down the road is unlikely to have planned for actually catching that car. And it appears that the Bush administration, similarly, appears not to have gamed the outcome of its effort to challenge Tehran’s nuclear program at the UN Security Council.

The U.S. certainly prevailed in last Saturday’s vote at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna to refer Iran to the UN Security Council over non-disclosure of aspects of its nuclear program. It did so by
browbeating reluctant allies with all manner of threats and promises, resulting in the rather bizarre outcome in which the IAEA board finds Iran non-compliant and thereby liable for referral to the Security Council, but nonetheless avoided actually making the referral. For countries like India, it was simply a case of voting for a resolution that raised pressure on Tehran but at the same time gave it more time to be more forthcoming — India, after all, has massive economic ties, particularly a planned natural gas pipeline, that would make sanctions threaten India’s immediate interests a lot more than Iranian nukes would; at the same time, it has secured extensive U.S. cooperation for its own civilian nuclear energy program, and Washington had made clear that the price was New Delhi’s support on the IAEA vote. India is but one example of the states who voted with or didn’t block this resolution, but nonetheless have no interest in seeing Iran brought before the Security Council for sanctions, which is what Washington wants (or, at least, the part of Washington that doesn’t mind paying $100 a barrel for oil, which would surely result if Iran’s share of global output, close to 10 percent, is taken off world markets by sanctions). So India, like many of the EU countries, voted with the U.S. on Saturday, but with no intention of backing the U.S. in a bid to impose sanctions on Iran — indeed, they’re probably all pretty relieved that China’s veto power would almost certainly be invoked to stop any sanctions resolution. (Iran is fast emerging as China’s largest foreign oil supplier, and the Chinese are committing tens of billions of dollars in investment to Iran’s oil industry. For Beijing, even more than India, sanctions are a lot more threatening than Iranian nukes.)

Let’s make one thing clear: Unlike the bogus WMD case against Iraq, I do believe Iran is using the latitude permitted by the Non Proliferation Treaty to build most of the infrastructure for a bomb program under the aegis of its civilian nuclear energy program. This would give it the option, within about a decade, to simply withdraw from the NPT and move quickly to assemble a bomb. I don’t believe the final decision has yet been taken; instead I suspect the consensus among the leadership in Tehran is that they should build as much of the infrastructure as they can within the limits of the NPT, and that the question of whether to actually proceed to build a bomb will be answered later. (I also have little doubt, I’m afraid, that the eventual decision will be to build nuclear weapons.)

This is why the Europeans have joined the United States in seeking to persuade and pressure Iran to voluntarily desist from enrichment and reprocessing activities allowed for a civilian energy program under the NPT, in exchange for economic and technical incentives. Those talks have now broken down, Iran clearly emboldened by the U.S. failure to impose its will in Iraq, which has patently overstretched U.S. military resources and made clear that an occupation of Iran is simply militarily untenable — indeed, the likelihood is that Washington will require Tehran’s tacit support for any withdrawal strategy.

And the Europeans, partly out of their own concerns over Iranian nukes, more out of a desire to repair the transatlantic relationship, had agreed to back the U.S. on a push for Security Council referral if negotiations failed. But that’s as far as it goes. Once the matter gets to the Security Council (if, indeed, it gets there at all, which remains in doubt despite Saturday’s vote), U.S. Ambassador John Bolton will find precious little support for sanctions, let alone any tougher forms of action.

Oil self-interest creates a trump card, but even before that, the Iranians have played this well diplomatically. President Ahmedinajad’s rant about the U.S. forcing the world to accept a “nuclear apartheid” may have sounded like self-destructive rhetoric to some U.S. analysts, but he’s playing a sophisticated game. The Iranians know they’re using the rights accorded them by the NPT to pursue a goal that the NPT is specifically designed to preclude, i.e. nuclear weapons. So, what they’re doing in diplomatic forums is drawing attention to the idea of U.S. and EU hypocrisy: Just as Iran is using the NPT to pursue a goal quite opposite to that intended by the NPT, so are the U.S. and EU, my using the treaty to protect a nuclear-weapons monopoly. The premise of the treaty was not to entrench the nuclear-weapons status of the five nuclear-armed states that existed at the time it was adopted (1968), but to quote its preamble, “to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.”

The nuclear-armed states looking to use the NPT to ensure that Iran doesn’t achieve that status (France, Britain and the U.S.) have no intention of moving to abandon their own nuclear weapons. That, ultimately, is where Iran is going to take this argument. Already, at the IAEA, a secondary battle is being waged to the same end, with Arab states promoting a resolution calling for a nuclear-free Middle East, a call that puts Israel in a bind. By underscoring the hypocrisy of its adversaries in protecting their own nuclear monopoly (and tolerating the nuclear status of their allies such as Israel), Iran is helping set the diplomatic stage in the long-run for the acquisition of a strategic nuclear capability.

But the more immediate problem facing the U.S. is that even many of those who voted with it in Vienna last week have no interest in seeing sanctions imposed on Iran, much less any more coercive forms of action. As Condoleeza Rice learned to her alarm during her European debut trip last February, public opinion in Europe has already accepted a nuclear-armed Iran as inevitable. Obviously they’d love to stop it, but it’s unlikely any of them will see as in their interests to allow the issue to be turned into a new Middle East confrontation.

And then, there’s plenty of room for maneuver by Iran because the issue on which they’re being cited is failure to disclose a host of activities in its program, rather than the activities themselves, most of which are permissible within the terms of the NPT. (The U.S. and EU are arguing, essentially, that Iran should be held to a higher standard than the NPT because of — valid — suspicions over how they’re trying to use it.)

Kofi Annan is said to have warned UN member states against bringing matters to the Security Council when there’s no consensus there over how to respond. Good advice, as the U.S. may discover if it actually manages to get the Iran issue onto the table in New York.

Posted in Featured Analysis, Situation Report | 9 Comments

Abu Ghraib as America

New allegations of prisoner abuse in Iraq not only give the lie to the administration’s claims that the Abu Ghraib torture was just the work of “bad apples” like Lindie England, it also reminded me of a column I wrote back then for TIME.com about how these abuses are not at all out of character with the ways in which industrialized democracies have behaved when they send their troops abroad to fight wars against darker-skinned “others”. Here’s an excerpt:

The Indian writer Salman Rushdie once said the British don’t understand their history because most of it happened overseas, and the same may be coming true for the U.S. also. The notion of liberation is an integral part of America’s own image of its mission in Iraq, but the reality experienced by the Iraqis is a classic occupation. The sad fact is that colonialism and the occupation of foreign countries typically produce a disconnect between the self-image of the occupier, and the way he’s seen by the natives. Life in the occupied country has little relation to occupying nation. And when resistance occurs — sometimes in the form of massacres, dismemberings, beheadings and other grotesque acts — it often prompts the occupiers to behave in ways that the folks back home would have trouble recognizing.

At home, Imperial Britain was supposedly all about democracy, the rule of law and morality, fair play and decency. But out in the colonies, the British built the first concentration camps (where 27,000 Afrikaner civilians died after being rounded up in an effort to end the Boer insurgency), pioneered the bombing and gassing of civilian population centers (in among other places, Iraq in the 1920s) and other nasty habits that were — well, just not cricket. A Western nation-state that occupies another typically develops two faces: A democratic one at home, and a harsh authoritarian one in the occupied country.

Many Brits themselves may have been shocked to learn of what was being done in their name. Empire-builders and occupiers typically invent and believe a tale of selfless virtue in which they’re only there to serve the best interests of the locals, and those who fight back are thugs and terrorists at odds with the wishes of the “silent majority.” The “true” leaders are always deemed to be those among the occupied people most willing to say the things the occupiers want to hear. Only once they’re defeated can the colonial powers grant due respect to a “rabble rouser” like Mahatma Gandhi or a “terrorist” like Nelson Mandela. (Mandela has improbably been morphed into a pacifist in the American imagination; he was in fact the proud commander of a guerrilla army who got his own military training in Algeria and saw “armed struggle” as an integral component of his campaign against the apartheid regime.)

France still struggles to accept the regime of torture implemented by its soldiers in Algeria in a vain attempt to suppress the nationalist rebellion in the late 1950s. The French political class has been in denial for decades; they’d prefer to pretend it didn’t happen. Not so the soldiers. The general in charge of counterinsurgency in Algiers, Paul Aussaresses, recently stirred the pot in a memoir in which he explained that torture was essential to achieving France’s goals in Algeria. You sent me to suppress the rebellion, he argued. This was the only way to get it done.

Israeli military historian Martin Van Creveld has written extensively on the corrosive effect on Israeli society of maintaining its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Citing the debilitating effect of Afghanistan on the Soviet Union and of Vietnam on the U.S., he argues that an occupation pits a sophisticated high-tech army not against an equivalent foe, but against lightly-armed insurgents hard to distinguish from the civilian population. “As Israel’s own history clearly shows, fighting a stronger opponent will cause a society to unite,” he writes, “but combating a weaker one will cause it to split and disintegrate.”

America’s own worst encounter with a Mr. Hyde side abroad came in 1969, when a young journalist named Seymour Hersh first broke a story about the massacre of scores of Vietnamese civilians at the village of My Lai. The remedy at the time was to blame it all on Lt. William Calley, an officer in charge on the day. My Lai may simply have been a symptom, however, of a war in which American forces were ranged not only against communist insurgents, but against a substantial proportion of the civilian population who supported them. My Lai was hardly the only instance of non-combatants dying by American hands in Vietnam. But back home, the U.S. public had — and still has — difficulty digesting what took place in the steamy jungles of South East Asia four decades ago. Interestingly, it is once again Hersh who has been way out in front of the media pack in breaking the Abu Ghraib torture revelations.

Click here for the full text.

I’d only add that it’s worth underscoring Van Creveldt’s point about the corrosive effect these events have on the occupying nation. I fear that long after the last U.S. troops have left Iraq, America is going to be paying a heavy price for the psychological brutalization the occupation has inflicted on many of the soldiers who served in it.

Posted in From Tony's Archive | 4 Comments

What Makes Food Jewish?

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Originally published in the Anglo-Japanese magazine Eat in August 2000

There’s nothing more Jewish than fish on Fridays. Or so I thought, growing up in a household that tucked into pedestrian fried hake and chips every week after blessing the meal with the Sabbath “kiddush” prayer, wine and challah bread. If we were lucky, of course, that fried fare was preceded by the garlic-and-dill heavy potato-and-fish soup whose recipe my grandmother had brought with her from Poland. It was many years before I began to understand how our family — and who knows how many other Jews from the same part of the world — had come to adopt this peculiarly Catholic habit as their own. Figure it out: if you lived inland in a predominantly Catholic society, Friday was the one day of the week you might find fish in the markets.

Thus the circumstantial pragmatism and syncretism of Jewish cuisine.

Indeed, if I’d grown up in New York City, I might well have imagined that Jews had been eating Chinese on Sunday nights ever since Moses led them out of the desert. Yet another tradition born of circumstance: the first mass wave of Jewish immigrants to settle the city at the turn of the century created a New World shtetl in the Lower East Side – adjacent to Chinatown, whose exotic aromas tempted more adventurous Jewish diners over to sample a cuisine quite unlike anything their mothers cooked. And those mothers saw their own advantages in a weekly excursion for the cheap, delicious fare offered in the raucous restaurants of Chinatown that served as communal kitchens to a fellow immigrant – it could save her having to cook on Sunday nights. Thus the roots of tradition, and even today there are at least 12 kosher Chinese restaurants in New York to cater to the minority of Jews who continue to observe Biblical dietary laws.

Of course, the fact that there are also 24 Italian kosher restaurants, 5 kosher sushi bars, 6 burger joints, and two each of French, Mexican and Indian restaurants certified kosher signifies the depth of temptation to which New York living has subjected the Jewish palate. Indeed, at an up-market ultra-orthodox Lubavitch wedding these days you’re more likely to be served sashimi than chopped herring.

Historically we’ve been a wandering people, and along the way we’ve let our appetites and imaginations roam, taking notes on the culinary habits of all those in whose midst we’ve lived over centuries. That’s put a tension between denial and temptation at the very heart of Jewish cooking — denial prescribed by dietary laws originally evolved out of ancient hygiene concerns but subsequently upheld as a measure of piety; temptation in the form of the local cuisines Jews encountered in their dispersal across Europe, Asia and North Africa. The resolution of that tension has always been syncretic — to incorporate local recipes into the Jewish family cookbook, adapting them in keeping with Jewish dietary laws and giving them a Yiddish (or Ladino) name and inflection.

Today my father finds most of the “Jewish” food he was weaned on in New York’s Polish and Ukrainian diners – perogen (pierogi), kasha, latkes (potato pancakes), schav (pickled sorrel leaves), borscht and more.

But Sephardic Jews – those whose Diaspora included the Iberian and Agean peninsulas, the Bosphorous and the Maghreb, before setting sail for climes as exotic as Brazil, Cuba and Jamaica – would find the fare at most New York Jewish delis more than a little bland. Where dill is probably the herbal mainstay at Ratners or Katz’s, Sephardic chefs would be more inclined to reach for the allspice or cayenne pepper. And where Jews of Eastern European origin would celebrate a family or religious occasion with cheesecake recipes learned originally in Russia; Sephardim might be more inclined towards almond cake.

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Best of Lox: Russ & Daughters remains
the planet’s best source of smoked salmon

But Jewish cooking is more than simply a patchwork of traditions adapted from various exiles. There are its mainstays, such as cholent, which can be traced back to Biblical times. And others that, whatever their origins, have been adoptively Jewish for centuries – think bagels, for example. Believed to have originated in the Roman era, the boiled and baked O-shaped roll was brought to Poland by Jews in the 12th century, from where it spread both east and west. Lox, that’s another story. Cured and lightly smoked salmon was probably a taste acquired in Northern Europe — indeed, the word is simply a Yiddish version of the German “lachs” for salmon.

The syncretic habits of Jewish cuisine may have made it most at home in the U.S., which likes to think of itself if not as a melting pot, then as a buffet table. America encourages its immigrants to sample each other’s cuisines. And Jews have been doing that for centuries. Here in America, they’re part of the mix: After all, these days you can get a bagel at McDonalds.

Posted in A Wondering Jew, Cuisine | 20 Comments

Musharraf’s Balancing Act

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Mary Anne Weaver’s typically excellent (I’ve been a fan since 1999, when I read her book Egypt and militant Islam, which remains the best analysis of al-Qaeda’s history I’ve seen) chronicle of the Tora Bora debacle raises the key question in U.S.-Pakistan relations in a little aside towards the end: Is it in the interests of the Pakistani leadership to actually capture bin Laden?

There is certainly something darkly funny about the fact that every time Pakistan’s military dictator Gen. Pervez Musharraf comes to Washington, or hosts a top U.S. official, his security forces announce a major breakthrough in their relentless battle with al Qaeda. Funnier still is how much the General and his administration expect us to swallow with a straight face. For example, last year, when President Bush directly asked Musharraf to allow U.S. officials to interrogate A.Q. Khan, the nuclear scientist at the heart of a global discreet nuclear supermarket to, Musharraf responded that Pakistan would be happy to allow the CIA to “submit written questions for Khan.” Uh–never mind.

Last week, of course, President Musharraf was in New York, and this time his men outdid themselves: Announcing the by now de rigeur “breakthrough” against al-Qaeda through the arrest of “an important cell,” the Pakistani military then introduced the piece de resistance: An Al-Qaeda drone aircraft, which they claimed could be used to conduct surveillance and even guided bombing attacks on U.S. and allied forces in neighboring Afghanistan. One look at the photograph of the diabolical device left me crying with laughter.

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But the episode reminded me of Weaver’s question, and of a phenomenon I’d noted during the Tora Bora action in Afghanistan, and many times since in Iraq. There’s a tendency in Washington to want to believe those who profess friendship and shared interests, particularly when they say the sorts of things that confirm the beliefs, however misguided, prevalent in the corridors of U.S. power. The Afghan warlords appeared to have developed a knack for it.

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I watched Tora Bora on TV, of course, and I remember seeing the warlords subcontracted to go up and flush out Bin Laden mugging for the cameras every morning, scowling like so many extras in an old Hollywood pirate movie, vowing to go up and destroy al Qaeda — “we hate the terrorists,’” they’d snarl, on cue, aaarrrh. But there always seemed to be the hint of a grin at the edges of those scowls, a game face that anyone who has ever lived or traveled in the Third World would instantly recognize it as belonging to a hustler. Their vows to go up and finish Bin Laden never seemed any more credible than those of the Fox News harlequin Geraldo, donning a helmet and brandishing a .45 on camera at the bottom of the same hill. Particularly when events began to take on a familiar pattern, of morning scowling at the cameras, then a charge up the hill, which cranked up the Qaeda heavy machine guns, prompting a retreat and an air strike before bad light stopped play and the warlord’s men would knock off for the night and vow to return the next day to finish the job.

But if you stopped to consider it for a moment, through the prism of the interests involved rather than the wishful fantasies concocted in Washington — and this, granted, in retrospect — you have to wonder why it would have been in the interests of provincial Afghan warlords to hurl themselves selflessly at the guns of al-Qaeda. They were happy to take the money, and the vehicles and the weapons offered by the Americans in payment for outsourcing the Tora Bora job. Those would be inordinately useful in their battle with rival warlords over the next hill on such bread and butter issues as taxing opium production. But it made no sense to waste good fighting men on a contract killing for the Americans when the target was well-armed, well dug-in and desperate. At the crucial moment, it turned out some of the same warlords turned out to have made their own deals with Bin Laden, too. And why not? Warlords, borrowing for a moment John Foster Dulles’s aphorism about American statecraft, don’t have friends; warlords only have interests. They’re always at war with their neighbors; always in danger of being obliterated by ambitious rivals within their own ranks. Their survival is based on a combination of force, and cunning, outwitting their opponents, internal and external by carefully balancing competing interests, and always picking the right moment to change horses.

It made no sense for the warlords of Tora Bora to risk everything to kill Bin Laden. Besides, some of those were far more loyal to bin Laden than US commanders wanted to know. And so Bin Laden, and hundreds of his leading cadres, escaped to set up shop in Pakistan. Which brings us back to General Musharraf, whose circumstances are not unlike those of some of the larger Afghan warlords, but on an even grander scale.

The general, like the warlords next door, rules by dint of force – and cunning. It’s a longstanding tradition, of course, for Pakistan to be ruled by military men, who imposed themselves as an answer to the national malaise. Democracy has been the exception rather than the rule in Pakistan’s half-century of independence, and the military rulers who have dominated its history tend to have been removed by violent death rather than through elections or peaceful retirement.

Musharraf presides over a polity in which pro-al Qaeda Islamist parties control whole regions, while the officer corps of his military and intelligence services is filled with sympathizers of the Taliban and Qaeda-linked Kashmir groups that Pakistan had, before September 11 2001, nurtured and promoted as a matter of national policy. September 11 represented a real crisis for the regime in Pakistan, because it forced Musharraf to abandon his Taliban proxy. His first response was to do everything in his power to persuade them to force out Bin Laden, so that they could remain in power. When that failed, he reluctantly agreed to back U.S. military action in Afghanistan, but mostly on the quiet. He was always going to be a difficult ally in the ‘war on terror,’ needing to balance pressure from Washington with the need to survive in a country where a vast majority of the population identified more with Bin Laden than with Bush, and where armed extremism was rife and well integrated into his security forces. And, of course, India was the big winner when its friends in the Northern Alliance rolled into Kabul against U.S. orders — in deference to Pakistan — to remain outside the capital.

It is notable that while Pakistan has certainly arrested scores of Qaeda operatives and a few leaders, they have not seen fit to go after the leaders of the Taliban, many of whom live openly in Pakistan, much to the chagrin of the U.S.-backed Afghan government.

So the interests of Pakistan’s strongman, and those of his U.S. allies, are hardly identical. And yet, at the same time, neither are they antagonistic: despite his shortcomings as an ally, the U.S. has an overriding interest in ensuring Musharraf’s physical and political survival, because his departure from the scene in the traditional manner of Pakistani strongmen would likely see a new military regime that would take the country further towards the jihadist camp.

The Pakistani regime represents many things the U.S. finds odious, first and foremost its nuclear proliferation. (Nobody seriously believes that AQ Khan acted entirely independently of the military dictatorship in which he worked,, do they?) But Pakistan has made itself the key ally in the intelligence war against al-Qaeda, and “breakthroughs” to coincide with Musharraf’s travels aside, they have been responsible for netting the most valuable Qaeda operative snagged thus far. So captured al-Qaeda operatives are a kind of currency in the relationship, but one that the leadership in Islamabad seems mindful of of spending wisely and prudently, to their maximum advantage.

Weaver quotes U.S. officials and analysts wondering whether it’s in the interests of the Pakistani leadership to actually capture bin Laden. They’re skeptical, largely because of the domestic political consequences. But it’s worth adding that Pakistan’s usefulness in Washington’s calculations would plummet, precipitously, were al-Qaeda no longer an issue. Pakistan is an economic and political basket case; India, it’s arch rival is a regional power, a stable democracy whose long term economic and geostrategic importance to Washington (as a hedge against China) entirely dwarfs that of Pakistan. It’s far from clear that the Pakistani leadership would benefit more than it would lose should it manage to entirely uproot the Qaeda operations in its cities and wilds.

The administration likes to counter such skepticism by pointing out that al Qaeda has tried to kill Musharraf twice, and that this makes it an overriding imperative to prioritize their capture and elimination. Perhaps, but not necessarily. Musharraf owes his position not to any especially solid support base, but to his ability to balance, court and neutralize a number of competing interests. He’s certainly shown no sign that he believes it is in his best interests to mount a sustained, large-scale military offensive if the tribal lands bordering Afghanistan, where bin Laden is known to be hiding. But it’s a safe bet that there’ll be the occasional sortie to coincide with his foreign travels.

Posted in 99c Blogging, Featured Analysis, Situation Report | 5 Comments

Social Darwinism and New Orleans

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I’m probably still way too angry about what we’ve seen in New Orleans over the past two weeks to be writing about it. But a piece by Timothy Garton-Ash in the Guardian, of all places, has finally forced me to say something.

Garton-Ash is a very clever chap, and he tells us that what we have seen unfolding in New Orleans is an instance of “decivilization,” in which a crisis of resources quickly destroys the thin veneer of civility that binds us together, and reduces humans to their animal essence. (He’s talking of the incidents of extortion and brutality that got much media attention as the mechanisms of law enforcement were swept away.) “Katrina’s big lesson is that the crust of civilisation on which we tread is always wafer thin,” he writes. “One tremor, and you’ve fallen through, scratching and gouging for your life like a wild dog.”

“Remove the elementary staples of organised, civilised life – food, shelter, drinkable water, minimal personal security – and we go back within hours to a Hobbesian state of nature, a war of all against all. Some people, some of the time, behave with heroic solidarity; most people, most of the time, engage in a ruthless fight for individual and genetic survival. A few become temporary angels, most revert to being apes.”

By way of disclosure, he fesses up to the fact that he acts like an asshole in a crisis where the last seat on a plane may be at stake, assuming that the same goes for the rest of us and that we would therefore recognize such behavior as somehow natural. Garton-Ash warns that the combination of environmental cataclysms, poverty and war that await in the decades ahead are likely to combine to generalize this unfortunate state.

Now, I’m happy to accept the neo-Malthusians predictions on where things are heading in terms of scarce resources under ever greater pressure etc. because I’ve always found them far more compelling than the wishful thinking of globalization cheerleaders like Thomas Friedman who imagine global prosperity as an ever-expanding cake waiting to feed those who sign up for the program.

It’s Garton-Ash’s characterization of the human response to such crises that I find hard to accept. For every rapist and thug that rampaged in New Orleans, there were hundreds, thousands of ordinary people maintained their humanity and their sense of solidarity with one another even when it became clear that they had been abandoned by their government and the foundations of their society appear to be ripped out from under them. (Not entirely abandoned, of course: Bush flew over and then touched down among a crew of supporters to slap backs and praise FEMA chief Michael Brown – “Brownie,” in Bush’s adolescent nicknaming nomenclature — for the “great job” he was so obviously not doing. And the White House did warn those who dared to steal a loaf of bread from a flooded supermarket that such “looting” would not be tolerated, because property rights are sacrosanct and people ought to simply go hungry until some arm of the government could get supplies to them.)

The bulk of people in New Orleans bore their suffering with dignity and humanity. Just as in the Nazi concentration camps and other extreme instances cited by Garton-Ash, not everyone survived by being a selfish bastard. Just because you turn into an asshole when there’s only one seat left on the last plane out of Des Moines, Tim, doesn’t mean the rest of us do.

What I found a lot more annoying, and insidious, in Garton-Ash’s piece, was the fact that in the guise of this coolly detached social analysis, he is inadvertently rationalizing the very social Darwinism that lies at the heart of the betrayal of the people of New Orleans. Thousands may have died because the levees were not upgraded, despite repeated warnings of their vulnerability – the money was spent elsewhere. And FEMA’s response was shameful – hardly surprising, though, because FEMA was gutted by the Bush administration as part of their assault on “Big Government.” The hurricane was a natural disaster, but the extent of its impact was a product of human actions and omissions. The same social darwinism as Garton-Ash treats as inevitable is what undergirds the systematic looting of the federal government (through tax cuts and corporate welfare) over the past couple of decades, by a party governing in the interests of a tiny minority of the wealthiest Americans, but presenting themselves as bearers of the interests of the common people by draping themselves in the flag (who was it who said that “patriotism is the last refuge of scoundrels”?) and a version of Christianity that seems to have forgotten such basic observations by Jesus as the one that “it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven.” The logic of their actions in government, which have left the people of New Orleans more exposed than they needed to be, and then abandoned in the wake of the storm, is the same as that elaborated by Garton-Ash — resources are scarce, and the wealthy must take care of themselves first.

Given the extent of public anger, the Bush administration appears to have abandoned its traditional closing of ranks even around some of some of the fools, incompetents and charlatans that have authored some of its worst disasters — anyone remember that rather Soviet-esque moment in which President Bush literally awarded medals to George Tenet, Tommy Franks and Jerry Bremer for their “pivotal” roles in the Iraq fiasco. Last week “Brownie” may have been destined for a medal, but the administration is in such deep doo-doo politically that it needs a scapegoat, and “Brownie” — who told CNN four days after the storm that his department was unaware of the people taking refuge at the convention center — is the obvious choice.

But don’t let Brown’s anticipated hara-kiri distract you: The issue is not simply the competence of the CEO figure; it’s about a culture of government — and, more specifically, of shrinking government by starving it of funds in order to line the pockets of the wealthiest of the wealthy. Not only did Bush put an obviously incompetent political crony in charge of FEMA, he also slashed its funds and privatized some of its functions.

The problem with what Garton-Ash is saying is that if resources are scarce and anarchy inevitable, then – he suggests – a hoarding of resources by powerful elites is inevitable, “natural” even.

But if Garton-Ash is wrong, then New Orleans should serve as a reminder that a very different way of ordering society, and a very different set of priorities for government, may better serve and protect citizens in an age when scarce resources, environmental decline and longstanding conflicts are going to intensify the pressure on the bonds bind our fates together. New Orleans should be prompting a discussion on what defines America, on its common values and purpose, and how it ought to be governed in pursuit of those. It’s not a partisan thing, because the Democrats have hardly championed the cause of the common people with any conviction for some time now; they’ve been trying to avoid being accused of “class warfare” even though that’s exactly what the Republicans have relentlessly waged. What New Orleans showed more than anything else is that the America of Woodie Guthrie is very much alive; an America where people are still hungry and unemployed and line up by the relief office, or still work just as hard as they’re able for the crumbs from a rich man’s table, and still wonder if its truth or fable that “this land was made for you and me.” And that America has been failed by its leaders.

Posted in Situation Report | 4 Comments

Catering Camp David

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Only Clinton had an appetite for a deal

Published in the Tokyo-based magazine Eat in September 2000

Just what were those crafty Americans up to? The only soupcon of information tossed out to a ravenous pack of journalists after the first day of July’s failed Camp David peace summit was this: The previous evening, President Clinton, Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Barak and their delegations had dined on tenderloin of beef with sun-dried tomatoes, fillet of salmon with Thai curry sauce, roast baby Yukon potatoes, steamed green beans with almonds, a mixed garden salad, fresh fruit, and assorted desserts.

The question was what subtle signals were implied by this rather bland, eccletic offering. Were Washington’s chefs simply trying to play it as outlandishly neutral as possible, or was there some complex split-the-difference logic at work. After all, White House chefs of late have tended to doff their hats at the national cuisine of their guests: Morocco’s King Abdallah, for example, had been feted just the previous month with lemon-zest flavored lamb and warm goat’s cheese salad with fig dressing, followed by an exclusive concert by Earth, Wind and Fire — the latter, unlike the menu, being the young monarch’s own choice. In March, South African president Thabo Mbeki dined on apricot-glazed lamb and spring vegetables, followed by a stupendously kitschy monstrosity called “The Pride of South Africa”: a pineapple filled with pineapple ice cream and sour cherry sherbet, and wrapped with a white chocolate ribbon decorated with the shapes of exotic animals.

But then tenderloin beef, salmon and Thai curry have no relationship at all to the culinary traditions of either Israelis or Palestinians (which, of course, are remarkably similar, and serving falafel could certainly have sparked a showdown between the two sides on the touchy issue of just who invented it).

Perhaps the mystery of the menu can be divined in the runup to the talks, when both sides staked out their positions with visiting U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In Jerusalem, Barak laid on the finest Japanese appetizers the Jewish State could offer: molded avocado, grilled egg plant and sushi, followed by a grilled salmon, and finished off with chocolate mousse served on molded chocolate.

The following day Arafat, at his office in Ramallah, had countered Barak’s offering by staying Mediterranean, with a mezze platter followed assorted plates of fish, lamb and kebabs with spiced rice, finished off with heaping bowls of fresh fruit.

So perhaps Camp David’s menus were an attempt to navigate the difference. While Arafat’s men might have seen the salmon and Thai curry as a concession to the Israeli leader’s preferences, the following night appeared to be a symmetrical concession to Arafat with a “Mediterranean barbecue.” After that, Washington clamped down on menu information. It’s sensitivity may have been hinted at in the dying days when State Department official Richard Boucher was asked when next Arafat and Barak would next meet over dinner. “I am not sure that it will happen at this evening’s meal,” Boucher answered. “They were still thinking about it, about what kind of meal to have.”

Posted in Cuisine | 8 Comments

Judaism, Zionism and the Gaza Grotesquerie

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Settlers cynically appropriate the Holocaust: Jews can’t claim the support of other Jews when they violate Judaism’s fundamental ethics. Expelling Jews when they occupy other people’s land seems to me to be a very Jewish idea

We’ve already discussed why Israel’s withdrawal of its Gaza settlements is unlikely to move forward any kind of peace process — precisely, because, as even some of its most fervent advocates emphasize, it’s designed to avoid rather than facilitate negotiating a solution with the Palestinians. But the “disengagement” may mark the beginning of a breakdown of the Zionism that has been the organizing principle of Israel’s national ideology, and that could, in turn, eventually advance the cause of peace despite Sharon’s intention.

For Jews like myself, who see Judaism primarily as a universal ethical challenge rather that has nothing to do with the tribal nationalism of Ariel Sharon or the crusader-in-a-yarmulke eschatology of the settlers; those of us who have chosen to live elsewhere and don’t see Israel as “representing” us or claim a kind absentee landlord right to “return” there at the expense of others, it’s sometimes hard to find the words to express our outrage at their sheer chutzpah in claiming to act in our name. Harder, still, to remain silent when Eli Wiesel demands that the Palestinians should show more gratitude for Israel’s decision to end its settlement policy in Gaza.

Wiesel has every right to demand that the Palestinians understand the Holocaust experience and how this has shaped Israeli thinking. But when he demands gratitude from the Palestinians for Israel’s decision to give back land seized at gunpoint, and insists that the episode has been so traumatic that nobody can expect Israel to make any moves now towards peace, Wiesel uses his status as a symbol of the Holocaust to simply endorse Ariel Sharon’s political views. I have to agree with the view of former Knesset speaker Avram Burg that there was nothing “Jewish” about Israel’s colonization of Gaza, and I certainly don’t believe it flowed in any logical way from the Holocaust experience. The “trauma” to which Wiesel refers is entirely self-inflicted.

If the ethical basis of Judaism is that we measure our own actions by the impact they have on others — Hillel’s “That which is hateful unto yourself, do not do unto others” — then Wiesel’s description of the retreating settlers as “the Dispossessed” is straight out of Orwell’s 1984. The settlers moved into Gaza fully aware that it was occupied territory, not part of Israel; they have been subsidized up the wazoo to stay there, and once the realpolitik of those who originally encouraged them to settle there now required them to leave, they were paid monumental “compensation” packages. Gaza was not theirs to possess; if anyone in Gaza is truly “dispossessed,” it is the territory’s 1 million Palestinians, most of them descendants of those driven out of Israel in 1948. The Jews forced to give up their homes in Gaza when the whole settlement enterprise finally became politically untenable have no claim on my sympathy — not even to the extent that they were duped by Sharon, who as recently as 18 months ago was telling them that the fate of Netzarim was the fate of Tel Aviv, and that the Gaza settlements were essential to Israel’s future.

Saving the Jews

Still, the trauma of which Wiesel writes is real within the ranks of Sharon’s ruling alliance, and the Zionist movement more generally. And that could presage an important long-term shift. Remember, we are talking here about an ideology whose worst nightmare is that Israel becomes a “normal country.” Don’t take it from me, you can hear it from the horses mouth in the proceedings of an “elite” conference convened in Maryland earlier this year to
“formulate a plan for the Jewish people.” (In a display of epic self-restraint, I shall resist the temptation toward savage sarcasm, but I will note that these are the sort of folks who would prefer to see “most Jewish children enrolled in Jewish educational institutions” — a fate I strenuously, and successfully resisted throughout my South African childhood, a fact for which I’m eternally grateful — rather than getting educated along with the rest of America, and who consider “intermarriage” a crisis.) One of the primary fears explored at the gathering was what they saw as the mounting pressure, in Israel, to create a “normal” country where Israeli identity was more important than Jewish identity. Now wait a minute: Why should young Israelis be burdened with maintaining the fallacy that their national purpose is to maintain a great national ghetto in the heart of a hostile region in order to maintain a safe haven for the rest of us, who have chosen, quite freely, to live elsewhere? Why should they, under the rubric of national service, be forced to enable, at their own considerable pain and discomfort, and sometimes at the cost of their lives, the deranged messianism of a bunch of extremists who want to live in the heart of Palestinian areas in Gaza, Hebron and elsewhere? Young Israelis want to watch their soccer teams compete in Europe, drop ecstasy in the clubs of Tel Aviv and Goa, live in peace and tranquility as global citizens. Normalcy — the nightmare of the self-appointed guardians of our fate — is their right. And if the Gaza pullout results in an ideological fracturing that reinforces the voices of normalcy in Israel, then that’s a good thing.

A detour by way of disclosure: I was a teenage Zionist, reared on the movement’s basic premise that Jewish life in the Diaspora was doomed by anti-Semitism to be nasty, brutish and probably short. Jewish survival and freedom of self-expression, I was taught, depended on growing a Jewish nation state in Israel, and maintaining maintaining a Jewish demographic majority there. I was no Likudnik, of course — even as teenagers, we in Habonim called Betar, the youth wing of the Likud movement, “fascists” because of their militaristic ultranationalism (and the fact that their founder, Zeev Jabotinsky, had openly admired Mussolini) — I was an idealistic young socialist of the Labor Zionist movement, imagining that working the land collectively in our blue Kibbutznik shirts we would be a Jewish vanguard in the pursuit of a global socialist utopia. Our nationalist emigration was but a way station to a global brotherhood. Yes, yes, I know, but I was only 17, and in comparison to the “Christian National Education” on offer at the windswept cultural wasteland of Milnerton High School in the mid 1970s, these ideas transmitted once a week by blue-shirted hippies who introduced me to everything from Bob Dylan and Bob Marley to dialectics and the poetry of Yevtushenko were an intellectual lifeline.

The conflict with the Palestinians pained me, of course — and I was especially uncomfortable about the fact that while the PLO was close to the liberation movement in South Africa, Israel was the most important military ally of the apartheid regime. There was not even the slightest inclination in the Zionist movement of my youth to seek to understand why the other side might be fighting; that would be too subversive. (As, indeed, it soon was for me, and also cleary always had been for many Israelis: In 1999, during his successful campaign for prime minister, Ehud Barak was asked in a live TV interview what he’d have done if he’d been born Palestinian. He answered: “Join a fighting organization.” He tried to backtrack later, but in that moment of candor he’d revealed the most profound truth of the conflict — that Israelis themselves, were they to find themselves in the situation of the Palestinians, would also have taken up arms. If that perspective were widely embraced on the Israeli side, and the Palestinian leadership were able to articulate a similar understanding of the situation in which the survivors of the Holocaust who made it to Israel found themselves in 1948 — in the way that the ANC leadership came to appreciate anxieties at the root of Afrikaner nationalism — the prospects for peace would be greatly enhanced.)

My doubts grew during a 1978/9 visit to Israel, when I heard the elders of Habonim now settled on Kibbutz Yizreel issue prescient warnings of the dangers lurking in the settlement movement that had begun in earnest following Likud’s victory a year earlier. Encouraged by a certain Ariel Sharon, Israel was fast grabbing some of the best land in the West Bank and building settlements, precisely to make it impossible to give back this land in any peace deal. Israel couldn’t afford to annex the West Bank and Gaza, they said, because that would add 4 million Palestinians to the Israeli electorate, meaning the end of a Jewish majority. So by building a permanent presence to claim control over the West Bank but deny its people the rights of citizenship, Likud would turn Israel into an apartheid state.

Growing doubts

Nor could I avoid the whiff of racial thinking all too familiar from South African official discourse when the leaders of our own movement urged us to move to a new kibbutz, Tuval, which was being built from scratch in the Gallillee, as part of an internal settlement policy to entrench a Jewish presence in a region where the birth-rate among Israeli-Arabs threatened its Jewish demographic majority .

In South Africa, of course, the liberation movement led by the ANC offered an increasingly compelling alternative that seemed to far better realize the ethical impulses that had first inspired me in Habonim. It was a movement premised on the idea that all South Africans, black and white, shared a common humanity that was denied by apartheid. Whites therefore were called on not simply to reject white domination, but also to join the liberation struggle alongside their black compatriots. And the fact that so many of the white South Africans who had earned places of honor in that struggle were Jewish certainly strengthened its appeal as a vehicle to express even my own particular version of Jewishness. Israel may have been the apartheid regime’s most important friend, but when Nelson Mandela was tried in 1964, the three white men among his co-accused were all Jewish. The exiled leadership of the ANC included the likes of Joe Slovo, Ruth First, Ronnie Kassrils, Rusty Bernstein, Jack Simons, Ray Alexander and many, many more. (Years later, following Slovo’s death, his comrades met to discuss the epitaph for his tombstone — they had settled on “Mensch,” but had to drop the idea when they considered the inscrutability of that term to rank-and-file Zulu- or Xhosa-speaking activists.)

When one of my Habonim elders in Cape Town lent me a copy of Uri Avnery’s “Israel Without Zionism,” I finally found the comfort zone that allowed me to articulate my own rejection of Zionism’s basic premises and mythology. Avnery, after all, was one of “us,” he’d been there in the war of 1948 and described some of the ethnic cleansing done by Israeli military units including his own. Because it had been drummed into me that criticism of the Zionist project was nothing more than a Trojan horse for Nazism, at that time it was emotionally important to me that Averny was Jewish rather than an Arab or Western critic who could be accused of harboring some unstated ill-will towards Jews. Moreover, Avnery was advocating co-existence between Jews and Arabs in Israel, rather than the idea of maintaining the territory as an “ethnic” homeland for the Jews of the world — the “normalcy” so dreaded by the Zionist leadership.

But normalcy is now slowly being forced on Israel, by the simple fact that the majority of Jews — two thirds of us — have chosen to remain in the Diaspora, thereby negating Zionism’s dark premise that the world is so innately antisemitic that Jews could never survive except among themselves. Most of us have found the Diaspora sufficiently comfortable that we’ve never felt forced to retreat to Zionism’s version of the ghetto — and some three quarters of a million Israeli Jews who now live abroad appear to have made a similar assessment.

Zionism’s collapse

It was the choice of most Jews to stay away from the “Jewish State” that negated the Zionist enterprise, according to Israeli and Zionist leaders interviewed in Ethan Bronner’s recent New York Times analysis of the matter. Bronner quotes the New York consul general of Israel, Arye Mekel, thus: “Ideologically, we are disappointed. A pure Zionist must be disappointed because Zionism meant the Jews of the world would take their baggage and move to Israel. Most did not.” Bronner continues, “Contrary to the expectations of the early Zionists, as Ambassador Mekel noted, most of the world’s Jews have not joined their brethren to live in Israel. Of the world’s 13 million to 14 million Jews, a minority – 5.26 million – make their home in Israel, and immigration has largely dried up. Last year, a record low 21,000 Jews immigrated to Israel… the misery that Zionists expected Jews elsewhere to suffer has not materialized. More than half a century after the establishment of the Jewish state, more Jews live in the United States than in Israel. ”

Without necessarily intending it, Bronner’s piece has drawn attention to the fact that the Zionist project is predicated on Jewish misery; on the world being too hostile a place for Jews to live. The founder of the Zionist movement, Theodore Herzl, was initimately aware of anti-semitism as the essential precondition for realizing his goal of a Jewish State, writing in his diary during the Dreyfuss trial: “In Paris, as I have said, I achieved a freer attitude toward anti-Semitism, which I now began to understand historically and to pardon. Above all, I recognized the emptiness and futility of trying to ‘combat’ anti-Semitism.” Well, no, I don’t think anti-Semitism is in anyway natural or inevitable or intractable, or that seeking to combat it is futile. But then, I’m not a Zionist, I’m a Jew who sees my place as wherever I choose to live in the wider world.

The peacenik Labor Zionism of my youth — a combination of utopian socialism and the nationalist impulse (spurred by the rise of European nationalism in the breakup of the Hapsburg empire and by the anti-semitic currents that accompanied it in some places) to create a safe haven for Jews — had essentially collapsed by the mid 1970s. Its impassioned epitaph was written by Burg two years ago. Its worth quoting at length: “It turns out that the 2,000-year struggle for Jewish survival comes down to a state of settlements, run by an amoral clique of corrupt lawbreakers who are deaf both to their citizens and to their enemies. A state lacking justice cannot survive. More and more Israelis are coming to understand this as they ask their children where they expect to live in 25 years. Children who are honest admit, to their parents’ shock, that they do not know. The countdown to the end of Israeli society has begun. It is very comfortable to be a Zionist in West Bank settlements such as Beit El and Ofra. The biblical landscape is charming. From the window you can gaze through the geraniums and bougainvilleas and not see the occupation. Traveling on the fast highway that takes you from Ramot on Jerusalem’s northern edge to Gilo on the southern edge, a 12-minute trip that skirts barely a half-mile west of the Palestinian roadblocks, it’s hard to comprehend the humiliating experience of the despised Arab who must creep for hours along the pocked, blockaded roads assigned to him. One road for the occupier, one road for the occupied.

“This cannot work. Even if the Arabs lower their heads and swallow their shame and anger forever, it won’t work. A structure built on human callousness will inevitably collapse in on itself. Note this moment well: Zionism’s superstructure is already collapsing like a cheap Jerusalem wedding hall… Israel, having ceased to care about the children of the Palestinians, should not be surprised when they come washed in hatred and blow themselves up in the centers of Israeli escapism. They consign themselves to Allah in our places of recreation, because their own lives are torture. They spill their own blood in our restaurants in order to ruin our appetites, because they have children and parents at home who are hungry and humiliated.”

This from a man who was, within the last decade, the speaker of Israel’s national legislature.

For the past two or three decades, however, Zionism’s standard has been mostly born by the hard-right nationalists of Likud (the nationalist impulse without the socialist one), in alliance with the religious Zionists (Taliban-style literalists) who have increasingly given that nationalism its content and cultural sustenance. In other words, the “national purpose” of the Israeli state has shifted, gradually, from the utopian socialist ideals of the labor movement to the false messianism of “redeeming” the Biblical Land of Israel as if the coming of their Messiah can be hastened by the conquest of territory. But theirs is a Judaism less of universal ethics than of eschatalogical literalism and the “holiness” of piles of stones and patches of dirt. Instead of a golden calf, they’re hard at work trying to breed a red heifer.

Labor Zionism gave way to the impulse towards “normalcy.” To understand this phenomenon, I strongly recommend the work of Tom Segev, the marvelous Israeli historian and post-Zionist commentator. Pick up “Elvis in Jerusalem” for a brief chronicle of the emergence of “post-Zionism” in Israel, although all his work is worth reading, particularly “The Seventh Million: Israeli Jews and the Holocaust” and “One Palestine Complete”. The antithesis of post-Zionism, of course, was the growth of the religious-nationalist right of which the settlement movement is the vanguard.

They were nurtured and encouraged by Sharon, of course, the champion of secular right nationalism. But it’s a tactical alliance whose limits have now been exposed: The settlers have an absolutist view; Sharon trades in realpolitik. For many religious Zionists, Sharon has betrayed them, and in the process taken the temporal Israeli nation-state off the path of messianic redemption. Israel will be wracked for years to come with a debate over what exactly the basis of its national identity is to be. That’s a debate that could go on until the messiah comes (or doesn’t), of course, but in the mean time, there’s little chance that the Zionist movement will be able to reverse the choice of the majority of Jews to live elsewhere. There’s simply not enough anti-semitism out there to realize the goal of Zionism — and the Maryland talkshop mentioned earlier — to have the majority of the world’s Jews move to Israel. Normalcy beckons.

Posted in A Wondering Jew | 11 Comments

Whose Coke Is It, Anyway?

Published in the Cape Times, July 1998

chamula
The Mayan church at St. Juan Chamula, in Chiapas: When
Pepsi arrived here, it was simply incorporated into indigenous rituals

The revolution will not be televised, not in Afghanistan, any way. The country’s ruling Taliban militia have banned television and given Afghans two weeks to destroy all TV sets, VCRs and satellite dishes. The Taliban thought they’d eliminated television two years ago when they shut down Afghanistan’s only TV station. But Afghans had fashioned satellite dishes out of bicycle wheels and other household implements to join the more than 1 billion people who tune in to the likes of “Baywatch,” the most popular program on the planet. The spectacle of David Hasselhof and his buff crew of swimsuited young lifeguards romping on the beaches of an imaginary California (in which everybody is white and the plot line seldom runs deeper than the lyrics of any Beach Boys song) might corrupt the Taliban’s medieval interpretation of Islam. Now the zealots, who came to power with the tacit backing of the U.S. after its Reagan-era Afghanistan policy had left the country in a state of catastrophic collapse, can go about the business of barring women from education and ensuring that men don’t shave free of the distractions posed by “Beverly Hills 90210.”

Earlier in the week, a New Delhi court had issued a warrant for the arrest of media mogul Rupert Murdoch, on the grounds that his Star TV satellite network was beaming “obscenity” into India – although their definition extends to such not-quite-erotica as tampon ads.

Two weeks ago, in Ottawa, Canada, a gathering of culture ministers from 20 countries had gathered to discuss concerns not dissimilar from those of the Taliban and New Delhi’s nationalist magistrates – the encroaching juggernaut of U.S. popular culture. Participants ranging from Cote D’Ivoire and South Africa to Iceland and Ukraine planned a series of further meetings over the next two years to formulate strategies to counter the Disneyfication of the planet.

In this era of globalization, concern at the impact of the world’s children being raised on a diet of Hollywood movies and television is understandable – after all, responsible parents would certainly do their utmost to avoid feeding their children only cotton candy. But culture is a commodity in today’s world economy, one of America’s top three exports. Which is why when France tries to promote its own film industry by imposing additional taxes on U.S. films in order to subsidize French productions, the issue is fought out at the World Trade Organization. Similarly Canada’s attempts to protect its magazine industry by imposing a stronger tax regime on American titles looking to publish there. It’s also the reason why the mass pirating of CDs and videos in China has been accorded far more importance than human rights on the agenda of Beijing-Washington relations during the ’90s. Those looking to fight the encroachment of U.S. popular culture are often trying to protect a fledgling local entertainment industry against being swamped by Baywatch and 90210 – a tough proposition since American TV are not only often more attractive to Hollywood-coached palates everywhere than much local programming; being in syndication they usually cost only a fraction of what it costs to produce homegrown TV drama in most countries.

Trying to roll back the tide of U.S. popular culture in a world whose communication system is global may be like trying to unlearn a language acquired in childhood – after all, go almost anywhere on the planet and you’ll find that people recognize the images of Mickey Mouse or Leonardo DiCaprio or Michael Jordan or Madonna, or the logos of Coke, Pepsi and Nike. American pop culture is a kind of cultural “second language” spoken around the globe. But critics given to despair at this apparently unassailable “cultural imperialism” should consider that while it might be impossible (and even ill-advised) to deny Mickey an entry visa, that doesn’t mean the cartoon rodent is able to digest all indigenous culture.

The spread of Catholicism provides an interesting analogy. When Europeans began colonizing the New World in the 15th century, they used horrendous violence to force millions of indigenous people and African slaves to abandon their own cultures and accept, often at gunpoint, the “salvation” offered by the Catholic Church. Once armed resistance was defeated, those people’s had no option but to comply. Or at least create the impression of complying – what was in fact taking place was more complex.

Three years ago I visited a Catholic Church in the village of San Juan Chamula in the hills overlooking San Christobal De Las Casas in Chiapas, the rebellious Mexican state where indigenous Mayan culture had proved most tenacious. It was unlike any other Catholic Church I’d ever seen – there were no pews and the floor was covered in pine needles. Images of the Christian saints were arranged along the walls — each associated with an iconic animal – and St. John, rather than Christ, occupied the central position. People gathered in clusters around shamans, who performed healing and cleansing rites with live chickens, eggs and a potent moonshine called ‘Posh’. There wasn’t a priest in sight, and a guide explained that the Church was run by a council of Mayan elders, who allowed the priest to perform baptisms but not to say Mass. While it maintained, in altered form, the accoutrements of Catholicism and its status in the local Archdiocese, the church was essentially a modern incarnation of a traditional Mayan place of worship. In other words, when the Spanish had defeated them on the battlefield, the Maya had entered the church but had carried their traditional beliefs with them and transformed Catholic symbols and cosmology to suit their own.

This “syncretism,” as scholars of religion call it, is characteristic of Catholicism throughout the New World — from the U.S. to Cuba and Mexico to Brazil, the phenomena of Santeria, Voudou and Candomble reflect the survival of traditional African and indigenous American beliefs in Catholic garb. In other words, where Catholicism may have appeared to have remade the world in its own image, there was a counter-tendency of Catholicism being remade to reflect the beliefs of the indigenous cultures it had tried to obliterate.

When worshippers in this Mayan church suddenly produced bottles of Coke and Pepis and started downing them with gusto, the whole argument seemed in danger of collapse. Until the guide explained that when the popular the American colas had arrived in the village a few years earlier, the Mayan elders had responded by incorporating them into religious rituals as a means of inducing the belching that would release bad spirits.

There’s a lesson in there somewhere.

Posted in Annals of Globalization | 6 Comments