Bono’s Vanity: Showcasing Africa, or its Glamorous Patrons?


Can anyone explain Queen Rania’s presence?

It with great pleasure that I introduce guest columnist Sean Jacobs, a fellow Capetonian who these days divides his time between Brooklyn and Ann Arbor, where he is an assistant professor of Communication Studies and African Studies at the University of Michigan. He describes himself as “a frustrated journalist” (is there any other kind?), and in his spare time edits the online edition of Chimurenga magazine. In 2004 he directed the Ten Years of Freedom Film Festival in New York City in April 2004.

Bono’s Vanity: Showcasing Africa, or Promoting its Glamorous Patrons?

By Sean Jacobs

In 1965, the Senegalese filmmaker Ousmane Sembene wrote and directed — against the odds, with minimal support from his government and a few French patrons, and as a director with meager cinematic background — the film Le noir de … (Black Girl) about a young Senegalese immigrant domestic working for a French family in the Antibes. The film, the first feature directed by a black African, was hailed at the time by New York Times critic A.H. Weiler (in now outdated language) as “put[ing] a sharp, bright focus on an emerging, once dark African area and on a forceful talent with fine potentials.” Sembene died this week at 84 after an illustrious career, saluted by another New York Times critic, A.O. Scott, for being as uncompromising in his criticism of Africa’s post-liberation regimes as he had been of French colonial domination. More importantly, Scott pointed out, Sembene was also passionate about celebrating the equality of Africa with the West: “He believed that Africans would experience true liberation when they threw off European models and discovered their own, homegrown versions of modernity.”

One can only wonder what Sembene might have achieved with the resources made available to former rock star Bono in his recent role as guest editor of a special “Africa” issue of the high-end monthly Vanity Fair.

Africa, of course, is now everyone’s pet cause. It offers an opportunity to shine for northern political leaders unpopular at home, and for Hollywood actresses and former and current pop stars to be seen doing their bit for humanity by lining up to visit the continent (mainly its children) or pleading its case in Western capitals. Bono, especially, has built a new career as a savior of Africa and makes much of pulling out all stops to plead the continent’s case — and his access to the corridors of power makes him a lot more effective in this role than his pop predecessor, Bob Geldof. In March this year, the U2 frontman who has accomplished the remarkable feat of being a friend to Nelson Mandela and George W. Bush simultaneously, announced he would guest edit the special issue of the glossy magazine, which would “rebrand Africa” for the magazine’s well-heeled readership and advertisers. His intentions were noble: “When you see people humiliated by extreme poverty and wasting away with flies buzzing around their eyes, it is easy not to believe that they are same as us,” he said.

Capturing the energy of a continent with 890 million and 54 countries in one issue of a magazine was always going to be a tall order, but even then, Bono and his team gets it really wrong. The key personnel included the head of communication of Bono’s RED Campaign as well as the actor Djimon Hounsou, who is credited as a “consultant.” And it shows. At times it looks like another ad for the RED Campaign.

It is never entirely clear whether the purpose of the edition is to showcase Africa — or people who promote Africa in the West, especially within the United States?

Much has been made of the issue’s twenty different covers. Twenty-one “prominent people” photographed by Annie Liebovitz in groups of two and three in a series meant to depict a “conversation” about Africa — she called it a “visual chain letter … spreading the message from person to person.”

The result of all that planning and effort (the real editor Graydon Carter lists Liebovitz’s flight schedule in his “editor’s letter”) is hardly extraordinary — though I was intrigued by, if not sure what to make of, the curious shot of Madonna apparently sniffing Maya Angelou.

Only three of those featured are actual Africans: the actor (and editor’s consultant) Djimon Hounsou, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Iman. (Three and a half, if you count U.S. presidential longshot Barack Obama, another cover model, by virtue of being the son of a Kenyan economist.)

Not exactly a new brand of Africa: Hounsou is largely a product of Hollywood; Tutu, with respect, has retired from his life as an activist cleric; and Iman’s only qualification is that she was a well-known model in 1980s.

As for the non-Africans featured on the cover, if some of these are Africa’s friends, it does not
need enemies. President George W. Bush and his Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice are a particularly odd choice — incidentally, they are pictured in a strangely intimate moment with Condi seeming to tug at George’s arm, as if the image was designed to provoke titillated speculation in the U.S. media.

Vanity Fair is not a news magazine, and therefore usually avoids putting people it dislikes on its cover. Carter, in his editor’s note, reveals his differences with Bono about including Bush and Rice, but the rock star appears to believe Bush’s Africa policies may be the “silver lining” of the current U.S. administration. But if silver linings were the criteria, then Thabo Mbeki, probably the most recognizable African political leader for his promotion of democracy, good governance and economic development, ought to have been included — perhaps Editor Bono deems Mbeki’s strange politics on HIV/AIDS and his “quiet diplomacy” on the crises in Zimbabwe are somehow worse than the Iraq war.

As for as strange cover choices go, though, Queen Rania of Jordan tops this list. I hope it was not because Bono thought Jordan was an African country.

A group of actual Africans profiled as representing the “spirit” of the continent — “activists, artists, doctors, athletes, entrepreneurs, economists” are given more limited treatment in short paragraph-length descriptions of their achievements.

The feature articles are written by go-to “Africa hands” in the United States, including Christopher Hitchens (offering a rambling stream of consciousness piece of Tunisia that recycles some earlier reporting), Sebastian Junger (a journalist described elsewhere as fascinated with “extreme situations and people at the edges of things”), and Spencer Wells (an “explorer-in-residence at National Geographic”). Only one actual African contributor, Binyavanga Wainaina on contemporary Kenya, made the cut.

Youssou N’Dour, the Senegalese singer, is credited as a contributor for a piece on a music festival in Mali written by a former MTV executive, but that appears more like a transparent attempt to counter criticism of the magazine’s editors for the limited African “voice” in the magazine.

The big profiles go to anti-poverty economist Jeffrey Sachs (Bono’s friend) and the late Princess Diana — since the issue appeared, much of the mainstream coverage has been about how this article, and an accompanying book, could resurrect the career of Tina Brown. Former U.S. president Bill Clinton writes on Nelson Mandela and Brad Pitt plays journalist by asking Archbishop Desmond Tutu really silly questions. Having praised South Africa for going the route of “restorative justice” — last time I checked nothing of the sort happened — Pitt has a follow-up question for Tutu: “Then it is worth asking what is the outcome for societies who have rushed toward retributive justice, like the Shia in Iraq?” Huh? Madonna gets to redeem herself after her bungled adoption of a Malawian child: she is doing a documentary on orphans in Malawi now.

Nothing substantial is written about the continent’s most populous and vibrant region, West Africa (except for the article on the music festival in the Malian desert). South Africa, the continent’s richest country (with Johannesburg slowly emerging as the continent’s cultural and media capital as the paragraph-length feature on the Africa Channel and the drooling photograph of actress Terry Pheto of the film Tsotsi suggests) gets short shrift. Apart from the Clinton piece on Mandela (which, typical of the tradition here, reduces the former guerrilla to saintly grandfather) and the Pitt “interview” with Tutu, there is nothing that captures some of the struggles to define this new Africa.

Nevertheless, on the upside, publications like the Cape Town-based literary and politics magazine Chimurenga (full disclosure: I am its online editor) and “new wave” writers such as Wainaina, Orange Prize-winner Chimamanda Adichie, Doreen Baingana and Mohamed Magani, among others, are getting some helpful exposure to new (and well-heeled) audiences and readers. And there’s some well-deserved attention for the AIDS activism of people like Zackie Achmat and the global justice campaigner Archbishop Ndungane (Tutu’s successor as Anglican prelate in South Africa, who would have been a more contemporary choice for the cover image), among others.

Also recognized is for the tireless work of New York African Film Festival director Mahen Bonetti, and the filmmakers Teddy Mattera, Gaston Kabore, Jean Marie Teno, and Safi Feye who all, unfortunately, are featured only in a group photo, with their work summed up in one paragraph. The coverage of these figures, however, is very minimal.

But even these upsides are spoiled by the sloppiness of the magazine. According to one of my sources, the one substantive article on the actual work of Africans (apart from Wainaina’s piece on Kenya) — -an omnibus article on the continent’s “literary renaissance” by Elissa Scappell and Rob Spillmann — contains a lot of untruths and plain invention.

For one, Nadine Gordimer, part of the old guard of African letters is described as a “founder member of the African National Congress” and the “conscience of South Africa.” Uh, the ANC was founded in 1912, 11 years before Gordimer’s birth, and only opened its membership to whites in 1969. As for Gordimer being the “conscience of South Africa,” I’m not sure you’d find many South Africans who would have accorded her such prominence in the national imagination.

It also appears that description of the event at the heart of the article — the SLS Kenya/Kwani? Literary Festival — is a bit off base. According to my source (who like me, is a fan of Adichie’s novels) the descriptions of “standing room only” readings given by her in Nairobi, is more an attempt by the writers of the articles to make the story fit the issue’s hype. On the night she read at the University of Nairobi, most festival visitors opted instead to go listen to the much older Ugandan writer Taban Lo Liyong, who was reading in the room next door.


Fela says…

In the end, reading Bono’s Vanity Fair Africa branding edition leaves me remembering what a friend of mine says when he feels he’s been had: “As Fela would say, this is ‘expensive shit’.”

Posted in Guest Columns, The Whole World's Africa | 51 Comments

Gaza: Another Mess Made in U.S.

Coming, as he does, from Fox News, Tony Snow is obviously a deeply cynical fellow, but this takes some beating: Asked to comment Wednesday on the bloodbath in Gaza, he answered: “Ultimately, the Palestinians are going to have to sort out their politics and figure out which pathway they want to pursue — the pathway toward two states living peaceably side-by-side, or whether this sort of chaos is going to become a problem.”

Everyone following the conflict in Gaza knows full well that the reason for the violence is not that Palestinians have not “sorted out their politics” — they’ve made their political preferences abundantly clear in democratic elections, and later in a power-sharing agreement brokered by the Saudis. The problem is that the U.S. and the corrupt and self-serving warlords of Fatah did not accept either the election result or the unity government, and have conspired actively ever since to reverse both by all available means, including starving the Palestinian economy of funds, refusing to hand over power over the Palestinian Authority to the elected government, and arming and training Fatah loyalists to militarily restore their party’s power. Unfortunately, after three days of some of the most savage fighting ever seen in Gaza, that strategy now lies in tatters. Fatah is, quite simply, no longer a credible fighting force in Gaza, where it has long been in decline as a credible political force.

But Snow’s cynicism is hardly unexpected. Back in January, I wrote:

In the coming weeks, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will cluck regretfully about the violence unfolding in the Palestinian territories as if the chaos in Gaza has as little to do with her as, say, the bizarrely warm winter weather in New York. And much of the U.S. media will concur by covering that violence as if it is part of some inevitable showdown in the preternaturally violent politics of the Palestinians. But any honest assessment will not fail to recognize that the increasingly violent conflict between Hamas and Fatah is not only a by-product of Secretary Rice’s economic siege of the Palestinians; it is the intended consequence of her savage war on the Palestinian people – a campaign of retribution and collective punishment for their audacity to elect leaders other than those deemed appropriate to U.S. agendas. Moreover, the fact that the conflict is now coming to a head is a product of Rice’s micromanagement of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s political strategy – against his own better instincts.

Rice’s siege strategy was premised on the belief that the economic torture of the entire Palestinian population would either force the Hamas government to chant the catechism of recognizing Israel-renouncing violence-abiding by previous agreements (again, Israeli leaders have to giggle at that one!) — or else, preferably, force the Palestinian electorate to recant the heresy of choosing Hamas as its government in the first place. Frustrated by the failure of this collective punishment to produce the desired results — and mindful of the need to quickly reorder Palestinian politics in order to satisfy the urgent need of the increasingly marginal Arab autocracies that Washington seeks to mobilize against Iran — she has stepped things up a notch, cajoling the hapless Abbas to take steps to toppled a government democratically elected only 11 months ago and beefing up the forces of the Fatah warlords dedicated to taking down Hamas in order to restore their own power of patronage.

At about the same time, Conflict Forum reported on the aggressive campaign by White House Middle East policy chief Elliot Abrams to provoke a coup by Fatah against Hamas. The U.S. policy was to prevent a Palestinian unity government from forming, and once it was formed, the policy became to topple it. And Robert Malley and Henry Siegman warned that the White House policy failed to reckon with the fact that Fatah had been defeated politically, and would not be able to restore its leadership of the Palestinians through a putsch. Even if his forces could be boosted, they warned, “(they) will remain a far less motivated one (than Hamas), seen by many as doing America’s and Israel’s bidding. In such a contest, success is far from assured, as we should know from Iraq, Lebanon and, indeed, Palestine itself.”

Last month, when the first round of fighting between Fatah and Hamas began, I noted that its key protagonist on the Fatah side was not President Abbas, but the warlord Mohammed Dahlan. I noted:

Dahlan’s ambitions clearly coincided with plans drawn up by White House Middle East policy chief, Elliot Abrams — a veteran of the Reagan Administration’s Central American dirty wars — to arm and train Fatah loyalists to prepare them to topple the Hamas government. If Mahmoud Abbas has been reluctant to embrace the confrontational policy promoted by the White House, Dahlan has no such qualms. And given that Abbas has no political base of his own, he is dependent entirely on Washington and Dahlan.

…Dahlan was just about the only thing that the U.S. had going for it in terms of resisting the move towards a unity government. Although his fretting and sulking in Mecca couldn’t prevent the deal, the U.S. appears to have helped him fight back afterwards by ensuring that he was appointed national security adviser, a move calculated to provoke Hamas, whose leaders tend to view Dahlan as little more than a torturer and a de facto enforcer for Israel.

But Dahlan appears to have made his move when it came to integrating the Palestinian Authority security forces (currently dominated by Fatah) by drawing in Hamas fighters and subjecting the forces to the control of a politically neutral interior minister. Dahlan simply refused, and set off the current confrontations by ordering his men out onto the street last weekend without any authorization from the government of which he is supposedly a part.

…it’s plain that Dahlan, like Pinochet a quarter century, would not move onto a path of confrontation with an elected government unless he believed he had the sanction of powerful forces abroad to do so. If does move to turn the current street battle into a frontal assault on the unity government, chances are it will be because he got a green light from somewhere — and certainly not from Mahmoud Abbas.

But the confrontation under way has assumed a momentum of its own, and it may now be beyond the capability of the Palestinian leadership as a whole to contain it. If that proves true, the petulance that has substituted for policy in the Bush Administration’s response to the 2006 Palestinian election will have succeeded in turning Gaza into Mogadishu. But it may be too much to expect the Administration capable of anything different — after all, they’re still busy turning Mogadishu into Mogadishu all over again.

This analysis was echoed by Haaretz’s Danny Rubinstein, who writes:

“The recent events we have been witnessing in Gaza are actually the disbanding of Palestinian rule. The primary reason for the break-up is the fact that Fatah, headed by Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, has refused to fully share the PA’s mechanism of power with its rival Hamas – in spite of Hamas’ decisive victory in the January 2006 general elections.

“Fatah was forced to overrule the Palestinian voters because the entire world demanded it do so. The United States, the European nations, most of the Arab leaders and, of course, the State of Israel, warned Fatah not to share power with Hamas.

“And so, after the Israeli pullout, instead of becoming a model for Palestinian self-rule, Gaza turned into the exact opposite. Matters have come to the point where Hamas operatives attempted all through Monday and Tuesday to take by force what they believe they rightfully deserve. “

Indeed, in this month of observing the anniversary of the 1967 war, Hamas appears to have taken a leaf from Israel’s playbook in that conflict. Instead of standing by and letting Dahlan set the terms of the conflict, slowly raising the temperature of the confrontation in keeping with the capabilities of his forces, Hamas went to war this time to destroy Fatah’s capability to fight in Gaza. Having trounced Fatah on the polls, it now moved to trounce them on the streets in a well-orchestrated military campaign that scattered and neutralized Dahlan’s forces. Many of them surrendered or simply melted away; some 40 officers of the U.S.-trained presidential guard were last seen blowing a hole into the Israeli wall around Gaza through which they fled to Egypt, where there commander, Dahlan, happened to be anyway.

The rout has been complete in Gaza, forcing Abbas to accept Hamas’s terms for a new truce. Gaza, as Abbas aides have said bluntly, “is lost.” Another spectacular Middle East debacle for the Bush Administration’s trophy cabinet. Hundreds of Palestinians have died and thousands more have had their lives ruined by the brutal arrogant folly of Rice, Abrams and company. Hamas is in power because the Palestinian people wanted it there, and no amount of economic strangulation or proxy warfare has altered that fact. It didn’t have to go this way; this was the route that Washington chose, believing it would prevail.

The administration’s response when Hamas was elected in January 2006 echoed Brecht’s mocking of the East German leadership in 1948: “The people have lost confidence in the party? Well, then, why not dissolve the people and elect another?” It was widely warned that Hamas was an intractable reality, that the U.S. should engage with rather than try to ignore or eliminate. I wrote in February of last year,

The administration that proclaims its mission as spreading democracy now seeks to punish the Palestinians for using their votes to get rid of a corrupt and decrepit regime (that happens to be headed by a U.S. ally). Shades, here, of Kissinger’s rationale for the coup in Chile: “We can’t stand by and let a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.” The Bush people are so tragically out of touch with the reality on the ground that they spent the weeks before the election funding desperate last-minute projects by local Fatah candidates in the hope of saving their hides. The effect was probably just the opposite: Hamas was only too pleased to point out that these were America’s candidates, knowing that in Palestinian eyes that’s a kiss of death.

…The Palestinian electorate was able to abandon Fatah for the simple reason that Ariel Sharon, with the backing of the Bush administration, had shown the Palestinians that Fatah was entirely irrelevant to their fate. The New York Times says some U.S. officials wonder whether the election should have been delayed further in order to allow Fatah to gain maximum benefit from Sharon’s Gaza pullout. And to think that these geniuses are paid a salary out of my tax dollars… The only Palestinians to benefit politically from Sharon’s Gaza pullout was Hamas. After all, it was not negotiated with Fatah or Abu Mazen; it was a unilateral action coordinated with Washington, and the Palestinian street deduced that is must therefore have been a victory for the resistance of Hamas and likeminded Fatah elements. Abu Mazen was never going to get the benefit from Gaza no matter how long the election was delayed, but a second delay (remember, they were supposed to be held last summer) would have doomed his party to an even heavier defeat.

The Palestinians simply decided to move on rather than maintain the illusion that Abu Mazen somehow had a diplomatic strategy that would deliver their national goals. Conventional wisdom after 2001 was that the Palestinians, through their intifada, had elected Ariel Sharon to lead Israel. And five years later, it may be argued that Sharon elected Hamas.

…The election of Hamas is not a threat to the peace process; it’s a symptom of the failure of that process. And the Bush administration’s passivity, and its encouragement of Sharon’s unilateralism, contributed in no small part to that failure, and therefore to the victory of Hamas. (I mean, has everyone really forgotten the warnings of years ago from the Fatah moderates and the Israeli doves that failure to reach a deal with Fatah would leave Israel to have to deal with Hamas? It really was that obvious.) For the decade of Oslo, West Bank Palestinians had stood by and watched Fatah leaders enriching themselves while the Israelis continued to grab their land and choke off their economic life. Fatah had come to represent Palestinian powerlessness as Sharon bulldozed his way around, remaking the landscape of the West Bank and Gaza to his own specification knowing that the only consequence would be the sound of Saeeb Erekat complaining to Wolf Blitzer. It’s hardly surprising that Hamas managed to cloak itself in the mantle of the redeemer of Palestinian national dignity and subjectivity.

…The U.S. can’t afford to restrict itself to scolding and warning the new Palestinian government. Engagement is vital at this point, and the grownup position – as articulated by the Europeans – is that Hamas must be judged, in the new situation, on its actions rather than on the contents of its slogans, songs and manifestoes. There is, strangely enough, an enhanced prospect for security and stability in the new situation, if it’s smartly managed on all sides. That, of course, is a big if.

As, indeed, it was. Instead, the U.S. talked the Europeans around to reluctantly signing on to their siege strategy until Hamas was ready to symbolically surrender. That didn’t happen. Now, Hamas has made clear that it is an intractable reality, although the fighting has likely greatly increased the balance within the organization in favor of the more confrontational element. And Dahlan turned out to be a Paper Pinochet.

Still, given their spectacular inability to comprehend the reasons for their defeats in the Palestinian territory, I don’t expect the U.S. to begin engaging pragmatically with the reality of Hamas as an indispensable component of the Palestinian leadership. Instead, given the endless capacity for self-delusion of the people running U.S. Middle East policy, I fully expect to see the U.S. rush resources to Egypt where Dahlan can be reunited with his scattered forces in preparation for his next historic role — at the head of a “Bay of Pigs” type invasion of Gaza.

Posted in Situation Report, Unholy War | 47 Comments

Equality, Not Zionism, Will Save Israel

On the same day that we learn that Norman Finkelstein has been denied tenure at De Paul University largely because of an aggressive campaign by Israel supporters to silence the (to them) menacing figure of a Jew, son of a Holocaust survivor, as combatively anti-Zionist as Finkelstein is, it is with great pleasure that I welcome Antony Loewenstein as a guest contributor. Antony is a generation younger than me, but he’s further evidence of the fact that the efforts of the nationalists to police Jewish identity in a way that enforces a narrow Zionism are failing — despite their victory over Finkelstein. The sweet smell of Jewish dissent is suddenly everywhere in the air, most recently last week when Avram Burg released his new book, renouncing Zionism and warning of its dangerous consequences for his Judaism and his humanity — it’s not exactly every day that a former Speaker of the Knesset turns around and rejects the very principle of a “Jewish State.” I have a long posting of my own on this in the works. In the mean time, please give Antony Loewenstein a resounding Rootless Cosmopolitan welcome!

Guest post:

Equality, Not Zionism, Will Save Israel

By Anthony Loewenstein

As an Australian anti-Zionist Jew writing about Israel/Palestine, the rules of the game are made clear to me on an almost daily basis. All Jews must support the “Jewish State,” no matter what. Any action carried out by the state is defensible, justified and moral. Any public criticism of Israel will be assumed to be anti-Semitic; if Israel is to be criticized at all, it should only be in hushed tones and in private. Dare to challenge these rules, and you can expect to be bombarded with hate-mail, death-threats and public abuse, invariably from fellow Jews.

The email I received this week from “Steve” in Australia is typical:


You are one of the largest distorters of facts about the Arab – Israeli conflict. The only larger liars about this sensitive issue are the terrorist organisations, Palestinian Authority, Iranian Government and some Arab media.

By portraying Israel in such a negative light, which is completely unwarranted, you cause people to be anti-Israel, which more often that not spills over into anti-Semitism. The attacks on Jewish buildings, graves and people would occur less often if the ignorant pricks such as yourself did not write all the shit that you do.

Sometimes I wonder whether you have a learning disability, because you are completely ignorant of the facts. Go talk to the traumatized residents of Sderot, with Qassam rockets falling around them all the time. Go talk to all the Israelis who have lost relatives and friends. Go to Beit Halochem in Israel and talk to the people who have been disabled, often permanently, because of the gutless actions of Palestinian terrorists.

You disgust me, Antony. Stop betraying your own people and do some proper research instead of spreading propaganda.

Sincerely,

Steve

It’s hard to respond seriously to such incoherent screeds, but I recognize where they come from.

As a Jew growing up in Melbourne, Australia, it was simply expected that I would show solidarity with Israel in good times and bad. I didn’t know any better in my early years and it wasn’t until my teens that a sense of inner conflict developed. Why were most Jews able to defend the firing of Israeli rockets into Palestinian refugee camps? How did some Jews not think twice when they heard of systematic abuse by IDF soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza? By time I turned 20, I was no longer the same kind of Jew. I wasn’t able to properly articulate my feelings, perhaps, but I now know that too many Jews used the same excuse that Germans articulated after the Second World War; pleading ignorance or condoning brutal violence against the “other.”

In Australia, the Jewish community is primarily parochial, strongly Zionist and highly insecure. They love Israel, but fear it’s only one step away from annihilation. They detest Palestinians who dare to articulate their own narrative. And they offer platitudes towards a two-state solution and rights for all, but in fact never speak out against the ever-expanding occupation that has negated any prospect for realizing such a solution. Indeed, such positions are the default position of most Diaspora Jewish communities, and those among them who dare to dissent are greeted with ridicule or hysterical howls of treachery. My parents have paid a social price for the fact that I have publicly expressed my views, which they share. They found themselves shunned by old friends, for whom those views were so despicable that those who declined to condemn them had to be excommunicated.

Years ago, the constant abuse I received perplexed and upset me. When it was directed at my partner at the time, who was also Jewish, I knew a line had been crossed, but was unsure how to respond, if at all. The hysteria I had generated told me I was having an effect – rather than seriously debating the issues I was raising, my Jewish critics seemed capable of little more than demagoguery and name-calling. Their rage seemed fueled by the fact of my Jewishness; in their worldview, the criticisms I was making were solely the prerogative of Arabs, anti-Semites, terrorists.

The release of my book in 2006, My Israel Question, and its subsequent best-selling status in Australia – it was released in the US this past April – caused even greater vitriol (from, among others, Australia’s only Jewish Federal MP. I had dared to suggest that robust debate on Israel/Palestine was being stifled by an aggressive Zionist lobby. I argued that an alternative Jewish identity was essential for Israel if it was to survive in the next 50 years.

This meant separating Zionism from Judaism, and recognizing that being a Jew didn’t mean automatic identification with every Israeli action. This Jewish identity had to not be solely defined through what was “good for the Jews”, but on the universal principles of justice as espoused by the Jewish prophets, i.e. by creating a state that treats all citizens as equal. No religiously based state – Muslim, Christian or Jewish – is able to achieve this, and Israel is no exception. Instead, many Jews continue to identify with Israel despite its flagrant violations international norms, denying those or blaming them on the victims. Just last week, on the 40th anniversary of the Six Day War, The Australian Jewish News editorialized that the “continued occupation is mainly the result of Arab intransigence .” Clearly the occupied are to be blamed for building new settlements, restricting their own freedom of movement and imprisoning their own children.

Whatever noble thoughts may have been in the minds of some of its founders, Zionism in the real has always been a racist enterprise, precisely because the majority of people living on the land on which it envisaged building a Jewish state were not Jewish, and their very existence in that space was deemed a “problem.” From its outset, it has been obsessed with attaining and maintaining a “Jewish majority” in that territory, which necessarily required discrimination — and worse — against the Arab population of Palestine. Today, still, when the world has come to recognize the politics of ethnic exclusion as a dangerous anachronism, Israel continues to treat its Arab citizens and the non-citizens who live under its occupation not as fellow human beings who should enjoy the same rights as any other, but as a “demographic time bomb.”

As leading British historian Tony Judt wrote in 2003, “Israel itself is a multicultural society in all but name; yet it remains distinctive among democratic states in its resort to ethnoreligious criteria with which to denominate and rank its citizens. It is an oddity among modern nations not—as its more paranoid supporters assert—because it is a Jewish state and no one wants the Jews to have a state; but because it is a Jewish state in which one community—Jews —is set above others, in an age when that sort of state has no place.”

The obsession with maintaining a Jewish majority in a land that always housed a substantial Arab population was always going to require serious military might and super-power support. How should we explain to Palestinians that they can’t return to the lands of their ancestors, but I, as an Australian Jew, can arrive in Israel and automatically gain citizenship?

I couldn’t be proud of a nation that beat, starved, killed, tortured, raped and destroyed another people. But I do remain proud of my Jewish heritage, although curious as to its most-recently deformed evolution. For articulating a Judaism that strives for equality, one is mocked. When writing about Israel’s apartheid in the occupied territories, one is met with denial. When seeing disastrous U.S foreign policy in the Middle East and Israel’s unyielding love affair with it, one can’t help but note that the Jewish state’s future is seriously in jeopardy until radical changes are made. The Australian Jewish establishment wanted to hear none of this, of course, preferring to talk of Jewish solidarity and Israeli strength in the face of Arab “terror”. I was, in the words of the Australian Jewish News, capable of little more than “Israel bashing.”

I fear that most Jews are unprepared to take the necessary decisions to guarantee Israel’s future. And it appears many Israelis are equally unwilling to understand the cost of their continued intransigence. Israel doesn’t need to commit political suicide, merely, like apartheid South Africa before it, re-define who is an Israeli.
The Israeli peace movement is too divided and weak to achieve these changes alone – during last year’s Lebanon war, Peace Now actually supported the mission. Justice-minded Jews around the world must continually explain why they are in fact the best friends Israel will ever have. Tough love is needed.

The solution to the conflict requires debate and the path to achieving it will be tortuous, but it must be framed by principles of democratic equality. While I once believed a two-state solution was the correct outcome, I have come to believe that in fact a unitary democratic state for Jews and Arabs may yet be the only way to resolve the conflict on the basis of equal rights. In many ways, there is already a single state of Jews and Arabs in the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, but most of the Arabs live under occupation and Israeli laws in which they have no say because they are denied the democratic rights of citizenship – an apartheid state by definition.

There is clearly an urgency about Israel ending its occupation regime over the West Bank and Gaza. The rest is open to debate and negotiation, and past discussions have shown that compromise is possible between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side on issues such as Jerusalem and the fate of the Palestinian refugees.

Jews around the world have begun debating these issues outside of narrow terms demanded by the Zionist establishment, which is struggling to contain the fires. The recent launch of the UK-based Independent Jewish Voices — I soon co-founded Independent Australian Jewish Voices is a signal that a growing number of Jews is no longer willing to accept the Zionist establishment’s limits on debate over Israel. Many of the adherents of these groups love Israel and believe that the state’s own policies are leading to its destruction. I’ve lost count with the number of Jews who’ve told me about Jewish family members or friends who have slammed them for daring to criticize Israeli policies in public and private. Furthermore, literally hundreds of non-Jews have written to me and expressed exasperation that they feel uneasy discussing Israel because they fear being accused of anti-Semitism.

Public debate on Israel/Palestine in the West invariably revolves around “what is good for the Jews?” The tradition of Judaism has always been about campaigning for justice, not just for our own. What has happened to this humanity? The rights of Palestinians are secondary, if they’re considered at all. It’s far easier to blame Hamas or Mahmoud Abbas or the French or the EU. The fact that the international community is deliberately trying to unseat the democratically elected government of Hamas is justified as a pragmatic reality. Political Islam is a growing force around the world and the Western elite is singularly unprepared for its arrival. During a recent visit to Egpyt, I was struck by the number of Western-oriented intellectuals, bloggers and journalists who simply couldn’t understand why Washington and London refused to recognize the Muslim Brotherhood, the undeniably popular opposition party despite its ban by the Egytian authoritarian regime. They saw it as evidence that the West isn’t really interested in democracy in the Arab world, merely seeking subservience. Likewise in Iran, where I am currently, the Western view of a fundamentalist people led by a Jew-hating leader is utterly removed from reality. As a human being first, and Jew second, I believe that a more open-minded Judaism is essential if Israel is to successfully move past its current militaristic malaise.

The personal price many of us pay for critically analyzing the Middle East is balanced by the encouraging messages received from university students, high-school children and average citizens who are either curious about the conflict, or studying my book. As is so often the case, the general public is far savvier than the ruling elite give them credit for.

I write as I do because I believe it to be the truth, not because of the associated controversy or fame. As an atheist Jew, I struggle with my identity only so far as I wonder how my religion has been hijacked by a militaristic and exclusionary ideology.

Israelis are not Nazis, but I wonder, as Harvard academic Sara Roy, herself a child of Holocaust survivors, put it , how have children of the Holocaust ended up as brutal occupiers and oppressors? And why do so few Jews speak out against it?

Posted in A Wondering Jew, Guest Columns, Situation Report | 59 Comments

Putin Calls Bush’s Bluff

Throughout this mawkish missile-defense saga, President Bush has been talking to the Russians as if they were born yesterday. “Don’t worry, Vladimir, the Cold War is over,” Bush urged. And then he proceeded to bash Putin over Russia’s backsliding on democracy — as if Russian democracy was an issue when Boris Yeltsin was shelling the elected legislature.

More importantly, Putin has not been impressed by the notion that the U.S. plans to sight a missile interceptor system on Russia’s Western doorstep in order to better intercept ICBM’s fired from Iran or North Korea. Nor should he be; the argument is hard to take seriously. Missiles fired at the U.S. from North Korea would fly over the Pacific onto the U.S. West Coast, for one thing. Iran has no space program, and therefore no ICBM capability for the foreseeable future. If it were to attack the U.S. it would do so by targeting its imperial footprint on Iran’s doorstep — even if it used missiles, they would be short- or medium-range types, against which an interceptor system in Poland would have no relevance.

For all the media claims that Putin and Bush smoothed things over by talking nicely at the G-8 summit, what in fact transpired was that Putin, with a very polite and gracious smile, put Bush on the spot, by proposing that the U.S. sight its interceptor system in Azerbaijan. After all, the former southern Soviet Republic is far closer to Iran, and better able to offer the protective shield to Europe, as well.

Bush was taken aback. He had told the Russians to be more helpful; to “participate” in the U.S. plan. And that’s exactly what Putin was doing. But, of course, sighting the missile interceptors on Russia’s southern front would make them entirely useless against Russian missiles fired westward. So what Putin has done is called the U.S. bluff on the real intention of the shield it plans to put in Poland and the Czech Republic.

It’s not hard to see why the Russians assume that its real purpose is to target Russia’s own missile capability — in the longer term. The missile shield system being deployed right now at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars is actually no threat to anyone’s missiles — it has yet to pass the most basic test of consistently hitting a missile whose flight path has been pre-programmed into the interceptor’s guidance, rather than one that may be trying to evade defenses. But by deploying an ineffective system, Bush is trying to put down a marker: It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that their ultimate goal is as a seat-warmer for a more technologically capable system, to be deployed later, which would have the capacity to attack Russian missiles in the boost phase (missiles are more vulnerable before they leave the earth’s atmosphere, but to target them in the boost phase, interceptors have to be as close as possible to their firing point).

M.K. Bahdrakumar suggests that the U.S. moves are driven by the need to consolidate its own increasingly fragile geopolitical position — eliminate Russia’s strategic parity with the U.S. and prevent China from establishing anything close to a nuclear balance of terror, as well as reasserting its leadership over Western Europe as the platform for its continued global dominance.

And Martin Jacques has argued that “The starting point for understanding the deterioration in the relationship between the US and Russia lies in Washington, rather than Moscow.” He writes:

After 1989, Russia was a defeated power. Despite the fine words and some limited gestures, the Americans have treated it like one. Their policy has been one of encirclement. Following the end of the cold war, there was much discussion concerning the point of Nato. In the event, it was reinvented as a means of reducing Russia’s reach on its western frontiers and seeking to isolate it. Its former east European client states were admitted to Nato, as were the Baltic states. It now finds itself militarily encircled to its west and, in central Asia, to its south. It is hardly surprising that Russia is unhappy about these developments. Not only are its reasonable security concerns being trampled on, but it also feels it is being humiliated.

As John le Carre once noted, the right side lost the Cold War but the wrong side won. Bush tells Putin that the Cold War is over, but it is Bush who is behaving as if it isn’t. His contempt for international law and international consensus even as he goes about invading countries and threatening to bomb others is hardly encouraging to a humiliated power now beginning to pick itself up thanks to oil revenue increases. It’s no wonder the Russians are pushing back, and it may be a sign of more to come — and not only from Moscow.

Bush’s father knew the Cold War was over; that was why he took the whole matter of going to war in Kuwait very patiently through the U.N. But the current president wants act out the fantasy of every college-age Reaganaut of the 1980s, who believes the Soviet Union collapsed because Reagan threatened to build a missile shield and made speeches demanding that Gorbachev tear down the Berlin Wall.

And it tells you how bad things have gotten with U.S. unilateralism that Vladimir Putin, almost as nasty a piece of work as Dick Cheney, can show himelf to be more adept at diplomacy than his counterpart in Washington.


Posted in Situation Report, Unholy War | 43 Comments

How the 1967 War Doomed Israel

I.

Avir harim kalul ba’yayin, ve reach oranim…

The opening lines of Naomi Shemer’s legendary Yerushalayim Shel Zahav (Jerusalem of Gold) can still bring goosebumps to my flesh, even decades after I deconstructed and relinquished the mythology connoted by the old Basque lullaby she repurposed as an ode to Israel’s conquest of East Jerusalem in June of 1967. I first heard the song at age 8 in a documentary film shown at my afternoon Hebrew class (ugh!), all gorgeous evening sunshine glowing pink off the old city, as it related the “miracle” of Israel’s “six-day” triumph over its Arab neighbors in that year. And it made me feel good, in an epic kind of way. Already the song had become a kind of anthem, an emotional seduction into the notion of the conquest of East Jerusalem somehow signifying Jewish salvation. Steven Spielberg even planned to include it in the grossly misleading postcard he tacked on to the end of Schindler’s List, in which Holocaust survivors are shown in Jerusalem as if this was somehow a triumph over Nazism, although he dropped the idea after Israeli test audiences found the connection discordant. But rarely has there been a more powerful song in the Israeli imagination, precisely because of the giddily messianic atmosphere that prevailed in Israel in the wake of the war — an atmosphere that blinded Israelis to the calamitous implications of their conquest. But hey, even at age 6, I bought into that atmosphere.

There was no such thing as television in South Africa in 1967, so it was through grainy black-and-white photographs in the evening newspaper that I learned that Mirage jet fighters — the same delta-winged plane flown over my house with great, and occasionally sound barrier-breaking regularity by the South African Air Force to and from nearby Ysterplaat air base, although the ones in the paper bore the Star of David on their wing tips — had destroyed Egypt’s MiG squadrons on the ground. And with those images, and later ones of paratroopers in webbed helmets at the Wailing Wall, that I learned of the “miracle” — Israel, the tiny Jewish state whose map I knew from the blue and white money tin into which we would put a coin every Friday night after Shabbos dinner, had faced down the combined armies of its Arab neighbors, and had dispatched them within six days. And they had “liberated” our “holiest” site, an old stone wall in East Jerusalem pocked with pubic clumps of weeds, into whose cracks and crannies I was told that Jews could insert notes to be read by God — like a hotel message cubby. (Let’s just say that by the time I got there, at age 17, this bubbemeis about holy stones and a celestial post office only fueled my atheism.) Not only that, they’d made Israel “safe” by “liberating” the whole of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights. In six days! A miracle, like the creation story in Genesis! (Of course, many years later, I would learn that it hadn’t even taken that long; Israel had attacked first and effectively won the war in the opening hours by destroying its enemy’s air forces on the ground — Six Days just sounded like a good name for a war given the creation story.)

Even at the age of six, my first year in big school, Israel’s victory had a profound effect on me. The previous year, I had heard my older step-brothers describe a Phys-Ed class being turned into a kind of playful pogrom, in some sort of fighting game that had pitched the Jewish boys against the rest. Being Jewish jocks, they had, according to my brothers’ account over dinner, given as good as they’d gotten, and it was a genuinely playful thing, besides — the sort of playful contest I recall from my older years that often saw a class divide on lines of “Boer against Brit,” i.e. Afrikaans kids against English-speakers, recalling the Boer War. But at six years old, the idea of a small group of Jewish boys being surrounded and set upon by their gentile classmates was absolutely terrifying.

But the news out of Israel in those mid-year months in 1967 was infinitely reassuring. Israel’s dramatic victory had proved that we, the prickly little state or the Jewish boys in their white Phys-ed (we called it PT) vests and shorts, were not to be fucked with. (I remember a similar effect a decade later, after the audacious raid on Entebbe had freed a group of passengers held on a hijacked Air France plane in Uganda — by then, my friends and I were literally accepting congratulations on Israel’s behalf.) And, I know anecdotally as much as anything else, that anyone ever called a “Jewboy” anywhere in the world walked a lot taller after the first week of June in 1967.

We were certainly granted the recognition on the playground that the epic victory demanded. The idea of Jews as being weaklings or afraid to fight was buried; white South Africa with its own narrative pitting it as an embattled minority in a sea of hostile neighbors embraced the Israeli victory as an inspiration. The word “Arab” became synonymous, on the playground and in the classroom, with incompetence and idiocy. “Don’t be an Arab!” I heard a teacher exclaim, more than once in response to a student’s failure to properly carry out his instructions. And, three years after the 1967 war, when the apartheid regime celebrated the tenth anniversary of South Africa’s formal independence from Britain, the ceremony in my school playground saw my Jewish friends and I, in our blue Habonim shirts and scarves and kakhi shorts, line up alongside the boy scouts and the Voortrekkers (the fascist Afrikaner youth movement) to salute the flag and proclaim our loyalty to the Republic (even though the whole point of Habonim was to persuade us to emigrate!). A regime rooted in vicious anti-Semitism and explicit admiration for the Nazis had now come to recognize Israel and its local supporters as a fighting ally in their epic struggle, couched in Cold War language, between white peoples and peoples of color.

Die Vaderland (The Fatherland), a newspaper of the apartheid regime, editorialized in 1969, on the occasion of a visit to South Africa by Ben Gurion, “When we, from our side, look realistically at the world situation, we know that Israel’s continued existence in the Middle East is also an essential element in our own security… If our Jewish citizens were to rally to the call of our distinguished visitor — to help build up Israel — their contribution would in essence be a contribution to South Africa’s security.”

South Africa and Israel became intimate allies in the years that followed the ’67 war, with unrepentant former Nazis such as Prime Minister B.J. Vorster welcomed to Israel to seal military deals that resulted in collaboration in the development of weapons ranging from aircraft and assault rifles to, allegedly, nuclear weapons. I remember well how some products of South Africa’s Jewish day-school system, where Hebrew was taught as well as the mandatory Afrikaans, finding themselvse with cushy posting during their compulsory military services — as Hebrew-Afrikaans translators for Israeli personnel working with the SADF. And that alliance raised the comfort level of the South African Jewish community in apartheid South Africa — while a handful of Jewish revolutionaries had made up a dominant share of the white ranks of the national liberation movement, they were largely disowned by the mainstream organized Jewish community, which had chosen the path of quiescence and collaboration with the regime. Their posture, and Israel’s, were now in perfect alignment.


Fruitful collaboration: The Israeli
military called it the Galil, the SADF
called it the R-4, but it was the same gun

Even as I came to recognize and react to the horrors of apartheid, Israel seemed to me to represent a shining alternative. I remember shocking the grownups at a Pesach seder in 1974, my Bar Mitzvah year, by telling them that I would never do my compulsory military service in South Africa. But they smiled and murmured approvingly when I declared that, instead, I would go to Israel and serve in the army there, because that way “I could fight for something I believe in.” (I had, of course, in my cheesy adolescent way, stolen that line from a Jewish character in James A. Michener’s “The Drifters,” who uses it in relation to Vietnam; but the image in my mind when I read it, as when I said it, was of those paratroopers at the Wailing Wall.)

I could not conceive of Israel as in any way complicit in the crimes of apartheid, much less as engaged in its own forms of apartheid. After all, my connection to Israel, by the time I was 14, came largely through Habonim, a socialist-Zionist youth movement whose Zionism was infused with just the sort of left-wing universalism for which my own anti-apartheid subversive instincts yearned. My Habonim madrichim, bearded radicals from the University of Cape Town opened by mind to Marx and Marcuse, Bob Dylan and Yevtushenko, Woodie Guthrie and Erich Fromm. I was already a Jewish atheist, and considered myself a socialist, but in my mind, Israel and Kibbutz were the absolute negation of all that was wrong with South Africa; as a stepping stone to universal brotherhood and equality as expressed in the idealism of early left-wing Zionist thinkers like Ber Borochov, A.D. Gordon and Martin Buber. It became clear to me soon enough (by the time I was 18, to be specific) that their Zionist idealism — and mine — had no connection to the reality of Israel, largely because it ignored the elephant in the room: the Arab population of Palestine.

II.

The war of 1967 was a continuation of the war of 1948, a battle over sovereignty, ownership and possession of the land in what had been British-Mandate Palestine. Sensing the escalating conflict between the Arab population and the European Jewish settlers who had been allowed by the British, since their conquest of Palestine in 1917, to settle there and establish the infrastructure of statehood — and moved by the impulse to create a sanctuary for the survivors of the Holocaust while avoiding giving most of them the choice of moving to the U.S. or other Western countries — the U.N. recommended in 1947 that Palestine be partitioned, to create separate Jewish and Arab states. The Zionists were disappointed by the plan, because they had hoped to have all of Palestine become a Jewish state. And the fact that it left Jerusalem, where 100,000 Jews lived, within the territory of the Arab zone, albeit run as an international city, was particularly irksome. But the Zionist leadership also knew that the plan was as good as they were going to get via diplomacy, and accepted the plan. (The rest, of course, they would acquire in battle, in 1948 and 1967, in wars that they could blame on their enemies — after all, 40 years after the 1967 war, during which time Israel has been at peace with the enemy it faced on that flank, the West Bank remains very much in Israeli hands, with close to half a million Israelis settled there.)

And, of course, war would likely have looked inevitable, because the Arabs were unlikely to accept a deal in which they were, by definition, the losers. Today, Israel insists that the demographic “facts on the ground” must be taken into account in any peace settlement, and demands that it be allowed to maintain the large settlement blocs built on the best land in the West Bank since 1967. And the Bush Administration has formally endorsed this claim. But look at the “facts on the ground” of 1947/8: The Partition Plan awarded 55% of the land to the Jewish state, including more than 80% of land under cultivation. At the time, Jews made up a little over one third of the total population, and owned some 7% of the land. Moreover, given the demographic demands of the Zionist movement for a Jewish majority, the plan was an invitation to tragedy: The population within the boundaries of the Jewish state envisaged in the 1947 partition consisted of around 500,000 Jews and 400,000 Arabs.

Hardly surprising, then, that the Arabs of Palestine and beyond rejected the partition plan.

For the Arab regimes, the creation of a separate Jewish sovereign state in the Holy Land over which the Crusades had been fought was a challenge to their authority; it was perceived by their citizenry as a test of their ability to protect their land and interests from foreign invasion. And so they went to war believing they could reverse what the U.N. had ordered on the battlefield. For the Jews of Palestine in 1948, a number of them having narrowly survived extermination in Europe, the war was a matter of physical survival. Although in the mythology, the war pitted a half million Jews against 20 million Arabs, in truth Israel was by far the stronger and better-organized and better-armed military power. And so what Israel called the War of Independence saw the Jewish state acquire 50% more territory than had been envisaged in the partition plan. The maps below describe the difference between the Israel envisaged by the UN in 1947 and the one that came into being in the war of 1948.

But maps don’t convey the disaster that befell the Palestinian Arabs in 1948. The war also allowed the Zionist movement to resolve its “demographic concerns,” as some 700,000 Palestinian Arabs found themselves driven from their homes and land — many driven out at gunpoint, the majority fleeing in fear of further massacres such as the one carried out by the Irgun at Dir Yassein, and all of them subject to the same ethnic-cleansing founding legislation by passed the new Israeli Knesset that seized the property of any Arab absent from his property on May 8, 1948, and forbad the refugees from returning.

The revised partition effected by the war left hundreds of thousands of Palestinians destitute in refugee camps in neighboring Arab countries, a drama that continues to play out today in northern Lebanon.

And for the next generation of Arab leaders, pan-Arabists and nationalists who overthrew the feeble Western-allied monarchies, the fundamental challenge of their nationalist vision became “redeeming” Arab honor by reversing their defeat of 1948. They tried twice, in 1967 and again in 1973, and failed. But even today, as political Islam supplants nationalism and pan-Arabism as the dominant ideologies of the Arab world, reversing the defeats of 1973, 1967 and 1948 remains a singular obsession.

III.
For Jews of my generation who came of age during the anti-apartheid struggle, there was no shaking the nagging sense that what Israel was doing in the West Bank was exactly what the South African regime was doing in the townships. Even as we waged our own intifada against apartheid in South Africa, we saw daily images of young Palestinians facing heavily armed Israeli police in tanks and armored vehicles with nothing more than stones, gasoline bombs and the occasional light weapon; a whole community united behind its children who had decided to cast off the yoke under which their parents suffered. And when Yitzhak Rabin, more famous as a signatory on the Oslo Agreement, ordered the Israeli military to systematically break the arms of young Palestinians in the hope of suppressing an entirely legitimate revolt, thuggery had become a matter of national policy. It was only when some of those same young men began blowing themselves up in Israeli restaurants and buses that many Israel supporters were once again able to construe the Israelis as the victim in the situation; during the intifada of the 1980s they could not question who was David and who was Goliath. Even for those of us who had grown up in the idealism of the left-Zionist youth movements, Israel had become a grotesque parody of everything we stood for.

Even those within the Zionist establishment who came through the same tradition were horrified: Former Knesset Speaker Avraham Burg wrote in 2003:

It turns out that the 2,000-year struggle for Jewish survival comes down to a state of settlements, run by an amoral clique of corrupt lawbreakers who are deaf both to their citizens and to their enemies. A state lacking justice cannot survive. More and more Israelis are coming to understand this as they ask their children where they expect to live in 25 years. Children who are honest admit, to their parents’ shock, that they do not know. The countdown to the end of Israeli society has begun.

It is very comfortable to be a Zionist in West Bank settlements such as Beit El and Ofra. The biblical landscape is charming. You can gaze through the geraniums and bougainvilleas and not see the occupation. Travelling on the fast highway that skirts barely a half-mile west of the Palestinian roadblocks, it’s hard to comprehend the humiliating experience of the despised Arab who must creep for hours along the pocked, blockaded roads assigned to him. One road for the occupier, one road for the occupied.

This cannot work. Even if the Arabs lower their heads and swallow their shame and anger for ever, it won’t work. A structure built on human callousness will inevitably collapse in on itself. Note this moment well: Zionism’s superstructure is already collapsing like a cheap Jerusalem wedding hall. Only madmen continue dancing on the top floor while the pillars below are collapsing…

Israel, having ceased to care about the children of the Palestinians, should not be surprised when they come washed in hatred and blow themselves up in the centres of Israeli escapism. They consign themselves to Allah in our places of recreation, because their own lives are torture. They spill their own blood in our restaurants in order to ruin our appetites, because they have children and parents at home who are hungry and humiliated. We could kill a thousand ringleaders a day and nothing will be solved, because the leaders come up from below – from the wells of hatred and anger, from the “infrastructures” of injustice and moral corruption…

Between the Jordan and the Mediterranean there is no longer a clear Jewish majority. And so, fellow citizens, it is not possible to keep the whole thing without paying a price. We cannot keep a Palestinian majority under an Israeli boot and at the same time think ourselves the only democracy in the Middle East. There cannot be democracy without equal rights for all who live here, Arab as well as Jew. We cannot keep the territories and preserve a Jewish majority in the world’s only Jewish state – not by means that are humane and moral and Jewish.

Many pro-Israel commentators today lament what they see as a shift in the Palestinian political mindset from the secular nationalism of Fatah to a more implacable Islamist worldview, supposedly infinitely less reasonable because it couches its opposition to Israel in religious terms. Yet, what is often overlooked is how the Israeli victory in 1967 effected a similar shift
in Zionist ideology away from the secular nationalism of Ben Gurion’s generation to a far more dangerous religious nationalism. Tom Segev, my favorite Israeli historian, writes that the 1967 war resulted in many Israelis coming to see the army as an instrument of messianic theology. The knitted yarmulke of the settlers moving to colonize the West Bank in the wake of the 1967 victory came to replace the cloth cap of the socialist kibbutznik as the symbol of Zionist pioneering. Segev quotes from Rav Kook, the founder of the settlement movement: “There is one principal thing: the state. It is entirely holy, and there is no flaw in it… the state is holy in any and every case.”


The settlement of Maale Adumim, on the West Bank.
Its permanence signifies that whatever their intentions,
the Zionists created a single (apartheid) state for Jews
and Palestinians after 1967

The religious Zionists saw the West Bank and holy land to be “redeemed,” or “liberated” by settlement, and with the tacit support of all Israeli governments since then (and the more active support of some) they rushed to build permanent structures and settle a civilian population there, in defiance of international law, in order to preclude the possibility of returning that land to the Palestians as a basis for peace.

As David Remnick notes in a review of some of the literature on 1967, many Israelis quickly realized that the “Six Day War” had brought about a potential disaster for the Zionist project, because Israel now found itself not only in control of all of the territory of British-Mandate Palestine, but also all of its current inhabitants. He quotes Amos Oz’s dark warning

“For a month, for a year, or for a whole generation we will have to sit as occupiers in places that touch our hearts with their history. And we must remember: as occupiers, because there is no alternative. And as a pressure tactic to hasten peace. Not as saviors or liberators. Only in the twilight of myths can one speak of the liberation of a land struggling under a foreign yoke. Land is not enslaved and there is no such thing as a liberation of lands. There are enslaved people, and the word “liberation” applies only to human beings. We have not liberated Hebron and Ramallah and El-Arish, nor have we redeemed their inhabitants. We have conquered them and we are going to rule over them only until our peace is secured. “

But the religious-nationalists and Likudniks, who had always imagined a “Greater Israel” [EM] the Betar kids I knew in Cape Town used to wear a silver pendant on their chests, depicting a state of Israel running from the Nile to the Euphrates, and they used to sing a song called “Shte Gadot La Yarden” (“Both Sides of the Jordan” [EM] had something else in mind. As I’ve noted previously, it was my South African Habonim elders on Kibbutz Yizreel, in 1978, who first warned my generation that the settlement policies of the new Likud government would turn Israel into an apartheid state — Israel, they said, could not afford to give the Palestinians on the West Bank the vote, but the objective of the settlements was to ensure that Israel did not withdraw from the land it had conquered. The result would be that Israel would rule over its Palestinian residents without giving them the rights of citizens — the very essence of the apartheid regime back home.

And that is, indeed, what had transpired. Today, the West Bank is carved up by hundreds of Israeli settlements, and roads and land reserved for settlers. And they have no intention of leaving, while no Israeli government for the foreseeable future will muster the political strength to be able to remove them (even if that was their intent).


The black and blue areas are Israeli settlements, and the white parts are the roads and land under Israeli control

For an enlarged version of this map, click here.

Today, talk of a two-state solution to the conflict must reckon with the facts on the ground. The 1947 Partition plan left the Palestinians with 45 percent of the territory of Palestine; the 1948 war left them holding onto 22 percent, which fell into Israeli hands in 1967. Even when it talks about a two-state solution, Israel still demands to keep some of the best lands and the key water sources within that 22 percent. A simple glance at the map above should be enough to raise serious questions about the viability of a separate, sovereign Palestinian nation-state. It’s hard to imagine such an entity, blessed with few natural resources and with hardly any independent economic base, maintaining an independent economic existence, even as it is forced to accomodate hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees returning from refugee camps in Lebanon and elsewhere (as most versions of the two-state plan envisage). Indeed, such an entity may well have the feel of an enlarged refugee camp, whose survival is largely dependent on handouts.

When it conquered the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, Israel put the Palestinian population of those territories under the rule of the Israeli state. For forty years, now, the entire population of British-Mandate Palestine has been governed by a single state. The difference, of course, is that those who live within Israel’s 1967 borders have democratic rights, while those outside are governed by an Israeli colonial and military administration. The extent of Palestinian “authority” in those territories — even Gaza — remains entirely circumscribed by Israeli power.

Suddenly panicked by the demographic implications of the apartheid order its 1967 conquests have created, Israeli leaders talk of “separating” from the Palestinians, as if they can dispense with the problem by drawing political boundaries and building a wall around self-governing Palestinian enclaves (Ariel Sharon himself used the analogy with South Africa’s apartheid Bantustan policy to describe the idea.) But the Gaza experience has made clear the limits of that option.

For the Palestinian population, and their Arab neighbors, the crisis of 1948 has never been resolved. And the Israelis, for the last 40 years, by colonizing the West Bank and East Jerusalem, have squandered whatever opportunities their victory of 1967 presented for changing the dynamic — instead, they have sought to cling to elements of the “Greater Israel” they created in that year, and in the vain hope that the Palestinians will some day surrender in exchange for whatever Israel chooses to offer them.

But precisely because they have continued to expand Israel since 1967, they have dimmed the prospects for a new partition creating a viable Palestinian state separate from Israel. Today, more than ever, the fate of the Israelis is inextricably, and intimately linked to the fate of the Palestinians — and vice versa. The lasting legacy of the 1967 war is the bi-national state it created in the old territory of British-Mandate Palestine.

Posted in A Wondering Jew, Featured Analysis, Situation Report | 111 Comments

By Their Footprint, Ye Shall Know Them

Okay, guess what the image above represents? A redesign of Manhattan southeast of Houston Street? A sprawling Southern California college campus? No, it’s an architectural plan for the new half-billion dollar U.S. embassy in Baghdad. This is how the architects’ blurb describes it:

[THIS POST BECAME A LITTLE POINTLESS SINCE THE ARCHITECTS TOOK DOWN THE IMAGES OF THE EMBASSY PLAN FROM THEIR WEB SITE!]

This self-contained compound will include the embassy itself, residences for the ambassador and staff, PX, commissary, cinema, retail and shopping, restaurants, schools, fire station and supporting facilities such as power generation, water purification system, telecommunications, and waste water treatment facilities. In total, the 104 acre compound will include over twenty buildings including one classified secure structure and housing for over 380 families.

Tom Engelhardt, in an a smart and hilarious appraisal of the project, notes the ironies in the architectural comparison to Saddam Hussein’s grotesque palace compounds and gargantuan monuments. (Tom also provided the link to the architect’s site from which the above image was drawn — go check it out for more.) And he offers detailed advice to those planning to staff the place. Most importantly, though, he sees it as reflecting an imperial vision already hopelessly doomed.

He concludes:

In Baghdad, Saddam’s giant hands are already on the road to ruin. Still going up in New York and Baghdad are two half-billion dollar-plus monuments to the Bush imperial moment. A 9/11 memorial so grotesquely expensive that, when completed, it will be a reminder only of a time, already long past, when we could imagine ourselves as the Greatest Victims on the planet; and in Baghdad’s Green Zone, a monument to the Bush administration’s conviction that we were also destined to be the Greatest Dominators this world, and history, had ever seen.

From both these monuments, someday — and in the case of the embassy in Baghdad that day may not be so very distant — those lone and level sands will undoubtedly stretch far, far away.

Read the whole thing here.

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A Patriotic Officer Confronts Bush — And the Democrats

I’ve long admired Andrew Bacevich’s analyses and commentary on the Bush Administration’s misadventures in the Middle East. Bacevich, a moderate Republican veteran of Vietnam and graduate of the U.S. military academy has taught in various strategic studies centers has written thoughtfully on contemporary U.S. militarism, and represents an enlightened voice of rationality from within the ranks of the military officer class that could see from the get-go that the Iraq war would be the unmitigated disaster it has, in fact, proved to be.

More than a year ago, he told Tom Engelhardt,

“It’s become incontrovertible that the Iraq War is not going to end happily. Even if we manage to extricate ourselves and some sort of stable Iraq emerges from the present chaos, arguing that the war lived up to the expectations of the Bush administration is going to be very difficult. My own sense is that the officer corps — and this probably reflects my personal experience to a great degree — is fixated on Vietnam and still believes the military was hung out to dry there. The officer corps came out of the Vietnam War determined never to repeat that experience and some officers are now angry to discover that the Army is once again stuck in a quagmire. So we are in the early stages of a long argument about who is to be blamed for the Iraq debacle. I think, to some degree, the revolt of the generals reflects an effort on the part of senior military officers to weigh in, to lay out the military’s case. And the military’s case is: We’re not at fault. They are; and, more specifically, he is — with Rumsfeld being the stand-in for Robert McNamara. Having said that, with all the speculation about Bush administration interest in expanding the Global War on Terror to include Iran, I suspect the officer corps, already seeing the military badly overstretched, doesn’t want to have any part of such a war. Going public with attacks on Rumsfeld is one way of trying to slow whatever momentum there is toward an Iran war. I must say, I don’t really think we’re on a track to have a war with Iran any time soon — maybe I’m too optimistic here — but I suspect even the civilian hawks understand that the United States is already overcommitted, that to expand the war on terror to a new theater, the Iranian theater, would in all likelihood have the most dire consequences, globally and in Iraq.

“… There are a couple of important implications that we have yet to confront. The (Iraq) war has exposed the limited depth of American military power. I mean, since the end of the Cold War we Americans have been beating our chests about being the greatest military power the world has ever seen. Overshadowing the power of the Third Reich! Overshadowing the Roman Empire! Wait a sec. This country of 290 million people has a force of about 130,000 soldiers committed in Iraq, fighting something on the order of 10-20,000 insurgents and a) we’re in a war we can’t win, b) we’re in the fourth year of a war we probably can’t sustain much longer. For those who believe in the American imperial project, and who see military supremacy as the foundation of that empire, this ought to be a major concern: What are we going to do to strengthen the sinews of American military power, because it’s turned out that our vaunted military supremacy is not what it was cracked up to be. If you’re like me and you’re quite skeptical about this imperial project, the stresses imposed on the military and the obvious limits of our power simply serve to emphasize the imperative of rethinking our role in the world so we can back away from this unsustainable notion of global hegemony.”

But coming from a family with a tradition of military service, he found his own son deployed in a war he strongly opposed. He saw his son’s service, and his own opposition to the war, as a case of both men doing their patriotic duty.

And in a tragic echo of the case of David Grossman, the Israeli writer, in last year’s Lebanon war, Bacevich lost his son in a war he opposed.

In a moving Washington Post op-ed, Bacevich asks whether his own efforts to oppose the war had been sufficient. He answers thus:

I did nurse the hope that my voice might combine with those of others — teachers, writers, activists and ordinary folks — to educate the public about the folly of the course on which the nation has embarked. I hoped that those efforts might produce a political climate conducive to change. I genuinely believed that if the people spoke, our leaders in Washington would listen and respond.

This, I can now see, was an illusion.

The people have spoken, and nothing of substance has changed. The November 2006 midterm elections signified an unambiguous repudiation of the policies that landed us in our present predicament. But half a year later, the war continues, with no end in sight. Indeed, by sending more troops to Iraq (and by extending the tours of those, like my son, who were already there), Bush has signaled his complete disregard for what was once quaintly referred to as “the will of the people.”

To be fair, responsibility for the war’s continuation now rests no less with the Democrats who control Congress than with the president and his party. After my son’s death, my state’s senators, Edward M. Kennedy and John F. Kerry, telephoned to express their condolences. Stephen F. Lynch, our congressman, attended my son’s wake. Kerry was present for the funeral Mass. My family and I greatly appreciated such gestures. But when I suggested to each of them the necessity of ending the war, I got the brushoff. More accurately, after ever so briefly pretending to listen, each treated me to a convoluted explanation that said in essence: Don’t blame me.

To whom do Kennedy, Kerry and Lynch listen? We know the answer: to the same people who have the ear of George W. Bush and Karl Rove — namely, wealthy individuals and institutions.

Money buys access and influence. Money greases the process that will yield us a new president in 2008. When it comes to Iraq, money ensures that the concerns of big business, big oil, bellicose evangelicals and Middle East allies gain a hearing. By comparison, the lives of U.S. soldiers figure as an afterthought.

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Blowback in Tripoli


A Lebanese mother mourns her soldier son

Last March, I noted Seymour Hersh’s alarming report on the efforts by Dick Cheney and his friends in Saudi Arabia to wage a proxy war against Iran, by enlisting all manner of Sunni fundamentalist jihadis, notably in Lebanon where they would be beefed up as a counterweight to Hezbollah. At the time I wrote:

These people have no shame, nor sense of humor or history, it seems: After all, it was a similar strategy in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that created al-Qaeda in the first place. This time, it will be different, Hersh’s sources insist, no doubt with a straight face:

This time, the U.S. government consultant told me, Bandar and other Saudis have assured the White House that “they will keep a very close eye on the religious fundamentalists. Their message to us was ‘We’ve created this movement, and we can control it.’ It’s not that we don’t want the Salafis to throw bombs; it’s who they throw them at—Hezbollah, Moqtada al-Sadr, Iran, and at the Syrians, if they continue to work with Hezbollah and Iran.”

All I can say is, it didn’t take long, did it? The radical Qaeda-oriented group fighting a pitched battle with the Lebanese Army at the expense of thousands of Palestinian refugees in Tripoli, Fatah al-Islam, appears to have been one of the beneficiaries of this strategy. Click here for the full story

Iraq: The Slimiest Benchmark

Political hegemony is achieved when a narrow group of people is able to convince a wider society that the group’s own, narrow interests, in fact, represent the general interest or the “greater good.” Nowhere is there currently a more visible (if artless) example of such a pursuit of hegemony than in Washington’s efforts to get Iraq’s politicians to pass the oil law drafted under U.S. tutelage. That oil law is packaged as the key to national reconciliation in Iraq, forcing the Iraqis to more equitably share oil revenues. What that packaging leaves out, of course, is that the bulk of those oil revenues, under the law’s provisions, would be controlled by foreign oil companies. Click here for the full story

Getting Sarkozy Wrong

Much of the U.S. media greeted the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as if the French had elected a White House ally to pull themselves out of their morbid decline. Guest contributor Bernard Chazelle explains why the White House will be disappointed by Sarkozy, and offers fascinating insights into everything from economics to anti-semitism to explain why the U.S. media doesn’t understand France in the first place. Click here to read the full story

A Palestinian Pinochet?

There’s something a little misleading in the media reports that routinely describe the fighting in Gaza as pitting Hamas against Fatah forces or security personnel “loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas.” That characterization suggests somehow that this catastrophic civil war that has killed more than 25 Palestinians since Sunday is a showdown between Abbas and the Hamas leadership — which simply isn’t true, although such a showdown would certainly conform to the desires of those running the White House Middle East policy. The Fatah-dominated security forces in Gaza answer to the warlord Mohammed Dahlan, long ago anointed by the White House to play the kind of role of a Palestinian Pinochet, and given the backing to beef up his forces to take down Hamas. Click here to read the full story

Why Blair Embraced Bush

So how could a British Prime Minister move so seamlessly from being Bill Clinton’s best friend on the global stage to being being ideologically and militarily joined at the hip with President George W. Bush? Guest contributor Gavin Evans believes the answer lies in a personality flaw that has been known to overcome liberals and lefties when they get too close to those who hold the real power. Click here to read the full story

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Blowback in Tripoli?


A Lebanese mother mourns her soldier son

Last March, I noted Seymour Hersh’s alarming report on the efforts by Dick Cheney and his friends in Saudi Arabia to wage a proxy war against Iran, by enlisting all manner of Sunni fundamentalist jihadis, notably in Lebanon where they would be beefed up as a counterweight to Hezbollah. At the time I wrote:

These people have no shame, nor sense of humor or history, it seems: After all, it was a similar strategy in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that created al-Qaeda in the first place. This time, it will be different, Hersh’s sources insist, no doubt with a straight face:

This time, the U.S. government consultant told me, Bandar and other Saudis have assured the White House that “they will keep a very close eye on the religious fundamentalists. Their message to us was ‘We’ve created this movement, and we can control it.’ It’s not that we don’t want the Salafis to throw bombs; it’s who they throw them at—Hezbollah, Moqtada al-Sadr, Iran, and at the Syrians, if they continue to work with Hezbollah and Iran.”

All I can say is, it didn’t take long, did it? The radical Qaeda-oriented group fighting a pitched battle with the Lebanese Army at the expense of thousands of Palestinian refugees in Tripoli, Fatah al-Islam, appears to have been one of the beneficiaries of this strategy. That’s what Hersh is saying, and point is backed up by Charles Harb of the American University in Beirut, who argues that the Fatah al-Islam group was nurtured by the U.S.-backed Siniora government for its own sectarian purposes. He writes:

In the 2005 national parliamentary elections, Saad al-Hariri, the son of slain prime minister Rafik Hariri, appealed to Sunni sentiment to woo northern voters. Significant efforts were made to bring the Sunnis of Tripoli and Akkar under his wing and away from the area’s traditional leaders. Fulfilling an electoral pledge, the new parliament pardoned jailed Sunni militants involved in violence in December 2000. Those clashes in Dinnieh between Islamist radicals and the Lebanese army left dozens dead in a precursor of the violence of recent days.

Courting radical Sunni sentiment is a dangerous game. A major sign of trouble ahead had already emerged in February last year, when a protest against the cartoons belittling the prophet Muhammad turned violent and the Danish embassy was set ablaze in the fashionable Beirut district of Ashrafieh. Most of those protesting came from the impoverished areas of the north.

This picture becomes more complicated when the regional dimension is factored in. The invasion of Iraq has inflamed the Sunni-Shia divide and is changing the dynamics of the Middle East. Fear of Shia influence in Arab affairs has prompted many Sunni leaders to warn of a “Shia crescent” stretching from Iran, through Iraq, to south Lebanon. Several reports have highlighted efforts by Saudi officials to strengthen Sunni groups, including radical ones, to face the Shia renaissance across the region.

But building up radical Sunni groups to face the Shia challenge can easily backfire. While militant Islamist groups are sensitive to appeals to Sunni sentiment, they remain locked in their own agenda. Courted by regional players – Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia – and infiltrated by intelligence services, Islamist radical groups serve the needs of some without necessarily becoming servants to any.

As Hersh told CNN this week, the carnage in Lebanon may be a sign of another Cheney-Abrams adventure gone bad.

CNN’s Hala Gorani begins by asking Hersh who is funding and arming groups such Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr el Bared refugee camp:

SEYMOUR HERSH: The key player is the Saudis. What I was writing about was sort of a private agreement that was made between the White House, we’re talking about Richard — Dick — Cheney and Elliott Abrams, one of the key aides in the White House, with Bandar. And the idea was to get support, covert support from the Saudis, to support various hard-line jihadists, Sunni groups, particularly in Lebanon, who would be seen in case of an actual confrontation with Hezbollah — the Shia group in the southern Lebanon — would be seen as an asset, as simple as that.

GORANI: The Senora government, in order to counter the influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon would be covertly according to your reporting funding groups like Fatah al-Islam that they’re having issues with right now?

HERSH: Unintended consequences once again, yes.

GORANI: And so if Saudi Arabia and the Senora government are doing this, whether it’s unintended or not, therefore it has the United States must have something to say about it or not?

HERSH: Well, the United States was deeply involved. This was a covert operation that Bandar ran with us. Don’t forget, if you remember, you know, we got into the war in Afghanistan with supporting Osama bin Laden, the mujahadin back in the late 1980s with Bandar and with people like Elliott Abrams around, the idea being that the Saudis promised us they could control — they could control the jihadists so we spent a lot of money and time, the United States in the late 1980s using and supporting the jihadists to help us beat the Russians in Afghanistan and they turned on us. And we have the same pattern, not as if there’s any lessons learned. It’s the same pattern, using the Saudis again to support jihadists, Saudis assuring us they can control these various group, the groups like the one that is in contact right now in Tripoli with the government.

GORANI: Sure, but the mujahadin in the ’80s was one era. Why would it be in the best interest of the United States of America right now to indirectly even if it is indirect empower these jihadi movements that are extremists that fight to the death in these Palestinian camps? Doesn’t it go against the interests not only of the Senora government but also of America and Lebanon now?

HERSH: The enemy of our enemy is our friend, much as the jihadist groups in Lebanon were also there to go after Nasrullah. Hezbollah, if you remember, last year defeated Israel, whether the Israelis want to acknowledge it, so you have in Hezbollah, a major threat to the American — look, the American role is very simple. Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state, has been very articulate about it. We’re in the business now of supporting the Sunnis anywhere we can against the Shia, against the Shia in Iran, against the Shia in Lebanon, that is Nasrullah. Civil war. We’re in a business of creating in some places, Lebanon in particular, a sectarian violence.

GORANI: The Bush administration, of course, officials would disagree with that, so would the Senora government, openly pointing the finger at Syria, saying this is an offshoot of a Syrian group, Fatah al-Islam is, where else would it get its arms from if not Syria.

HERSH: You have to answer this question. If that’s true, Syria which is close — and criticized greatly by the Bush administration for being very close — to Hezbollah would also be supporting groups, Salafist groups — the logic breaks down. What it is simply is a covert program we joined in with the Saudis as part of a bigger broader program of doing everything we could to stop the spread of the Shia, the Shia world, and it bit us in the rear, as it’s happened before.

GORANI: Sure, but if it doesn’t make any sense for the Syrians to support them, why would it make any sense for the U.S. to indirectly, of course, to support, according to your reporting, by giving a billion dollars in aid, part of it military, to the Senora government — and if that is dispensed in a way that that government and the U.S. is not controlling extremist groups, then indirectly the United States, according to the article you wrote, would be supporting them. So why would it be in their best interest and what should it do according to the people you’ve spoken to?

HERSH: You’re assuming logic by the United States government. That’s okay. We’ll forget that one right now. Basically it’s very simple. These groups are seeing — when I was in Beirut doing interviews, I talked to officials who acknowledged the reason they were tolerating the radical jihadist groups was because they were seen as a protection against Hezbollah. The fear of Hezbollah in Washington, particularly in the White House, is acute. They just simply believe that Hassan Nasrallah is intent on waging war in America. Whether it’s true or not is another question. There is a supreme overwhelming fear of Hezbollah and we do not want Hezbollah to play an active role in the government in Lebanon and that’s been our policy, basically, which is support the Senora government, despite its weakness against the coalition. Not only Senora but Mr. Ahun, former military leader of Lebanon. There in a coalition that we absolutely abhor.

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Iraq: The Slimiest Benchmark

The art of political hegemony is achieved when a narrow group of people is able to convince a wider society that the group’s own, narrow interests, in fact, represent the general interest or the “greater good.” Nowhere is there currently a more visible (if artless) example of such a pursuit of hegemony than in Washington’s efforts to get Iraq’s politicians to pass the oil law drafted under U.S. tutelage.

For months, now, we’ve heard the Bush Administration — and many leading Democrats — scolding the Iraqis over their lack of progress towards national reconciliation. And the most concrete litmus test cited for establishing Iraqi bona fides appears to be the passing of the draft oil law, which is currently stalled in the legislature and facing growing opposition in Iraq. Washington is not hiding its belief that passing of the oil law a primary test for the viability of the Maliki government. But in the great Rove-ian tradition of Orwellian political communication, the Bush Administration is certainly camouflaging its significance: An oil law whose primary beneficiaries appear to be the major U.S. oil companies has become, in Rove-speak, the foundation-stone of national reconciliation in Iraq — the U.S. media for the most part dutifully parrots the idea that the purpose of the law is to ensure an equitable distribution of oil revenues between Iraq’s regions, defined as they are by ethnicity and sect. But that, in fact, is a relatively minor part of the oil law. The Christian Science Monitor tells us that, in fact, a major reason for the Iraqis’ reluctance to pass it may be that “the draft law in fact says little about sharing oil revenues among Iraqi groups and a lot about setting up a framework for investment that may be disadvantageous to Iraqis over the long term.”

The CSM continues:

“The actual draft law has nothing to do with sharing the oil revenue,” says former Iraqi oil minister Issam Al Chalabi, in a phone interview from Amman, Jordan. The law aims to set a framework for investment by outside oil companies, including favorable production-sharing agreements that are typically used to reward companies for taking on risk, he says.

“We know the oil is there. Geological studies have been made for decades on these oil fields, so why would we let them [international firms] have a share of the oil?” he adds. “Iraqis will say this is solid proof that Americans have staged the war … because of this law.”

The Monitor reports that even some Democratic legislators are now beginning to question the content of the oil law, and whether it’s objectives are primarily to benefit Iraqis or U.S. oil companies.

Indeed, the opposition to the law inside Iraq appears to have united a broad political spectrum, ranging from mainstream Sunni parties and nationalist groups backing the insurgency to the Sadrists and the national trade union of Iraqi oil workers. That’s because, as Antonia Juhasz pointed out in a remarkable New York Times op ed, the draft law in fact would take Iraq entirely out of the international mainstream by putting ownership and control of its oil reserves in the hands of foreign companies — three quarters of the world’s oil is owned by governments, and the oil companies don’t like that.

She wrote:

The administration has highlighted the law’s revenue sharing plan, under which the central government would distribute oil revenues throughout the nation on a per capita basis. But the benefits of this excellent proposal are radically undercut by the law’s many other provisions — these allow much (if not most) of Iraq’s oil revenues to flow out of the country and into the pockets of international oil companies.

The law would transform Iraq’s oil industry from a nationalized model closed to American oil companies except for limited (although highly lucrative) marketing contracts, into a commercial industry, all-but-privatized, that is fully open to all international oil companies.

She explains how the terms of the law operate as a unique (in the Middle East) windfall for foreign companies, and recommends that Iraqis be allowed to determine this issue democratically, and free of foreign pressure. While I don’t believe oil was the factor that prompted the U.S. to invade Iraq, I do believe that aggressively moving to lock up its oil reserves for U.S. companies has been a key objective of the occupation regime ever since the invasion was first decided upon.

In an excellent summation of ‘The Struggle Over Iraqi Oil’, Michael Schwartz, writing on the indispensable TomDispatch, reveals the oil-grab policy inherent in the Administration’s approach to Iraq from 2002. And it clearly guided the actions of the U.S. once inside Iraq:

Not long after President Bush declared “major combat operations in Iraq have ended” under a “Mission Accomplished” banner on the deck of the aircraft carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln, Paul Bremer, the new head of the American occupation, promulgated a series of laws designed, among other things, to kick-start the development of Iraqi oil. In addition to attempting to transfer management of existing oil facilities (well heads, refineries, pipelines, and shipping) to multinational corporations, he also set about creating an oil-policy framework, unique in the region, that would allow the major companies to develop the country’s proven reserves and even to begin drilling new wells.

All these plans were, however, quickly frustrated, both by the growing Sunni insurgency and by civil resistance. Iraq’s oil workers quickly unionized — even though Bremer extended Saddam’s prohibition on unions in state-owned companies — and effectively resisted the transfer of management duties to foreign companies. In one noteworthy moment, the oil workers actually refused to take orders from Bechtel officials in the oil hub of Basra, thus preserving their own jobs as well as the right of the Iraqi state-owned Southern Oil Company to continue to control the operation in that region. Bechtel’s management contract was subsequently voided.

At the same time, the growing insurgency, acting on a general Iraqi understanding that a major goal of the occupation was to “steal” Iraqi oil, systematically began to attack the oil pipelines that traveled through the Sunni areas of the country. Within a few months, all oil exports in the northern part of Iraq were interrupted — and the northern export pipelines have remained generally unusable ever since…. Meanwhile, the major oil companies refused Bremer’s invitation to invest their own money in Iraqi projects, pointing out the obvious — that the insurgency and the spreading chaos made such investments unwise. In addition, they were well aware that Bremer’s regime in Baghdad lacked clear authority to sign contracts with them. This, in turn, meant that their investments might be in jeopardy once a legitimate government took power. When technical sovereignty was finally handed over to an appointed Iraqi government headed by the CIA’s favorite Iraqi exile, Iyad Allawi, in June 2004, the new premier embraced Bremer’s policy, but to no avail. The international oil companies were no more impressed with his future than they had been with Bremer’s. Like Wolfowitz, they knew that Iraq “floats on a sea of oil”; unlike him, they were no dreamers. They weren’t willing to risk their capital in the dangerous and legally ambiguous circumstances then prevailing.

Schwartz proceeds to explain how the U.S. leaned on the elected Iraqi governments to accept a U.S.-drafted oil law by using the management of Iraqi debt to twist the arm of Baghdad. But the government is balking, not only because of pressure from the Kurds who have questions about just how much of the oil they’ll control, but also from broad swathes of Iraqi society who appear to be asking what good is a law that makes for a more equitable distribution of Iraqi oil profits at the same time as ensuring that the lion’s share of those profits go to foreign oil companies. Fair question. And if the diverse range of forces arrayed against the bill is any indication, it may well be a boost for Iraqi national unity — primarily through the opposition it provokes.

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