Haven’t we been here before?
I. The Last Waltz?
Repeating behaviors that have produced catastrophic failures and expecting a different result is insane; and when a person’s psychotic behavior puts himself and those around him in immediate physical danger, the responsibility of those who claim to be his friends is to restrain him. But even as Waltz With Bashir shows in multiplexes across the world as a grim reminder of the precedent for Israel’s brutal march of folly in Gaza, the U.S. (and the editors of the New York Times and Washington Post) insist that there is a sanity and rationality to sending one of the world’s most powerful armies into a giant refugee camp to rend the flesh and crush the bones of those who stand in its way — whether in defiance or by being unlucky enough to have been born of the wrong tribe and be huddling in the wrong place. By fighting its way to their citadel, they would have us believe, Israel can destroy Hamas and usher in a golden age of peace. Or, to borrow from the casual callousness of Condi Rice during the last such display of futile brutality, we are witnessing, again, the “birth pangs of a new Middle East.” Israel failed in 2006, just as in 2002 and 1982. This time, they tell us, will be different.
And then the horror unfolds, as it always does — the hundreds of civilians accidentally massacred as they cowered in what they were told were places of safety, mocking Israel’s torrent of self congratulation over its restraint and its brilliant intelligence — and the hopelessly out-gunned enemy manages to survive, as he does every time. And by surviving, grows stronger politically. No matter how many are killed, the leaders targeted by Israel’s military are endlessly regenerated in the fertile soil of grievance and resentment born of the circumstances Israel has created. Circumstances it has created, but which it, and its most fervent backers refuse to acknowledge, much less redress.
Arafat is dead and gone. So are Sheikh Yassin, and Rantissi. And Abbas al-Musawi, and Imad Mughniyeh. Israel’s ruthless efficiency at killing the leaders of Palestinian and Lebanese resistance groups is second to none, and yet, no matter who it kills, there are always thousands more, ready to declare, “I am Spartacus”. That’s because those who step up to lead these organizations are acting not out of personal ambition — leadership in Hamas is a death sentence. The endless stream of Palestinians willing to sacrifice themselves in the role, then, is a symptom of the condition of their people. And Israel’s leaders know this. Asked when running for Prime Minister a decade ago what he’d have done if he’d been born Palestinian, Ehud Barak — the man directing the current operation in Gaza — answered bluntly, “I’d have joined a terror organization.”
By the logic of his own instinct on the campaign trail in 1999, Ehud Barak should know that Operation Cast Lead in Gaza cannot succeed, except, perhaps, in reviving his own political prospects. No matter how many leaders, militants and ordinary civilians Israel kills in Gaza, Hamas — or something like it — will survive.
Waltz With Bashir — a movie that had to be made in Israel, I venture, because questioning Israeli militarism would have been deemed “anti-Semitic” in Hollywood — reminds us that, in 1982, Ariel Sharon led an invasion of Lebanon supposedly aimed at stopping attacks on northern Israel, advancing all the way to Beirut in order to crush the PLO. Sure, the PLO was driven out of Beirut and exiled to Tunisia, but the Israelis were forced within six years to begin negotiating with it because of the uprising of the youth of the West Bank and Gaza. Lebanon in 1982 was a brutal and ultimately futile campaign that delivered only the brutal images of the massacres at Sabra and Shatila around which the movie centers.
Since 1982, of course, Israel has laid siege to and bombed nearly every major Palestinian city, killing and imprisoning thousands of Palestinians, blundering into Lebanon again in 2006 and killing another thousand Lebanese, repeatedly bombed Gaza and choked off its economy for much of the past three years, and yet, nothing has changed: They have killed some 700 in Gaza now, and still the rockets come; regardless of the state of its structures, Hamas is politically stronger on the Palestinian street, while those Palestinian leaders who have cooperated with Israel and the U.S. are weaker and more discredited than ever. The Israelis — and their backers in the American political establishment — appear incapable of grasping that which is empirically obvious: Hamas and its ilk grow stronger every time Israel seeks to eliminate them by force.
II. Dangerous Illusions and a War of Choice
“But what choice did Israel have?” say those in its amen corner in the U.S. “No normal society would tolerate rocket fire on its territory. Hamas left it no option.”
Well, actually, as Jimmy Carter explains from first-hand experience, Israel had plenty of alternatives and chose to ignore them, because it remains locked into the failed U.S.-backed policy of trying to overturn the democratic verdict of the 2006 Palestinian election that made Hamas the ruling party of the Palestinian Authority. The primary Israeli-U.S.-European strategy here (tacitly backed by Arab autocrats from Mubarak to Mahmoud Abbas) has been to apply increasingly strict economic sanctions, in the hope that choking off the chances of a decent life for the 1.5 million people of Gaza would somehow force them to reverse their political choice. Collective punishment, in other words. So, even when Hamas observed a cease-fire between June and November, Israel refused to open the border crossings. When the exchange of fire began again on November 5 when Israel raided what it said was a Hamas tunnel, Hamas escalated its rocket fire but made clear that it would restore and extend the cease-fire if Israel agreed to open the border crossings. Israel’s answer, Carter explains, was if Hamas ceased firing, Israel would allow 15% of the normal traffic of goods into Gaza. And it’s any surprise that Hamas was not prepared to settle for just a 15% loosening of the economic stranglehold?
Hamas appeared to believe that creating a crisis would force Israel to agree to new terms. Whether this was a mistaken belief or not actually remains to be seen: If the truce that ends Israel’s Operation Cast Lead leaves Hamas intact and includes the lifting of the siege, it will claim vindication. Even now, Israeli leaders continue to insist, idiotically, that Hamas cannot be allowed to achieve any diplomatic gains as a result of any truce that must, of necessity, require its diplomatic cooperation. Just as in 2006, the Israelis have achieved the exact opposite political result to what they intended: They have made it abundantly obvious, even to the incoming U.S. administration, that the policy of trying to isolate Hamas is spectacularly dysfunctional, and will have to be abandoned as a matter of urgency.
Even as the realization begins to dawn that their adversary, once again, will emerge politically stronger from a military pummeling, the Israelis contemplate one last bloody foray into the heart of Gaza City, hoping that military action can weaken Hamas and force it to surrender to Israel’s terms. Some American policymakers even cling to the fantasy that they can reimpose the regime of the pliant Mahmoud Abbas on Gaza — a pathetic fantasy, to be sure, because close observers of Palestinian politics know that the only thing keeping Abbas in charge of the West Bank, right now, is the presence of the Israeli Defense Force, and it’s willingness to lock up his opponents. Conveniently, for example, Abbas doesn’t have to deal with his own legislature, which is dominated by Hamas, because Israel has locked up most of the legislators. Mahmoud Abbas has allowed himself to be turned into a Palestinian Petain, and even much of the rank and file of his own Fatah party has turned against him. Not even the Israelis believe he could control Gaza without them, and they are not inclined to stay.
If Hamas is not allowed to govern in Gaza, chances are that nobody will govern in Gaza. It will look more like Mogadishu than like the West Bank — a chaotic cauldron run by rival warlords, with Hamas — no longer responsible for governance — the most powerful political-military presence (although al-Qaeda will fancy its chances of setting up shop if the Hamas government is overthrown — Hamas is the greatest bulwark against Bin Laden’s crowd gaining a foothold in Gaza).
III. Palestinian Sovereignty
The other trope being desperately worked by Israel’s cheering section is the idea that this is simply another episode of a regional conflict between Israel and its mortal foe, Iran. Hamas, we are told, by many media outlets that ought to know better, is a “proxy of Iran”. This is simply not the case, and sober regional analysts know it: Hamas is certainly dependent on Iranian cash in Gaza, although those Western and Israeli strategic geniuses who deprived it of all other sources of funding ought not be surprised that Hamas turned for funds to those who would offer them. No doubt it will take whatever military assistance it was offered, too. But Hamas shares neither ideology nor the kind of political relationship with Iran that Hizballah does, in Lebanon. Hamas was the creation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, originally, and its political decision making is entirely independent of Iran. Syria is more politically influential over Hamas, of course, and Syria is hardly a proxy of Iran despite their alliance — if it was, why would the U.S. be working so hard on a diplomatic strategy to break that alliance? Moreover, the idea of Iran on some sort of path of confrontation with Israel is something of a phantom. Sure, Ahmadinejad loves to warn that Israel will disappear, but he, and his superior, have long made clear that Iran has no intention of attacking Israel. And you’d think that those who insist that Iran’s mullahs exist in order to destroy Israel, even at the cost of their own survival (you know, the argument that the iranians are so ideologically committed to Israel’s destruction that normal deterrence policies won’t restrain them) might want to answer this question: Why has Hizballah refrained from firing its massive arsenal of rockets at Israel as it butchers Palestinians in Gaza? Israel tells us they have the means, and there’s no doubt they have the implacable rage. Could the answer be that this Iranian proxy is being restrained by the pragmatic concern for its own survival and progress in Lebanon? And if so, what does this tell us about Iran? Then again, Iran is not especially relevant to the conflict in Gaza.
Nor was the crisis there created by the militancy of Hamas; instead, it’s the final bloody chapter in the failed Bush Administration-Israeli strategy to overthrow Hamas. The alternative to war, ignored by Israel but patently obvious, is simple: It will have to negotiate with Hamas. (And spare me the “but Hamas doesn’t recognize Israel’s right to exist” argument: No Palestinian leader would, if offered the chance to reverse history, allow Israel to have come into existence, for the simple reason that Israel’s emergence was the Palestinian Nakbah, the catastrophe that dispossessed them and made them refugees. Israel started talking to the PLO long before its charter was revised to allow for recognizing Israel; its leaders realized that Israel could not be militarily defeated. Many in Hamas have come to the same conclusion; Efraim Halevy, the former head of Mossad, argues that Hamas is moving towards acceptance of a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders. The Americans are simply going to have to let go of the idea that they’re going to negotiate with a Palestinian leadership that answers to them, as Mahmoud Abbas does, rather than one that answers to the Palestinian public.)
As Oxford-based Israeli historian Avi Shlaim writes:
Israel likes to portray itself as an island of democracy in a sea of authoritarianism. Yet Israel has never in its entire history done anything to promote democracy on the Arab side and has done a great deal to undermine it. Israel has a long history of secret collaboration with reactionary Arab regimes to suppress Palestinian nationalism. Despite all the handicaps, the Palestinian people succeeded in building the only genuine democracy in the Arab world with the possible exception of Lebanon. In January 2006, free and fair elections for the Legislative Council of the Palestinian Authority brought to power a Hamas-led government. Israel, however, refused to recognise the democratically elected government, claiming that Hamas is purely and simply a terrorist organisation.
America and the EU shamelessly joined Israel in ostracising and demonising the Hamas government and in trying to bring it down by withholding tax revenues and foreign aid. A surreal situation thus developed with a significant part of the international community imposing economic sanctions not against the occupier but against the occupied, not against the oppressor but against the oppressed.
As so often in the tragic history of Palestine, the victims were blamed for their own misfortunes. Israel’s propaganda machine persistently purveyed the notion that the Palestinians are terrorists, that they reject coexistence with the Jewish state, that their nationalism is little more than antisemitism, that Hamas is just a bunch of religious fanatics and that Islam is incompatible with democracy. But the simple truth is that the Palestinian people are a normal people with normal aspirations. They are no better but they are no worse than any other national group. What they aspire to, above all, is a piece of land to call their own on which to live in freedom and dignity.
Like other radical movements, Hamas began to moderate its political programme following its rise to power. From the ideological rejectionism of its charter, it began to move towards pragmatic accommodation of a two-state solution. In March 2007, Hamas and Fatah formed a national unity government that was ready to negotiate a long-term ceasefire with Israel. Israel, however, refused to negotiate with a government that included Hamas.
It continued to play the old game of divide and rule between rival Palestinian factions. In the late 1980s, Israel had supported the nascent Hamas in order to weaken Fatah, the secular nationalist movement led by Yasser Arafat. Now Israel began to encourage the corrupt and pliant Fatah leaders to overthrow their religious political rivals and recapture power. Aggressive American neoconservatives participated in the sinister plot to instigate a Palestinian civil war. Their meddling was a major factor in the collapse of the national unity government and in driving Hamas to seize power in Gaza in June 2007 to pre-empt a Fatah coup.
The war unleashed by Israel on Gaza on 27 December was the culmination of a series of clashes and confrontations with the Hamas government. In a broader sense, however, it is a war between Israel and the Palestinian people, because the people had elected the party to power. The declared aim of the war is to weaken Hamas and to intensify the pressure until its leaders agree to a new ceasefire on Israel’s terms. The undeclared aim is to ensure that the Palestinians in Gaza are seen by the world simply as a humanitarian problem and thus to derail their struggle for independence and statehood.
Shlaim introduces us to the deeper flaw in the “no normal society would tolerate rocket fire” reasoning: Israel, quite simply, is not a normal society. It is a country without fixed legal borders, and the disputes over where those borders should be drawn — the basic conflict not over religion or ideology, but over land and power — is at the very epicenter of the current clash in Gaza, and of Israel’s never-ending series of wars with those around it.
One can only hope, with great fervor, that Barak Obama has heeded the wisdom of his foreign policy tutor Brent Scowcroft, whose observations about the folly of the Bush Administration backing Israel’s 2006 campaign against Hizballah apply as much to today’s offensive in Gaza: “Hezbollah is not the source of the problem,” Scowcroft wrote in the Washington Post. “It is a derivative of the cause, which is the tragic conflict over Palestine that began in 1948. The eastern shore of the Mediterranean is in turmoil from end to end, a repetition of continuing conflicts in one part or another since the abortive attempts of the United Nations to create separate Israeli and Palestinian states in 1948.”
If that were true in Lebanon, it’s even more so in Gaza. To understand everything from why Hamas refuses to recognize the State of Israel; why it fights by means both fair and terribly foul; and why it won Gaza by a landslide in the 2006 election; a good starting point is the demographic composition of the strip — 80% of today’s Gazans are refugee families, who were driven out of homes and off land they owned inside what is now Israel in 1948, and forbidden by one of the founding laws of the State of Israel from ever returning. Is it any surprise then that the basic default position of Palestinian politics has always been to refrain from “recognizing” Israel in the sense of simply abandoning their own claims to homes and land stolen from them by Israel’s very creation. Sure, Israel can say it won the war of 1948, and to the victor the spoils. But what would Ehud Barak do if it had been his father or grandfather who’d been forced off a farm in Ashkelon and now found himself in the hellhole of Gaza? You already know his answer.
And that answer will remain the same (even if Barak would never dream of admitting it any longer) as long as justice and dignity is denied to the community that gave rise to Hamas.
What Operation Cast Lead has revealed in stark and brutal terms, is that Israel’s leadership is incapable of transcending the dysfunctional patterns that lock it into a morbid cycle that precludes Middle East stability. Israel is moving steadily to the right politically — even when the center-left was in power and negotiating with the Palestinians, settlements on occupied land expanded at a steady clip; no Israeli government for the foreseeable future is going to withdraw from the West Bank to the Green Line. So, if the madness is to be stopped, Israel and the Palestinians will have to be told where their borders are, as part of an internationally enforced, fair settlement that gives the parties no choice, and provides the Turkish troops to enforce it. But hey, I’m not holding my breath…
EXcellent Mr Karon.
“Weep for Gazans who have no place to run or hide”, still being slaughtered in spite of the UN declared ceasefire.
What Israel REALLY WANTS, is beyond comprehension. Whatever it is, will not be the end result of this undescribable catastrophe.
What Israel wants is not beyond comprehension.
It is quite simple really. Israel is a colonialist settler state. It wants land and it wants it without the native population on it.
The Palestinian and Lebanon people are both in the way of the land Israel wants.
Hey Tony —
As you know I generally disagree with your take on these types of matters but always enjoy reading your posts and getting your perspective on the middle east.
But with this latest post, I found it nearly impossible to read through more than a couple of paragraphs, after you started off with:
“the hundreds of civilians butchered”.
I find that kind of language really offensive and irresponsible. It suggests a certain intention and character of the IDF that dehumanizes the soliders – when in fact the IDF takes more measures to protect civilians in a combat zone that any other military today — often at a cost of higher casualties to their own soldiers.
It also fuels some of the real anti-Israel hate speech that has unfortunately landed in some of your blog post comments — and even some of your regular readers seem horrified by the new tone of the comments here.
Here’s hoping for a more level headed conversation.
happy new yr !
Raanan — you mean I should have said “accidentally butchered” — I agree that the Israelis didn’t intend to kill these large clusters of civilians they killed with a single shell or bomb here and there. But there’s a limit to how much sympathy anyone can have for accidents that happen, and are bound to happen, in the course of a futile “show of strength” that actually strengthens those it is supposedly aimed at.
“Offensive and irresponsible” in my mind is sending tanks, artillery and an air force into giant refugee camp. The soldiers, as Waltz With Bashir tries to show, are dehumanized by those who send them on these crazy missions.
I agree with you about the tone of some of the comments on the site, specifically the antisemtic ones. But it is Israel’s actions, not criticisms of Israel’s actions, that has outraged most of the world.
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I was just in North Africa visiting relatives when the current war began. My nephews and nieces whose parents are upper middle class and who are no older than 12 years old (of Tunisian and Algerian heritage) were all wearing the traditional palestinian scarf around their necks and telling me they wanted to go to Palestine to help their brothers and sisters. Israel is only adding fuel to the fire and now taunting well educated and once moderate arabs. The populations of arabs countries are dwarfing that of Israel and is only a matter of time before sheer numbers decide who wins the war. Alekum a salem.
Excellent analysis, Tony. I lived in the Holy Land for two years (mostly in the West Bank, but frequently visiting Israel and occasionally Gaza) and have been focusing professionally on this conflict for the past five years. I couldn’t have said it better myself. Nicely done.
“Offensive and irresponsible” in my mind is sending tanks, artillery and an air force into giant refugee camp.
And what, in your mind, is operating rocket and mortar attacks from mosques, hospitals, and UN schools?
Mr. Karon, First time I heard about you but I must say this is a great article!
Bob Simon talking to Charlie Rose about the Gaza situation.
http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/9900
CNN Confirms Israel Broke Ceasefire First
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KntmpoRXFX4
UN: “Israel knew they were bombing a school”
Video: http://tr.im/3610
@Tony —
“you mean I should have said “accidentally butchered” “.
Nope. Butchering implies brutality or a kind of indiscriminate style of killing. Neither one is accurate here regarding the IDF. I think simply “accidentally killed” would be appropriate. Hamas firing rockets indiscriminately at Israeli cities with the only intention of killing innocent civilians — now that fits the definition of “butchering”. Hamas forcing residents into areas where it’s firing rockets from knowing that it ups the chances of civilian casualties – that’s “butchering”. And Hamas refusing to allow civilians to receive humanitarian aide or medical treatment and using ambulances to move it’s gunmen within the Gaza — that to me is tantamount to “butchering civilians”. And for a reality check – every lost civilian life is a tragedy, but it goes against the principals and morals of the IDF and serves no Israeli interest to kill civilians, and that should be obvious to everyone who follows these events.
In addition, the IDF calls Gaza residents to warn them if fighting is near their homes, it drops leaflets, and won’t bomb sites from the air on overcast days — not because it can’t hit the targets ( it has the GPS coordinates ) but because the Israeli air force cannot confirm if civilians are in the area, and therefor does not want to risk killing innocent civilans.
Does that sound like butchering ?
And why do doctors in Israel perform life saving surgery on Palestinian kids ( at a cost to the Israeli tax payer ) ? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wjqm5tzIwIQ ?
The answer is that Israelis care deeply about civilians in Gaza and overwhelmingly ( some polls put it at 65%+ ) want a two-state peace deal. What they don’t want is a neighbor who thinks they can shoot rockets and hold cities hostage and has the ultimate goal of wiping Israel off the map. Even at the height of this conflict when Israelis are attending funerals of fallen soldiers and civilians, if you watch the local media or talk to people in Israel you’ll find vigorous debate about the current situation and a deep sympathy to what the civilians in Gaza are facing. I’m not sure if you’ve ever visited Israel – by I really encourage you to do so soon and get an on-the-ground perspective.
Bottom line, the point of this operation is to go after Hamas, not the civilians in Gaza.
“But there’s a limit to how much sympathy anyone can have for accidents that happen, and are bound to happen, in the course of a futile “show of strength” ”
I think that’s an excellent point. It’s why we should avoid wars and military conflicts at all costs and exhaust all diplomatic options first – because wars are dirty, messy, and not a precision science the way they often gets portrayed by gun cam videos these days. What other country but Israel has from the inception agreed to compromise, dialog, and negotiation — and then when attacked later returned to the negotiation table on a principle of “land for peace” ? And what other country would put up with rocket fire for months on end (years really) and still try and negotiate and find a diplomatic solution while it’s civilians are being killed ( inside the green line no less ) ?
I also obviously don’t agree with all Israeli political positions on how best to negotiate a peace deal, but let’s put it in context of the “three NOs” that the Arab world adopted post ’67 (NO peace with Israel, NO recognition of Israel, NO negotiations with Israel) all the while when there was a real window of opportunity — 10 years before the first settlement was even started.
“I agree with you about the tone of some of the comments on the site, specifically the antisemtic ones.”
You have the power to curate the conversation here — I think you should exercise that ability to keep the conversation here flowing and at a high-level.
“But it is Israel’s actions, not criticisms of Israel’s actions, that has outraged most of the world.”
Yes and no. The coverage of Israel’s defensive military action is often portrayed with a tone and a language that is inappropriate and often borders on hate speech. By the way, the same “outrage” that the world has right now never seems to apply to Israeli civilians being killed — why is that ? And I’m sorry to say, but when someone as smart and well respected as you adds to the discourse by saying things like “butchered civilians” — it provides a green-light and creates a more conducive environment for those who want to spew hate speech and anti-semitic rhetoric.
“Sure, Ahmadinejad loves to warn that Israel will disappear, but he, and his superior, have long made clear that Iran has no intention of attacking Israel.”
What a strange bit in this entire article. It’s simple false that Ahmadinejad warned that ISRAEL would disappear. He said the Zionist regime would. And he was talking about the political viability of the Zionist ideology.
He repeated the quote (from Khomeiny) a year later, and added, for clarification, “just like the USSR faded from the pages of time.”
So there.
epitaph for a nations zeal
sowed the seeds for the real
new one world order
like from space
no nasty lines
for her figure
to disgrace
no army’s
standing
lying
buried
underground
no opposition needed
and never any found
we all must look
out for each other
that’s what this life’s about
it’s there in the waves cascading
and in the rooftop shout
“By the way, the same “outrage” that the world has right now never seems to apply to Israeli civilians being killed — why is that ?”
I don’t know. Maybe because, until Israel launched the current attack, not a single Israeli civilian got killed. God, I wonder why no one gets outraged when no one dies. That surely is intolerable.
More seriously, I’m wondering exactly on which planet you’re living. Pluto maybe ? The ratio of Palestinian to Israeli deaths is more than 100 to 1. The UN also uses a very special method of counting civilian casualties: there is no such thing as a male civilian. No grandpas, no dads, nothing. If you’re a male civilian in Gaza, you’re automatically a Hamas militant who lobs rockets into Israel. Wonder when you’ll show outrage for THAT.
As for how there’s no outrage for civilian casualties in Israel, I suppose those who don’t do that simply believe that Israel got it coming. I think it can be argued that the Israeli army is so powerful that sneaking up and shooting stuff from afar is the only winning strategy possible. You weren’t expecting Hamas to get into an open field and fight with their shitty weaponry, with grade-A Israeli armaments ? The Qassam rockets, the suicide bombings, that’s the result of decades of subsidies. Hamas and Palestinians would fight fairly, IF THEY HAD A CHANCE by doing that. Give them tanks and F-16s. You’ll see.
On the more general point of how immoral it is to kill civilians, there is already a norm about this. Something everyone signed. It’s called the Geneva Convention, and US and Israel are two of the actors that violate it the most. Ironic that they are also the one who are the most self-righteous.
I suppose each man is furthest to himself. But I’m pretty sure that if you’re bullshitting yourself about purity of arms, you’re only getting that much further from self-observation. Words don’t make stuff come true. Purity is not something to exclaim to strangers like a political slogan. It is the result of a long, humbling, and strenuous journey. Israel uses it like a slogan, and I’m not surprised the reality is far far away from the words.
Raanan — I’ll go with accidentally butchering, actually. The point is, there’s no way to do what Israel is trying to do without causing major civilian casualties. And you’re simply wrong about Israel having exhausted diplomatic options, throughout its history or even now, in teh course of this very conflict in Gaza. (See links to Jimmy Carter account in the story) Israel chose not to go for a new ceasefire (by refusing to reopen the crossings). This was a long-planned operation aimed at taking out Hamas military capability. And that’s in keeping with the “iron wall” tradition of smashing the Palestinians until they accept defeat. The Israelis had a way of stopping rocket fire without doing this — by accepting the idea of a ceasefire that reopened the crossings.
The absurdity is that Israel won’t negotiate with Hamas (or the U.S.) but is forced to anyway. This could all have been avoided with a more mature, rational response not only in November/December, but when Hamas won the election. This operation is the final, bloody chapter of the failed U.S.-Israeli campaign to overturn the results of the 2006 Palestinian election.
Apropos curating the conversation, I’ll try to do better, but have a lot on my plate.
But no amount of media management, which the Israelis have spent so much effort trying to do, can compete with the images that come out of Gaza.
In deference to your concern, though, I’ll change “butchered” to “accidentally massacred”
But Raanan, as quid pro quo, now you have to read to the end!
@littlehorn —
“I think it can be argued that the Israeli army is so powerful that sneaking up and shooting stuff from afar is the only winning strategy possible. You weren’t expecting Hamas to get into an open field and fight with their shitty weaponry, with grade-A Israeli armaments ? The Qassam rockets, the suicide bombings, that’s the result of decades of subsidies. Hamas and Palestinians would fight fairly, IF THEY HAD A CHANCE by doing that. Give them tanks and F-16s. You’ll see.”
I understand asymmetrical warfare, but a Hamas armed with more powerful weapons would simply try and kill many more Israeli civilians.
Israel on the other hand is carrying out defensive measures to protect her citizens, and on the other side trying to minimize civilians casualties in Gaza.
And what about prior wars like ’48 and ’67 when all the Arab states were talking about annihilating Israel and outnumbered the Israelis by a huge number — by your logic Israel should have resorted to killing civilians in Syria and Egypt then as a response ?
And as Wafa Sultan points out “we haven’t seen a single Jew blow himself up in a German restaurant” – which according to your logic should havee been the response to WWII: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ciOGS6r97oE
@Tony —
“Israel chose not to go for a new ceasefire (by refusing to reopen the crossings).”
Perhaps — and I don’t completely agree with this tactic, however Israel has every right to close it’s border to a hostile neighbor who not only threatens it, but executes terror trikes against it’s citizens.
The problem is Hamas wants to have it both ways. It wants to remain a radical terrorist orginization and a gov’t org that provides services to it’s people. And not only that, it wants to be rewarded by Israel to show it’s people that it “beat down” Israel — that simply can’t happen.
Imagine if after the pull out in 2005 instead of building 1000+ tunnels to smuggle in weapons, Hamas would have actually tried to improve the lives of it’s own people, made peace with Fatah (instead of executing dozens of them) and proved to the world that they were ready to be a responsible orginization.
It wasn’t that long ago in the late 90s when Jordan, Egypt, and the PA setup industrial parks in Gaza and new jobs were being produced and things were at least looking better.
“The Israelis had a way of stopping rocket fire without doing this — by accepting the idea of a ceasefire that reopened the crossings.”
Yes, but politically since nobody pressured Hamas to stop arming itself and shooting rockets ( not to mention kidnapping Gilat Shalit ) – it became very hard for Israel to “reward” Hamas.
“This could all have been avoided with a more mature, rational response not only in November/December, but when Hamas won the election.”
I agree with you that it would have been preferable – but the missing piece was an olive branch from Hamas that never came.
At times like this I really miss Rabin who liked to say that you “negotiate for peace as if there were no terrorism, and you fight terrorism as if there were no peace negotiations”.
“In deference to your concern, though, I’ll change “butchered” to “accidentally massacred” ”
You’ve got a dark sense of humor ! Masscared is the same if not a bit worse.
“But Raanan, as quid pro quo, now you have to read to the end!”
Going to be tough w/ your latest edit.
Perhaps — and I don’t completely agree with this tactic, however Israel has every right to close it’s border to a hostile neighbor who not only threatens it, but executes terror trikes against it’s citizens.
Israel doesn’t have any borders. As a matter of fact, it is the only country in the world without fixed borders. That’s because the land it claims keeps getting larger and larger. Kind of like Nazi Germany.
It is a colonial settler state, and its supporters are racists who want a religiously pure state, unlike modern democracies which are secular.
Raanan,
“Even at the height of this conflict when Israelis are attending funerals of fallen soldiers and civilians, if you watch the local media or talk to people in Israel you’ll find vigorous debate about the current situation and a deep sympathy to what the civilians in Gaza are facing. I’m not sure if you’ve ever visited Israel – by I really encourage you to do so soon and get an on-the-ground perspective.”
So, Ranaan, I see you wish to appropriate me as your propaganda tool. You PERSONALLY don’t care about loss of civilian lives–if you did, you wouldn’t still be defending Israel at this point–but you want to say Israel is moral because Jews like me protest. That’s simply false, considering the high support Israelis still show for the war. There are some moral Jews in Israel, specifically the Jews who agree with me that it is time to end the carnage. (If you change your mind, you can join them–there’s a Peace Now rally in Tel Aviv motzei shabbat.) But you are not moral. You are justifying war crimes.
I am the one that’s commented most about antisemitism on this forum, but I think it will be many months before I attend any event that can be construed as pro-Israel. On the other hand, even if I can not wear a kippah at pro-Palestinian rallies for fear of antisemitic maniacs, I will be there.
The point isn’t to visit Israel. I’ve done that extensively, it’s a nice place, and I genuinely enjoyed my time there. The point is to visit the Palestinians. I’ve found that most Israelis in W Jerusalem are as naive as New York Jews regarding what happens to Palestinians. They simply have no idea.
So I ask you: aside from army patrols, have you ever visited a Palestinian neighborhood? Have you talked to settlers, who are clear on their goals and will brag about their brutal methods? If so, what did you think?
I have to say, I visited Shderot and think the situation is quite bad in the south. The people there, beaten down by years of red alerts have a mixture of fear and resignation in their eyes. But so do Hevron Palestinians–and their situation has always been better than Gaza’s.
Shabbat Shalom
Hamas’ popularity is a function of the brutality of the occupation. If Israel is successful in weakening Hamas, then some other group that is more radical, violent, & uncontrollable will emerge in its place.
@ edwin –
Most Israelis, including myself, hope the ’67 borders can be finalized. But since Gaza was once part of Egypt, and the West Bank was part of Jordan, it’s not that simple to just got back to ’67.
@Shlomo —
“but you want to say Israel is moral because Jews like me protest”
Not sure I follow. But in general protesting and dialogue only lead to good things – so the more the better. Do Palestinians get to protest against Hamas in Gaza ?
I just object to using massacre/butchered/etc when those terms assume a certain intention and a certain scale that are not accurate to this situation.
This isn’t Hana in Syria where 40,000 Syrians were killed by Assad and his brother for being “anti Baath”.
“So I ask you: aside from army patrols, have you ever visited a Palestinian neighborhood?”
I have — many years ago though — not safe anymore to visit unfortunately.
“Have you talked to settlers, who are clear on their goals and will brag about their brutal methods? If so, what did you think?”
I think for most of them, they should either pack their bags or decide that they will be living in the future Palestinian state.
For pure logistical reasons if a peace deal included keeping a few settlements right on the edge of Israel and in return giving the Palestinians more land in the south ( so the total sq km was the same ) I’d be in favor of that.
Otherwise if we can ensure security and peace for the citizens of Israel, I don’t see why we can’t go back to the ’67 borders.
“Kind of like Nazi Germany.”
There’s as time and place for hyperbole, but it isn’t here. Let’s save the Nazi references for when someone is killing civilians by the million.
http://www.sott.net/articles/show/172252-The-Other-Side-of-the-Story-
It looks like slaughter to me, Raanan.
“I find that kind of language really offensive and irresponsible. It suggests a certain intention and character of the IDF that dehumanizes the soliders – when in fact the IDF takes more measures to protect civilians in a combat zone that any other military today — often at a cost of higher casualties to their own soldiers.”
This quote from Ranaan is a deliberate attempt to conceal the crimes of the IDF. They have murdered and wounded nearly four thousand human beings in the last ten days in a savage attack on a civilian population. Amnesty International, The Red Cross, the UN, and millions of concerned human beings deplore these war crimes and the complicity of those who attempt to justify and conceal these crimes behind the shield of anti-semitism, while they stand on the bodies of the dead.
http://www.counterpunch.org/cook01092009.html
Outcry Over Israel’s War Crimes
“Yesterday, Amnesty International also accused Israeli soldiers of using Palestinian civilians as human shields – a charge Israel has repeatedly leveled against Hamas.
Malcolm Smart, a spokesman, said: “Israeli soldiers have entered and taken up positions in a number of Palestinian homes, forcing families to stay in a ground-floor room while they use the rest of their house as a military base and sniper position.”
Raanan says: “For pure logistical reasons if a peace deal included keeping a few settlements right on the edge of Israel and in return giving the Palestinians more land in the south ( so the total sq km was the same ) I’d be in favor of that.”
The area to the south is the Negev Desert. So you want to exchange the prime Palestinian farm land on the Western Border of the West Bank for more desert? Isn’t the desert in the Jordan River Valley enough desert for the Palestinians.
How about handing over the Galilee instead. That is good land.
Pingback: Unwilling or incapable? | Antony Loewenstein
How dare Israel try to defend its civilians and its existence! Those uppity Jews think they deserve a place to live, of all the nerve!
Hamas has as a centerpiece of its charter the complete destruction of Israel. It also contains an approval of terrorism, the intentional targeting of civilians, to achieve that aim. Before Israel forcibly removed all Israelis from Gaza, the justification for targeting Israeli civilians was that it was a resistance to Israel’s occupation. But Israel withdrew completely from Gaza and the response? The citizens of Gaza elected the terror group Hamas and thus gave their approval for attacking Israeli civilians with the aim of destroying Israel.
Israel is not idealistically trying to usher in a magical era of peace with this operation, merely to hinder Hamas’s ability to fire rockets nonstop at Israel’s civilians.
If Hamas were so concerned about the welfare of its citizens, then it would not instigate wars with Israel by attacking Israel’s own civilians. It certainly would not deliberately stage these attacks from within densely-populated areas and use its civilians as human shields.
The central difference between Israel and Hamas’s approach to warfare is that Israel targets terrorists. The terrorist Hamas targets civilians, Israel’s directly, and its own citizens as well by putting them directly in the line of fire.
Most Israelis, including myself, hope the ‘67 borders can be finalized. But since Gaza was once part of Egypt, and the West Bank was part of Jordan, it’s not that simple to just got back to ‘67.
I bet you do. Borders were finalized in 1948 by the United Nations. Egypt and Jordan have nothing to do with it.
You might be interested in Michel Chossudovsky’s essay at Global Research entitled “War and Natural Gas: The Israeli Invasion and Gaza’s Offshore Gas Fields”
http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11680
“The central difference between Israel and Hamas’s approach to warfare is that Israel targets terrorists. The terrorist Hamas targets civilians, Israel’s directly, and its own citizens as well by putting them directly in the line of fire.” by Joe
I remind you sir, the State of Israel was founded by warfare intent on ethnic cleansing of Palestinians by Haganah, Irgun, and Stern Gang terrorists whose public statements made clear ethnic cleansing was their strategy in establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. The descendent’s of members of Zionist terror organizations today appear to continue the policy of maintaining a Jews only state in Palestine by violent ethnic cleansing and seizure of Palestinian land. The world can see the results of the Zionist project in Gaza, which is holding the world hostage, including Jews. I direct you to the links to the following websites, if you are interested in putting aside the lies of the Zionist rulers of Israel and studying their origins and agenda in an objective search for truth in this matter.
http://www.marxists.de/middleast/ironwall/index.htm
http://www.marxists.de/middleast/brenner/index.htm
Raanan, TK, good to see the old .com crew here, even if it’s in the midst of a heated argument.
Raanan, you read on my site what I think about this invasion. I just don’t see the end game: what is the desired result here? It just isn’t realistic to think that despite historic evidence to the contrary, this one particular military strike will make the Palestinian militants lay down their arms and get to the negotiating table. Paradoxically it will likely have the opposite effect: nobody wants to negotiate from a position of weakness, so I’m sure Hamas would prefer to regenerate slowly than to sit down to talks after the bombardment.
I will bring in the Irish yet again, because I think the situation translates pretty well. (I wrote about it a while back: http://patrickstack.com/2007/06/13/the-ireland-middle-east-parallel/) The English spent 800 years trying to extinguish the Irish nationalists with much more brutal methods than the most anti-Arab Israeli could fathom, yet like a weed (at least as the English saw it) the rebellions grew back again and again and again. The only way the English beat it was to accommodate it: they returned to their borders and left the Irish to their own devices. (The exception being the North, and we all see how well that turned out.) That was a humiliating thing for the British Empire to do in the face of IRA tactics that they saw as terrorist in nature, and clearly the British had the military means to crush the Irish rebels in any fair fight, but the alternative was to keep doing the same weed-cutting for another 800 years.
I don’t think Israel will get the stable Palestinian state it needs unless it unilaterally moves toward it, and that will take someone willing to be the guy who “gave in to the terrorists”. That won’t be true, and in the end Israel will be better off for it. (Sharon at least grasped this concept.) Using force, though, is just more time spent in the weeds.
P.S. – B-school is a motherfucker.
The beating Israel is getting in world opinion, unfortunately, will have little impact. Israel will continue to pummel Gaza. In 1982 Israel pummeled a helpless Beirut, killing thousands, and who really remembers or cares? That is the take home lesson for Olmert, Barak and Livni; The world will holler for a while, but after Israel “wins” it wont matter and everyone will forget. Does anyone in the west really care about Sabra and Chatilla now? The Hasbara damage control team will sanitize Gaza in the same way.
Israel isn’t going to back down in the face of “international pressure” if it is only in the form of protests, no matter how large. If no nation in Europe is willing to take practical steps, such as withdrawing an ambassador, downgrading ties, arms embargo, etc. then the Israelis really wont care. And there is no sign any European nation will do that.
Indeed, Israel can’t back down, period. After loosing in Lebanon, they ***HAVE TO*** win here. They will invade Gaza city and other urban areas. They will kill a lot of people to minimize their own casualties. Then, they will find a collaborator to run it. If Abbas isn’t up to the task, they will find someone else. If the collaborators fight with the people in some civil war, so much the better. missiles will still fall on Sderot, but that was never the issue. Sderot will be as forgotten as the Iraqi WMD.
Will this bring Israel security? It remains to be seen, but I can say with confidence that Israel will NEVER accept a true Palestinian state and will certainly never accept a bi-national state. There will allways be a number of individual Israelis who could live with a compromise, but the Israeli nation state never will. Unless the balance of power shifts, meaning a nuclear Iran, a very powerful Hizbollah, economic devastation in the west, a collapse of the Egyptian and Saudi regimes and a multi-polar world, then I see nothing that will change that.
It only gets worse from here.
Dear Mr Karon, would be interesting to read an article written by you (I am not cynical) that describes why the Hamas is losing again and again (not to mention the Palestinian people). Look where there are today, what is wrong with their strategy/ways of operating/decision making so far historically? If the Israelis are so wrong, maybe some creativity on the other side can bring to a solution? thanks, Ruti
I found your article full of cliche
Hear are some of them:
1. The use of force form Israel if is a failure
-The only reason why Hezbollah won’t help the Hamas is the memory of Israeli retaliation in 2006 when he attack Israel.
The suicide boomer when stopped only when Israel used aggressive force against the terrorist in the west bank starting on may 2002.
In the Middle East war starting when the Arabs think that the other side is week – that what happened when Saddam Husein invasion to Iran 1980.
The PLO would never come to negotiate with Israel if he wouldn’t expel from Lebanon and realized he can never beat Israel,
The same happened to Egypt and Syria – the both understand that there no real option to over come Israel and they chose not to step out from the military conflict against Israel
2.If Israel is so vicious, powerful, Brutal, ready to kill innocence civilian -why the Hamas challenge
it?
Would any of the reader would challenge a vicious powerful brutal neighbor of him/ her ?
The answer is like alot of political failure regime the Hamas failed to care for his own people and misjudge the Israeli tolerance and restricted behavior like Nassralla they fall in love with the Iranian military support and illude them self that the can beat Israel – so stupid/ so Arad
Raanan wrote:
“I also obviously don’t agree with all Israeli political positions on how best to negotiate a peace deal, but let’s put it in context of the “three NOs” that the Arab world adopted post ‘67 (NO peace with Israel, NO recognition of Israel, NO negotiations with Israel) all the while when there was a real window of opportunity — 10 years before the first settlement was even started”
We are dealing here with one of the more successful bits of hasbara stuff. One finds it over and over and it is rarely challenged.I take the liberty to repeat here what I have written elasewhere on the matter.:
Thus we have here a picture of Israel holding out publicly the olive branch to obstinate Arab nations and being rudely rebuffed by them.
I have argued before, and will argue again, that this juxtaposition provides a caricature of the situation – a caricature that hasn’t survived the opening up of the relevant archives, except for those who have a vested interest in the myth around it.
The Israeli cabinet did indeed shortly after the war, on the 19th of June 1967, make a decision (with a majority of one vote)of that nature but if it was meant as an ‘offer’ to the Arabs they went about in a very curious way. The decision of that day was taken in the deepest secrecy (even Rabin, not a member of cabinet at the time, did not know about it), was never conveyed to the Arab states and was soon a historical artefact anyway because the Israeli cabinet changed its mind several times and had made its own decision undone well before Khartoum.
Barely a month after that decision was made, and thus well before the Khartoum meeting with “the three noes”, politicians approved plans for building settlements on the Golan Heights. Before that Jerusalem had been ‘unified’ in the teeth of strong opposition from the Americans (the Israelis argued, with a fine feeling for semantic subtleties, that ‘unification’ was not the same as ‘annexation’). Mid August far reaching plans for the settlement of the West Bank had been adopted.
Thus the Israeli historian Avi Shlaim argues that the decision of the 19th of June had become a ‘dead letter’ well before Khartoum. Those who maintain that the Israeli cabinet only reversed its policy after Khartoum have but a scintilla of formal truth on their side in the fact that the precarious decision (taken with a majority of one vote) of 19th June was finally formally buried in October.
I went through the documents in the online archive of the U.S. Department of State, now open to public inspection. I specifically looked at the material from the period between the date of that decision of the 19th of June,that was never turned into an offer to the Arab states, and the beginning of the Khartoum Conference (thus from around the twentieth June 1967 until the end of August of that year). I have skipped the lengthy archivalia on the consultations with the Russians and have only retained the in my view most telling fragments of the rest. The documents follow here below.
They completely confirm the picture Shlaim gave of the situation which is not astonishing because he went through the same documents (plus other archives of course – specifically the Israeli archives that are, as far as I know, not online).
Shlaim is completely right in asserting that there never was an offer to Syria and Egypt for Israel to withdraw to the international boundary. The relevant document is the first one in the series that follows. As one can see Eban was, in relation to the June 19 decision by the Israeli Cabinet, not talking to the Americans about an ‘offer’ at all – he spoke of ‘tentative conclusions’ and the then U.S.Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, referred to Eban’s statements as ‘preliminary thoughts’. It is also completely clear that the Americans were not asked to convey these ‘preliminary thoughts’ to Syria and Egypt. If that had been the case there would have been a memorandum of some sort about it, plus information on the reaction of these two Arab countries. There is nothing at all.
This explains also the following statement by Rusk in his memoirs entitled “As I Saw It”.(This is the statement I quoted a few days ago and that Shai was referring to).
Rusk wrote:
“For twenty years, since the creation of Israel, the United States had tried to persuade the Arabs that they needn’t fear Israeli territorial expansion. Throughout the sixties the Arabs talked continuously about their fear of Israeli expansion. With the full knowledge of successive governments in Israel, we did our utmost to persuade the Arabs that their anxieties were illusory.
“And then following the Six Day War, Israel decided to keep the Golan heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai, despite the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol on the first day of the war went on Israeli radio and said that Israel had no territorial ambitions. Later in the summer I reminded Abba Eban of this, and he simply shrugged his shoulders and said, ‘We’ve changed our minds’. With that remark, a contentious and even bitter point with the Americans, he turned the United States into a twenty-year liar.”
I think Eban would have reacted differently if he could have reminded Rusk of a peace offer along the lines of the June 19 decision.
One explanation I have for Eban’s later assertion that such an offer was made is the one he himself offered to Lord Caradon, when this diplomat told him what the international understanding was about Resolution 242. Eban surmised that Caradon’s recollection ‘had dimmed with the passage of time’. This reflection was quite untrue as far as Caradon was concerned but might have accurately revealed the state of Eban’s own mind.
It should also be kept in mind that the Israeli cabinet veered at that time in quite a few different directions (though they all seemed to lead to a hardening of its stance) and Eban’s recollection might not only have dimmed but also have gotten a bit mixed up. The possibility that he himself got caught up in the myth about ‘the olive branch and Khartoum” can also not be excluded.
Whatever the case may be, there was no ‘offer’.
Israeli changeability in that period was partly due to the influence of General Dayan who, according to that other Israeli historian of the war, Oren, had, together with Rabin (who, however, was not a member of cabinet) been turned into a public icon by the war.
Oren wrote:
“ I’m waiting for the phone to ring”, Dayan was widely quoted as saying, implying that Israel would be willing to return territories if the Arabs came forward for talks. But in the Cabinet debate on the June 19 resolution, Dayan argued that there was no use discussing the terms for peace since the Arabs would never accept Israel. He protested the decision, saying, “We cannot withdraw from Sinai and the Golan on the basis of a single vote … “ Six weeks after the end of the Six-Day war, according to the British Embassy’s count, Dayan voiced no less than six different opinions on peace.” (2002, p.315/316).”
And Shlaim wrote in his review of Oren’s book:
“Defence minister Moshe Dayan was a law unto himself. … The resounding military victory over which Dayan presided greatly enhanced his political power at home, and he used this power to impose his muddled and myopic ideas on the wavering cabinet. In the country of the blind, the on-eyed man was king.”
“The three noes of Khartoum” 2
I spoke earlier of the gradual hardening of the Israeli stance pre-Khartoum. Though the Americans didn’t know the specifics of the Israeli cabinet decisions taken at that time they were very well aware of the general drift of these.
So spoke Saunders in his conversation of August 15 with the Israeli ambassador to the USA (see document 418) about his concern ‘that Israel seemed to be digging into its present position more solidly every day … I saw a problem for both of us in the rapidly sharpening image of Israel as the intransigent victor holding onto its spoils”. And from the last document presented here (no. 431) which contains a conversation, held between the Israeli minister and Walt Rostow a few days (29th August) before the Khartoum declaration was issued, it is clear that Israel did not agree with the call in the joint U.S.- Soviet resolution to return to the pre-war boundaries. Israel was not prepared to do so, not “even in exchange for a peace treaty”. It now wanted ‘secure’ boundaries. That could mean almost anything. And in the post Khartoum years the talk of prominent Israeli politicians and military men on that issue was well suited to fuel the Arabs’ worst suspicions and fears.
References to possible boundaries for Israel became more and more inflated and had by 1973, on the eve of the Yom Kippur War, apparently reached a megalomaniac crescendo. So said Abba Eban in a 1976 interview with Shlaim (belatedly published in Israel Studies 2003 Vol.8 No.1):
“The rhetoric of 1973 is almost inconceivable, with Ariel Sharon saying that we could capture everything from Tunis and Iran between Turkey and the Sudan; Dayan saying that, for the next ten years, the issue was not peace, but to draw a new map, because, in the next ten years, there would be neither peace nor war; Itzhak Rabin’s statement in 1973 that Golda had better boundaries than King David and King Solomon had had … So that it is really how opinion passed from sobriety to self-confidence, and from self-confidence to fantasy, reaching a somewhat absurd level in 1973 … ”
What is also apparent from these documents is Hussein’s almost frantic attempts to come, pre-Khartoum, to a negotiated settlement with Israel – even with the tacit understanding of Nasser (who was however not trusted by the Americans). Rusk was very happy with Hussein’s overtures and recommended them emphatically to the Israelis who reacted coolly. Their fist reaction was that there was nothing new in Hussein’s approach.
Uri Avnery has, in commenting on Israel’s reception of the Arab peace plan that has become identified with the name of Prince Abdallah (as if this broadly supported Arab proposal only came from him), delineated the various stages of the usual Israeli reaction to peace overtures: “PHASE A is designed to belittle the offer. “There is nothing new there,” the Political Sources would assert. “It is offered solely for tactical purposes. It is a political gimmick”. If the offer comes from an Arab: “He says it to the international community, but not to his own people”. In short, “It’s not serious.” “
Thus the reaction to Hussein’s pre-Khartoum overtures ran to type. Moreover, the basis for any understanding was taken away with the hasty annexation (eh, ‘unification’) of East Jerusalem and Israel’s far reaching plans for settlements on the West Bank.
The first document offered here concerns Eban’s first post 19th of June conversation with the American Secretary of State, containing the Israeli cabinet’s ‘tentative conclusions ‘ as he called them, that were, by the magic of political spin, post facto transformed into an ‘offer’.
(Wherever I have left out fragments in the following documents I have inserted the usual three dots)
314. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
New York, June 22, 1967, 0455Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv. Received at 3:27 a.m. Passed to the White House at 3:44 a.m. Secretary Rusk was in New York June 19-June 23 to attend the Special Session of the UN General Assembly.
…
Secretary and Ambassador Goldberg received Israeli FonMin Eban along with Rafael and Harman 7:15 p.m. June 21. Hour’s conversation revolved around two main topics: (A) Situation in Near East and Israeli view re settlement and (B) present parliamentary situation in UNGA. This telegram covers topic (A)./2/
…
Eban stated Israeli inter-ministerial committee had come to some tentative conclusions which he would like to discuss with Secretary but not others.
Egypt-Israel. Israelis wanted peace treaty on basis present international frontiers. This would involve Israeli maritime passage through Straits Tiran and Suez Canal and air passage over straits. In context non-belligerency this would mean Israel would be treated like everyone else. In same context Israel envisaged demilitarization of Sinai, which was natural barrier between two countries. From Egypt, Israel wanted only security, no territory. Israelis felt Egypt might be attracted to this concept.
Important thing that there must be treaty which committed Egyptians. Israeli unwilling accept another understanding on basis of assumptions. This had been major fault of 1957 arrangements which had committed much of world but not Egypt.
Israel-Syria. Israelis would like peace treaty on the basis of the international frontiers with some understanding that Syrian hills overlooking Israeli territory would be demilitarized. Israelis would also like assurances that Syria would not use returned territory for purpose of diversion of Jordan waters away from Israel. Eban noted that Syrians unable divert these waters now because Israeli held essential territory. Eban concluded that Israel was offering both Egypt and Syria complete withdrawal to international frontiers. These terms not ungenerous.
Gaza. Eban noted that Egypt had never claimed Gaza, had not accepted responsibility for occupying it, or for the refugees. The natural thing was for Gaza to be in Israel. Israelis would make every effort on behalf of Gaza population which totaled over 350,000 people. This plus Israel’s present Arab population would bring total Arabs in Israel to about 700,000. Israelis wondered whether some could not be settled elsewhere, e.g. northern part of Sinai, “Central Palestine” or West Bank of Jordan. Israelis would like to maintain status of UNRWA as source of assistance to these people.
West Bank of Jordan.
Eban said Israeli thinking “less crystalized” re West Bank. They were still working on basis two tendencies, two conceptions in GOI. One tendency assumed that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would continue and that an agreed settlement on the basis of the demarcation line should be worked out. Another idea was that there should be some kind of association between the West Bank and Israel on the basis of autonomy and economic union.
The difficulty with this latter approach, said Eban, was that it would push Hussein back across the Jordan River. Moreover, there were no international constitutional precedents for such an arrangement.
The Secretary interposed by wondering whether there were not precedents on the basis of letting the people concerned decide. Eban replied that GOI was trying to take soundings on the intelligence level. There were some “serious” Arab leaders on West Bank who felt that their relationship with East Jordan had been artificial and had provided them no security. Others had Hashemite loyalties.
…
Secretary commented that it was helpful to have these preliminary thoughts.
…
Jerusalem. Secretary hoped that Israel would be very careful with regard to Jerusalem as it involved actual or latent passions of an enormous number of people. The matter was very delicate and could be a source of strong anti-Israel feeling in the United States. Eban replied that Israel was trying to put the Christian holy places under Christian control and the Moslem holy places under Moslem control. Eban admitted that Israel had a job to do in projecting publicly its intentions regarding access to holy places.
…
“The three noes of Khartoum” 3
329. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson/1/
Washington, June 27, 1967.
…
The Israelis tell us they have not yet finally made up their minds on the position they will take with regard to the West Bank generally, and Jerusalem in particular. So far, we have advised them not to take unilateral actions, nor to present the world with a fait accompli.
…
Nicholas deB Katzenbach
. 331. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 28, 1967, 1:30-3:10 p.m.
…
SUBJECT
Prospects for solution of the Middle East Crisis
PARTICIPANTS
President Johnson Secretary McNamara
King Hussein Mr. Walt Rostow
Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Mr. George Christian
Mr. McGeorge Bundy Ambassador Macomber
Foreign Minister Tuqan Ambassador Shubeilat
General Khammash
Ambassador Burns
…
The King noted that the Arabs were at a major turning point. They could opt for what amounted to a settlement with Israel, to be followed by concentration on economic development; or the Arabs could opt to make no settlement and to re-arm for another round. Hussein favored the first course.
…
338. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/
Tel Aviv, July 2, 1967, 1130Z.
…
/2/Telegram 218573 to Tel Aviv, June 29, instructed Barbour to register U.S. opposition to any unilateral action by Israel to assert de jure control over occupied territories. (Ibid.)
/3/Document 333.
/4/Telegram 3 from Tel Aviv, July 1, reported that before receiving telegrams 218573 and 219964, Barbour had discussed the subject of Jerusalem with the Israeli Minister of Justice and several other officials and had strongly deplored the “precipitate issuance unification ordinance re Jerusalem.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
…
3. However, as to Jerusalem, GOI adamant.
…
Barbour (Barbour was the American Ambassador in Israel – A.B.)
360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/
Washington, July 13, 1967, 11:06 p.m.
…
6581. Please deliver at once following message from Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Eban reported at Plaza Hotel.
Dear Mr. Minister:
We have today received a most urgent and private message from King Hussein./2/ This message informs us that the King has determined that he is prepared to conclude some sort of arrangement with the Government of Israel. In the meeting in Cairo he apparently informed Nasser of the possibility that he may undertake such an action. The exact steps and the circumstances under which negotiation might be possible are yet to be determined and the timing is, of course, a matter of major importance.
/2/Telegram 4941 from Amman, July 13, reported a conversation between King Hussein and Ambassador Burns in which the King stated he was prepared to make a unilateral settlement with Israel, and that he had discussed this with Nasser, who had said he would raise no objections if Hussein raised this with the Americans. The King said he would like to know what the Israelis would be likely to do vis-à-vis Jordan if he were prepared for a settlement. He said Jordan would have to get back substantially all it lost in the war, including the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem. He also said it was essential that Jordan obtain some arms immediately. (National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR/SANDSTORM)
In our opinion this is a major act of courage on the part of King Hussein and offers the first important breakthrough toward peace in the current period following active hostilities. It is an opportunity in our judgment that must not be lost, offering as it does a chance to embark on a course in the Arab world which could lead to an acceptance of Israel by its neighbors and to steps which could well change the whole course of history in the Middle East.
We wish that time were available for us to consider abstractly and unrelated to immediate problems all of the issues that are involved in this offer. But we believe we have tomorrow in the vote in the United Nations on the Pakistan resolution an opportunity to pave the way for positive steps in the days ahead–an opportunity that must not be lost. With the knowledge of King Hussein’s willingness to risk a very great deal, certainly including his own security, it is imperative, we think, that your government take a step in connection with the consideration of the future of Jerusalem that would be in harmony with the courage shown by the King and which will facilitate negotiations in the days ahead of us. We urge that you attempt to make the broadest kind of gesture possible with respect to the future of Jerusalem. We urge especially that you make a generous offer with respect to the future of Jerusalem that would in effect explicitly interpret as interim the administrative arrangements recently placed in effect with respect to that city. We would also hope that your country could offer more explicitly to enter into international arrangements for a city which would assure that all religions and all faiths have access to the holy places. The offer might include a willingness to discuss with Jordan directly or otherwise the future of the old city based on the concept of universality, possibly pointing to Jordan as the spokesman for the Arab world in view of its location in relation both to Israel and to Jerusalem itself.
Let me add that as you know our own position on Jerusalem has for some years supported its international character, a position to which we still adhere.
The matter is urgent. The events of tomorrow in the General Assembly may have an important bearing on the greatest opportunity we have yet seen to achieve what you and your country have wanted and have suffered through two wars to achieve. I urge your most careful and urgent consideration of this matter. The more moderate and generous the position of Israel tomorrow, the greater the chance that there can be a good result from Hussein’s new readiness.
For Tel Aviv:
To save time and emphasize importance we attached to this message Ambassador should deliver it at once to highest available official with urgent informal suggestion it go at once to Eskhol if Eban has not yet had time to report it.
Rusk
“The three noes of Khartoum” 4
Hussein’s overtures apparently received no publicity in Israel. In a dispatch dating from December 1967 one of the most respected Israeli journalists, Amos Elon, wrote: “As far as such things can be ascertained … no political feelers were put out by the Jordanians, except on one occasion through an unidentified third party; judging from what Prime Minister Eshkol later told an interviewer about this feeler it did not appear to have been serious.” Thus was Avneri’s script followed to the letter.
Further with the archival pieces.
366. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/
…
Tel Aviv, July 14, 1967, 2135Z.
167. State 6581./2/
…
2. Eshkol welcomed overture from Hussein. However, he professed inability to understand our apparent surprise at Hussein’s step. Recalling various recent statements by King which he interpreted to effect King would attempt achieve Arab summit and failing that would feel free to proceed on his own, Prime Minister said move should not have been unexpected. What disturbed Eshkol was tenor of Secretary’s message that Israel should respond with concessions on Jerusalem and specifically indicate a willingness to regard renunciation of city under Israeli control as subject modification. He averred most positively that he had stretched his cabinet like a rubber band on a number of problems which had been considered in last few weeks but that rubber band would break immediately if he authorized Eban to make any statements that measures to reunify city only “interim” and subject further debate. As to GA debate and resolution on Jerusalem he urged that we not support resolution calling for retrogression. His argument was that such U.S. support would be disservice to Hussein who would then be expected to achieve more in negotiation than any Israeli Government could ultimately give.
…
Barbour
367. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 15, 1967, 11 a.m.-12:03 p.m.
…
SUBJECT
Near East Settlement
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Abba Eban, Foreign Minister of Israel
Ambassador Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Emanuel Shimoni, Private Secretary to the Foreign Minister
The Secretary and Under Secretary
M–Mr. Rostow
NEA–Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary
…
The Secretary said that the Palestinian solution would seem to involve a second-class status for the Arabs and could lead to Palestinian demands to become the 14th Arab state.
…
The Secretary saw real trouble ahead on Jerusalem. There are strong feelings in many places on this issue. The USG had never agreed with either the Israeli or Jordanian positions on Jerusalem, and there had been sharp, adverse reaction to recent Israeli steps in Jerusalem. The question of Jerusalem must be kept open for further discussion and negotiations. The U.S. sought solid international arrangements, and this would not be satisfied by scattered rights over a few holy places.
…
WR
370. Memorandum of Meeting/1/
Washington, July 16, 1967, noon.
. The meeting is also recorded in a July 16 memorandum from Wriggins to Walt Rostow and Bundy, which describes it as a meeting of the “inner circle of the Control Group”–Katzenbach, Eugene Rostow, Battle, Kohler, and Wriggins, plus Walsh and Burns. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII)
…
1. Hussein has informed us of his desire to reach a settlement with Israel. He has staked out a negotiating position of a return to the political lines of June 4, including Jordanian control of the Old City of Jerusalem. He is prepared to accept some border rectification, accompanied by over-flight rights and port facilities in Israel. He wishes us to determine whether this would be in the Israeli ball park. The Israelis, in turn, have informed us that they are ready to talk to the Jordanians although they are uncertain about the seriousness of Hussein.
2. The key to a negotiated settlement is Jerusalem. We need a better assessment of Israel’s flexibility on this subject before giving a definitive reply to Hussein.
385. Memorandum From the President’s Special Consultant (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 21, 1967.
SUBJECT
The Middle East as we Approach the Weekend
…
The Israelis are now telling us that they are not ready for serious talks (though they can handle opening feelers), and it looks as if it would take a little time to get this thing going in any event.
2. Arthur Goldberg (American UN ambassador A.B.) tells me that the most recent effort to get an agreed resolution on substance has run up against an Arab stone wall. It was a good game to play out, and I think he handled it extremely well in the face of Israeli worries which were both foolish and foolishly expressed.
…
Finally, I should report that there are a number of other signs of hardening Israeli positions up and down the line. Their intemperate reaction to Goldberg’s skillful round with Gromyko, their edginess about the Jordanian negotiations, their increasing interest in solutions that would not return the West Bank to Jordan, and the evidence of political jockeying among their leaders (each tougher than the other) make me think that the time is coming for American words and actions which will have at least a constructive effect in knocking you off the top of the Israeli polls. The trick will be to achieve that result without any parallel impact at home.”
“the three noes of Khartoum” 5
The following number, 398, was archived to put on record a conversation between Walter Rostow, then Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (a post now called National Security Adviser) to President Johnson, and Evron, then the Israeli Ambassador to the USA. However, I have only included an editorial note (in the original printed in blue) going with that memo about a conversation between Lucius Battle, then US Asst. Secretary of State for Near East and South East Asian Affairs and Evron since that has to do with our topic. The actual conversation between Rostow and Evron had mainly to do with technical matters (armament I seem to remember).
398. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 30, 1967.
…
Mr. Ephraim Evron, Minister, Embassy of Israel, called me yesterday [July 30] and asked if he could drop by at my home on his way back from the airport where he was leaving his wife at 10:00 p.m. I agreed.
…
/3/Evron told Battle in a luncheon conversation on July 31 that the Israelis were convinced that “time is on their side and that the longer the Suez Canal is closed and the greater the economic problem in the UAR, the better chance that Nasser will be the first Arab country to come to peace terms with them.” (Memorandum of conversation, July 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
…
Walt
Next item is self-elucidatory.
399. Memorandum From the President’s Special Consultant (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 31, 1967.
…
/SUBJECT
The Middle East at the End of July
The Israeli position appears to be hardening as the Arabs still resist all direct negotiations. The Israelis have great confidence in their short-run political and military superiority. I think the evidence grows that they plan to keep not only all of Jerusalem but the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, too.
…
The following telegram is from the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to Barbour, the US Ambassador to Israel, and refers to a report Rusk had received from Rostow (see above) concerning a conversation between Burns, US Ambassador to Jordan, and the Jordanian King, Hussein.
405. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/
Washington, August 4, 1967, 0001Z.
…
15897. 1. During Evron call August 2, Under Secretary Rostow reported that Ambassador Burns, on basis his recent talks with King Hussein, thought Hussein still wanted settlement and was attempting strengthen his position as preparatory step.
Rostow said our own soundings indicated there was strong feeling about Jerusalem in Moslem world. If formula on Jerusalem could be found which would permit Jordanian-Israeli deal, this could be of crucial importance. It should not be beyond the wit of man to find such formula. Rostow recalled Eban’s statement to Secretary that Israeli stand on Jerusalem represented “negotiating position” and that key consideration for Israel was preservation “unified administration.” This was not excluded by Hussein./2/ (Evron interjected to say “you mean unified Israeli administration.”) Rostow said we would continue to explore Jerusalem question and Israel must not exclude consideration of alternative arrangements.
…
Rusk
The following memorandum refers to a conversation between H.H.Saunders, an Asst.Secretary at the State Dept., and Evron, the Israeli Ambassador to the USA.
418. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, August 15, 1967.
…
SUBJECT
Discussion with Israeli Minister
…
I expressed concern that Israel seemed to be digging into its present position more solidly every day. Each new headline painted a darker image. Without even arguing the merits of letting the dust settle, I saw a problem for both of us in the rapidly sharpening image of Israel as the intransigent victor holding onto its spoils. Evron said it was inevitable that Israel (and we) would have a hard time in the coming UNGA. I suggested that there are two ways of dealing with the inevitable. One is to sit on your hands and accept all its consequences; the other is to see whether you can’t do something to face it with some dignity instead of just sticking your head in the sand and letting the brickbats fly.
…
H.H.S.
The next item is a telegram from the US Ambassador in Israel, Barbour, to the Department of State. The first paragraph is an added editorial note.
425. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/
Tel Aviv, August 21, 1967, 0900Z.
…
524. Ref: State 23385./2/
/2/Telegram 23385 to Tel Aviv, August 18, states that the Department had noted with increasing concern recent statements by Israeli public figures about long-term Israeli policy on the West Bank and other occupied areas and was concerned that they might indicate increasing Israeli determination to occupy permanently the territories currently under military occupation. (Ibid.)
1. We share Dept’s concern at recent spate statements by Israeli political leaders indicating hardening of positions in [garble] permanently expanded Israel. (See also our A-109 and A-113.)/3/ If Arabs continue unready to talk peace and Israeli political scene continues as hotly competitive as it has been–at this juncture both contingencies seem likely–then Israeli opinion, stimulated by politicians staking out ever more advanced frontiers in the occupied territories, must perforce be increasingly conditioned to accept [as] permanent many aspects of the present territorial situation.
…
Barbour
The last item concerns a conversation between Walter Rostow (see above) and the Israeli Ambassador.
431. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 29, 1967.
…
Minister Evron came in, at his request, to make two points on direct instruction from Foreign Minister Eban.
…
2. The UN Resolution
The heart of the Israeli objection to the joint U.S.-Soviet resolution is its implication that Israel must return to the territories occupied on June 4. Even in exchange for a peace treaty Israel is not prepared for a simple return to the June 4 boundaries. What Israel will seek by agreement with the Arabs are “secure” boundaries, in addition to maintaining the unity of the city of Jerusalem. When I noted that we had not accepted the June 4 date in the UN resolution, Evron said the resolution still contained the language: “withdrawal from all occupied territories.” He said that the Israeli Government was quite content with the carefully designed language used by the President with respect to boundaries, most recently in his communication with Tito; but it was essential that the U.S. position in the UN not clash with the President’s formula of “secure and agreed borders.”
…
“The three noes of Khartoum” 6 Postscript
The notion that Israel held on to a land-for-peace formula until ‘the three noes of Khartoum’, with its implied suggestion that in return for peace agreements it was willing to return to the pre 4th of June borders – that, at any case, already gave Israel 26% more of the 1947 territory than it had been allocated by the UN – is a myth. It is one of the many myths about this conflict that have been built up over the years and that are hard to dislodge because of the pervasiveness of pro-Israel apologetics.
If on the 19th of June 1967 the Israeli cabinet showed willingness to return to the pre-war borders, at any case as far as Egypt and Syria were concerned, it is clear that by the end of August and BEFORE KHARTOUM this willingness had disappeared. The talk was then of ‘secure borders’ not the ‘international boundaries’.
It is also clear that the Israeli cabinet reacted negatively to the overtures of Hussein that were received on the basis of the strategy sketched by Avneri viz ‘there is nothing new here’ and ‘this is not serious’. But what really blocked those attempts at peace was Israeli unwillingness to make the annexation of East Jerusalem undone and to give up settlement plans for the West Bank. It was Israel that was not serious about peace with Hussein.
And in the Israeli cabinet even the doves grew gradually more hawkish.
Elon mentions in his dispatch of December 1967 I have referred to earlier (it is included in his book “‘A Blood-Dimmed Tide”) that “even as moderate a man as Foreign Minister Abba Eban said that any peace conference would serve first to negotiate a ‘new map’ of the area. Israel must not withdraw to what he called its former ‘Auschwitz borders’ “ (whatever that may mean).
The intellectual elite, that usually sees critique of the powers that be as one of its main tasks, now shared this hawkish mood, even to the extent that professional hawks became worried. Elon refers to a statement by one senior army officer who said; “They frighten me, these intellectuals and poets …It is strange: if I were intoxicated with victory, that would be bad but natural. But they…?”
Voices of moderation were few and far between but they were there. Elon quotes Professor JL Talmon of the Hebrew University who wrote “The example of other nations fills me with the fear of lurking dangers to the moral texture, mental balance and spiritual values of a master race.” The statement is a bit obscure (‘and spiritual values’ should presumably be ‘from the spiritual values’) but nevertheless prophetic…
And what about Khartoum? Was it really a manifestation of complete Arab obstinacy and determination to see Israel wiped off the map? To take one’s cue here from the public broadcasts of the time is to confuse demagogics with diplomacy.
The two Israeli historians who have dealt in the greatest detail with this period, Avi Shlaim and Michael Oren, are too professional to fall into this trap. Michael Oren wrote:
“Western observers would later debate whether Khartoum was a victory for Arab moderation or radicalism. True, it vetoed any interaction with Israel, but it appeared to open doors to third party arbitration and the demilitarization of the occupied territories.”
Oren also said: “For the Israeli’s the ‘three no’s’ of Khartoum effectively closed the door on the June 19 resolution”. A shade of the old myth here. Perhaps there is for Oren a difference between merely closing a door and ‘effectively’ closing it.
Shlaim, who is generally more critical of Israel than Oren, wrote about Khartoum:
“The conference ended with the adoption of the famous three noes of Khartoum: no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace with Israel. On the face of it these declarations showed no sign of readiness for compromise, and this is how Israel interpreted them. In fact, the conference was a victory for the Arab moderates who argued for trying to obtain the withdrawal of Israel’s forces by political rather than military means. Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean no formal peace treaty, but not a rejection of a state of peace; no direct negotiations, but not a refusal to talk through third parties, and no de jure recognition of Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a state.
“President Nasser and King Hussein set the tone at the summit and made it clear subsequently that they were prepared to go much further than ever before toward settlement with Israel.”
This is borne out by Elon who wrote five years ago:
“Peace, at least with Egypt and Jordan, we now know, was a practical possibility from as early as 1970-71 … In 1971, UN mediator Gunnar Jarring addressed partly identical notes to the governments of Israel and Egypt. He asked Egypt whether it was ready to conclude a peace treaty if Israel withdrew from occupied Egyptian territory. And he asked Israel whether it was ready to withdraw if Egypt made peace with it. Egypt’s answer was yes. Israel’s answer was no.”
As someone from the south of Lebanon, i can appreaciate any universal voice expressing sympathy and objeting the injustice. Nevertheless Tony, you are a minority and clearley non of your elected leaders come close.I struggle with the percieved Western Moral Highgrounds.
I hope the justifications given by ms Rice and her colleagues serves as a wake up call for all the so named moderate arab intellectuals (Often called upon by Tom Friedman et al)to understand that human rights, dignity and justice can only be earned hardly (being a lackey of the West gets you no where). So pls away with the concept that the eyeball cant resist a screwdriver or eventually you,ll get us all screwewd.
Shai,
What options would you offer the Palestinians? It may not make sense but occupations and colonisations breeds martyr. The Holocaust survivors were viewed with contempt in Israel because they were many questions to their survival: did they collaborate? Did they accept futility against a stronger power just to get out alive? Did they sell out their Jewishness to save their own hides because the Nazis had all the power? (No, Israelis aren’t Nazis and this is not the Holocaust; the Palestinians have few options and obviously submission is not going to be one of them.)
Masochistic as it is, this plays into the very strategy of Hamas. The deaths are major and taking their toll but ultimately it’s the toll that is taking effect on Israel too on questioning what this can accomplish, who is this going to benefit and what is the purpose of this operation.
Many lives will be lost for liberations.
It’s become obvious that Israel will only have a future after a viable Palestinian state starts to build an economy and is thus able to provide essential services to it’s citizens.
This must include a corridor that links the West Bank and Gaza to the Mediterranean with it’s own sea port. Even the idea of Palestine taking on the shape that existed before the 1967 war, really will prove futile.
All Jewish settlers in this new state must then be given dual citizenship and the right to compensation on their return to Israel.
With the USA having given so many billions in US tax dollars along with so much in military technology since 1973, it could exert real pressure on Jerusalem to accept something close to this solution.
If such a scenario happens in our time, then all in this ‘reborn Palestinian State’ will have to put up with the lawlessness that will exist with so much fire power changing hands from the ‘politicos’ to your local corner thug.
That after all is what has happened in South Africa. Who knows maybe then the reward for this part of the eastern Mediterranean can be to play hosts to a future Football World Cup!
Party on it’s later than you think!
No one is looking for the submission of the Palestineas, I would be happy if they just direct they afford from trying to fight Israel to build there own country.
1. The Palwtieans can never benefit from been the bad boy of the neborhood…If they want to prospect they should and must have good relation with Israel as well as with Jordan and Egypt, No International airport or sea port can make them benefits like been with good relationship with the most advanced country in the region that they so geographically engaged for good and bad.
2. Trying to challenge Israel in the military way is futureless and just causing a harsher retaliation from
Israel each round.
3. Don’t u think that quiet absurd that a small organization like Hamas trying to impose a New order on 3 much larger and stronger countries Israel, Jordan, Egypt?
4. Unfortunately the Hamas is an Iranian marionette that his schedule determine by the will of Iran to export their extreme agenda and to become a regional supperpower
5. form the the above reasons I see to option to Hamas:
a. Adopt more pragmatic agenda
b. Be extinguish as a political and military movement by Israel
6. I sorry, but I didn’t follow your main idea about the Holocust, Nazi…
I will put it in a very non diplomatic way (don’t take it personally 😉 :
I don’t care if u think that I’m not moral. I prefer to survive.
“accidentely butchered”? I don’t thik so-
Eyewitness
Try again!
Eyewitness
or
http://lawrenceofcyberia.blogs.com/news/2009/01/two-eyewitness-reports-from-palestinians-inside-gaza.html
In response to Shai @39
No one is looking for the submission of the Israeli, I would be happy if they just direct they afford from trying to fight Palstinians to build there own country.
1. The Israelis can never benefit from been the bad boy of the neighborhood…If they want to prospect they should and must have good relation with Palstinians as well as with Syria and Iran, No International airport or sea port can make them benefits like been with good relationship with the most advanced countries in the region that they so geographically engaged for good and bad.
2. Trying to challenge Palestinians in the military way is futureless and just causing a harsher retaliation from
Palestinians each round.
3. Don’t u think that quiet absurd that a small country like Israel trying to impose a New order on 3 much larger and stronger countries Syria, Egypt, Iran?
4. Unfortunately the IDF is an U.S. marionette that his schedule determine by the will of U.S. to export their extreme agenda and to become a superpower
5. form the the above reasons I see to option to Israel:
a. Adopt more pragmatic agenda
b. Be extinguish as a political and military movement by Palestinians
Moses Hess was the first National Socialist. Therefore Zionism is fascism and will go the same way, the racist occupation regime will vanish from the pages of time.
In response @b & emil
1. For my fortune Israel don’t put all or much of her effort on fighting Palestineians u can come and visit and see it yourself
2. Good neighbors is preferred (even in a bad neighborhood)
3.Emil, It seem that u well knowledgeable on the Zionist movement History, even more then my, and seem even more then 99.9% of the Israelies.
Im sure that the occupation will finish, but the Gaza experience teaching us that it will take allot of time to the Palestinians to change their state of mind from the “blame the occupation in of of my troubles”
to a normal nation
First, can we agree that all attacks on civilians by either side is WRONG? So getting offended by various adjectival descriptions of the inhumane violence BY EITHER SIDE is plain stupid.
All holocausts are atrocious. That doesn’t stop them from happening though, because there is always some way to “justify” them to some group of people who lend their support. Presently, the world is complicit in the ongoing holocaust of Paelstinians — one that has gone on for DECADES
Second, to the extent that several attacks on civilians and in civilian areas by Israel have been justified by the claim that “terrorists” attacked IDF members, since when is attacking a military target (i.e., a soldier) an act of “terrorism?”
Third, if the year were 1620 instead of 1948-present and ongoing, then the Palestinians would have been long gone or by now relegated by “treaty” to tiny settlements (i.e., reservations). Well, it isn’t 1620 and every action by Israel is known throughout the world, whereas there wasn’t a soul around in 1620 who could convey to the entire world of the slaughter of native Americans.
One of the colonists, Jeffrey Amhurst, a piece of human garbage, is hailed in history books as a “hero” for his couragous and diabolical plan to eliminate the Native Americans by biological warfare.
In fact, white man had lost the military battle with the natives. and the white settlers were prepared to give up and return to England, when Amhurst had the brilliant idea to give “gifts” of blankets infected with smallpox to the natives.
Amhurst’s plan was a ripping success, as we all know. Tragically, the native american population was decimated and the rest is history.
If Israel weren’t hampered by the constant microscope of mass media (which notably they have endeavored unsuccessfully to exclude) there is no doubt that there wouldn’t be any Palestinians in Israel, and the West Bank and Gaza would have been subsumed into that state.
Bottom line is Israel’s agenda is to get rid of by killing or by imposing inhumane conditions, every single Palensinian there is and claim the entire territory for themselves. Only a blind person could fail to see this.
The real question is, is it OK with the world if this happens? And, if so, then why not blatantly authorize a wholesale slaughter of Palestinians and be done with it? And if it’s not OK, then the rest of the world MUST stop Israel. Period.
As far as the preposterous claim that Israel or any state on Earth has the “right to exist” — that is just too laughable to be taken seriously. States are political entities and they exist at the whim of the governed. Often states change via democratic means, sometimes, by violent means. Palestine, for example, disappeared in 1948 by force. Did Palestine have the right to exist? Apparently not.
So why should Israel? It’s absurd.
Even assuming that Israel does have the right to exist, what exactly is “Israel”? You cannot define it by any fixed borders — of course not — Israel isn’t through “expanding” yet. So, does Israel have the “right” to exist within her existing borders? Or, does Israel’s claimed Right to exist also include any territory that Israel may acquire by disappearing the right of other states and territories to exist?
Even assuming borders could be properly designated for purposes of this “right” to exist, what does such a “right” mean?
Does it entitle Israel to do whatever it wants to to defend that “right”?
Does recognition of this “eight” impose any obligation on the part of those doing the “recognizing” to defend Israel should her ?right to exist” be challenged?
Enough of this silly nonsense. It is plainly obvious Israel intends to take over the West Bank and Gaza PERMANENTLY. Sadly, the world has entered a new “Gentlemen’s Agreement” and that is to pretend that Israel is not an occupier and that the Palestinian people are less than human, therefore, their lives are unimportant.
So let’s stop the pretending. Most of the world doesn’t give a damn about the Palestinians, or it would have taken clearly available measures to defend them. They are outmanned, outgunned, outfinanced and outmaneuvered in every way possible.
The USA branch of AIPAC, otherwise known as the Congress, a collection of 535 ignorant dunces who don’t write or read the legislation they pass on behalf of the American people, much less, know anything of world history or anything else, have just, at the command of their AIPAC puppetmasters, thrown their unwavering support behind Israel. The US continues to exercise its veto power at the UN, thereby allowing other countries to continue their lip service charade of “solidarity with the Paelestinians” and nothing will be resolved this time either.
Rinse, repeat.
In summary, until and unless the world perception of Israel changes, nothing else will. First, we must curtail our tendency to view Israel through the lens of “jews were holocaust victims.” No one can deny that the German holocaust of 70 years past was horrible. However jews were not the only victims, in fact first in line were gays and “gypsies.” Moreover, the German holocaust was not the only one to occur. (See discussion of the colonial holocaust of native Americans above). However past victimhood is not an eternal “get out of jail free” card, carte blanc license to do anything and everything. Past victimhood should not be a bar to an objective view and perception of Israel’s conduct toward its neighbors. Moreover, rejecting the notion that past victimhood somehow precludes any critical evaluation of Israel is NOT anti semitism, nor is rendering criticism.
Until one can have a dialogue with and about Israel that is not premised on this misdirected empathy over the past, no honest peace can ever be brokered in the region.
re: 45 getaclue
One of the colonists, Jeffrey Amhurst, a piece of human garbage, is hailed in history books as a “hero” for his couragous and diabolical plan to eliminate the Native Americans by biological warfare.
In fact, white man had lost the military battle with the natives. and the white settlers were prepared to give up and return to England, when Amhurst had the brilliant idea to give “gifts” of blankets infected with smallpox to the natives.
Amhurst’s plan was a ripping success, as we all know. Tragically, the native american population was decimated and the rest is history.
While I broadly agree with the thrust of your argument and the conclusions of your post, I would have to say that your knowledge of Amherst and Pontiac’s Rebellion is terribly distorted. Wikipedia can get you on the right track.
I only say this because I think the analogy is, perhaps, a useful one. Pontiac’s Rebellion was a vicious, bloody conflict which neither side could win. In the end it was diplomacy and politics, with the British substantially modifying some of their high-handed behaviour toward the natives, that ended the conflict.
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 that officially ended the Rebellion in fact created a vast Indian Territory stretching from the Appalachians to the Mississippi, and from Florida to Newfoundland. By (in theory, at least) prohibiting colonial occupation of these Indian lands, the Brits ended the French practise of colonial/native co-habitation and integration. Segregation, not cooperation, became the dominant mode of native/colonialist relations in the pays haut.
The analogy to the 20th C. history of Palestine/Israel is in the emergence, through combat, of two hostile national identities from what had been a communally inhabited, multi-ethnic territory. Gaza’s current resemblance to an Indian reservation under siege is actually quite striking.
Yours,
Canadian Pinko
“I would be happy if they just direct they afford from trying to fight Israel to build there own country.”
Therein lies your problem: how can they effectively “build” their own country when (1) Israel controls their borders (2) controls their taxes (3) their territory (4) their security through the ubiquitous IDF (5) their economy and agriculture (6) their movement from city to city (7) their airspace (8) their sea port (9) what else can I name here to hammer in the fact that they have no sovereignty and have no say in how they can “build” a state under occupation.
Your point 5 (re: Hamas and adopting a reform agenda) has not only happening but continues to happen. Read Helena Cobban and Mark Perry who have dealt extensively with Hamas.
Furthermore, Hamas leader Khaled Meshal made many points for Hamas resistance to continue:
“Meshal: Since 1948, if we want to draw a curve of Israel’s progress, do you think that this curve is still heading up, or maybe is at a plateau, or is heading down? I believe that the curve is now in descent. And today, the military might of Israel is not capable of concluding matters to Israel’s satisfaction. Since 1948, you may notice that Israel has defeated 7 armies. In ’56 they defeated Egypt. In ’67 they defeated 3 countries: Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. In ’73, the war was somewhat equal in both sides between Egypt and Israel, if not for Nixon’s airlift to Israel’s forces at that time, the map of the world would be different. In ’82 Israel defeated the PLO in Beirut.
But since ’82, 26 years ago, Israelis has not won any war. They did not defeat the Palestinian resistance, and they did not defeat the Lebanese resistance. Since that time, Israel has not expanded but has contracted. They have withdrawn from southern Lebanon and from Gaza. These are indicators that the future is not favorable to Israel. Then today Israel, with all its military capabilities – conventional and unconventional – are not enough to guarantee Israel’s security. Today, with all these capabilities, they can’t stop a simple rocket from being launched from Gaza.
Hence the big question is, can military might ensure security? Hence, we may say that when Israel refuse the Arab and the Palestinian offer, a state of Palestine on the border of 1967, Israel is losing a big opportunity. Some years down the road, a new Palestinian generation, new Arab generations, may not accept those conditions, because the balance of power may not be in Israel’s favor.”
Answer for Joshua
1. Is it really matter if Israel won any war since 82? , even if u right it have to be with the shift from wars 2 sides of big conventional army to Not symmetric war between state to semi-guerrilla organizations, Mao said: that if gorilla organization not losing- he’s the winner. In the middle East even is u 3 years in a bunker and still afraid from Israeli retaliation – U still don’t have any problem to announce “Devinne Victory”
2. U said that b/c Israel not expanded but has contracted – the future is not flavor to Israel – Are u advicing me to keep conqueroring land?, Do u understand that u have the same logic of the right wing.
U doing the same mistake that the Hamas & Hezbollah did – infer Israeli tolerance behavior as a weakness, The mistake cost the Palestinians more then 800 death!
About Marshal saying:
U can look at it in a different way:
curve of Arabs willing to fight Israel showing less countries are willing to experience the taste of war against Israel, and in the recent 26 years only non state military organization who don’t realty have to take care for their own people try to challenge Israel in the battle field.
–
now lets take Gaza as example:
3.Controlling the borders: – I guess that It OK that Israel controlling the borders between Israel to Gaza, now why is the border between Egypt to Gaza closed? it appear that even an Arab state don’t want to open it borders to a hornet’s nest of terror.
don’t expect Israel to show more solidarity then Arab country toward Gaza.
4.Control their tax – It was a part of agreement between Israel to the PO
the logic behind it is: Two tax systems means two separate economics, and main loser from this it the Palestinians.
5. Controlling their airspace – we don’t need another 9/11
6. buy the way Gaza is 100% on the 67 borders – was it a guaranty for stating of peaceful time? unfortunately not mainly b/c of people like Mashal.
“1. The Palwtieans can never benefit from been the bad boy of the neborhood…If they want to prospect they should and must have good relation with Israel as well as with Jordan and Egypt, No International airport or sea port can make them benefits like been with good relationship with the most advanced country in the region that they so geographically engaged for good and bad.
2. Trying to challenge Israel in the military way is futureless and just causing a harsher retaliation from
Israel each round.
3. Don’t u think that quiet absurd that a small organization like Hamas trying to impose a New order on 3 much larger and stronger countries Israel, Jordan, Egypt?
4. Unfortunately the Hamas is an Iranian marionette that his schedule determine by the will of Iran to export their extreme agenda and to become a regional supperpower
5. form the the above reasons I see to option to Hamas:
a. Adopt more pragmatic agenda
b. Be extinguish as a political and military movement by Israel”
Shai, you make people sick with these comments.
Tell me, is Israel being the ‘good’ boy of the neighbourhood?
You’re reducing Palestine to a misbehaved little kid who should know better than to offend the big brother, Israel (a totally laughable idea).
Answer to Y:
It probably shocking to u if my thesis ruin the story of David (Hamas) againt Goliath (Israel) those are the reason behind my thesis:
There is a big game of power in the ME Between Sunni to Shiite it a war of influence between Egypt, Saudi-Arabia and other to Iran. Hamas is merely a point in the Arab word and when Hamas being an Iranian proxy in the hart of the ME – he become a really bad boy.
When Husni Mubarak saying “Egypt have a border with Iran” few month ago – he meaning that it his country interest that Israel will crash down the Hamas
Your comment showing that u not from the ME, Your naive is understand.
one of my favorite saying is that
“The Middle East is politics for advancers”